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TILEC Seminar: Margaret Kyle (MINES ParisTech)

Experts and Financial Ties: Evidence from FDA Advisory Committees
10:45-11:45, T 50A

Margaret Kyle (PhD, MIT Economics) studies innovation, productivity and competition. She has a number of papers examining R&D productivity in the pharmaceutical industry, specifically the role of geographic and academic spillovers; the firm-specific and policy determinants of the diffusion of new products; generic competition; and the use of markets for technology. Recent work examines the effect of trade and IP policies on the level, location and direction of R&D investment and competition. She also works on issues of innovation and access to therapies in developing countries. Her papers have been published in various journals of economics, strategy, and health policy, including the RAND Journal of Economics, Review of Economics and Statistics, Journal of Law and Economics, Strategic Management Journal, Health Services Research, and Health Affairs.

Margaret currently holds the Chair in Markets for Technology and Intellectual Property  at MINES ParisTech. She is an associate editor at the International Journal of Industrial Organization and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy. She previously held positions at Carnegie Mellon University, Duke University, London Business School and the Toulouse School of Economics. She has also been a visiting scholar at the University of Hong Kong and Northwestern University.

 Experts and Financial Ties: Evidence from FDA Advisory Committees (co-authored with Fanny Camara)

The use of expert committees is common in many settings. A key concern is the potential for conflict of interest, particularly for members of committees that oversee regulated firms. However, ties to industry may be correlated with relevant expertise. We examine the voting behavior of members of the Food & Drug Administration's Advisory Committees (ACs), which make recommendations on new drug applications and other regulatory questions. Our work exploits a novel dataset that includes detailed information on each AC member, including their academic degrees, age, areas of expertise, and scientific contributions. We construct a measure of financial ties to industry using information disclosed in scientific publications authored by AC members, as well as those reported directly to the FDA and by the industry under the Sunshine Act. Advisors with industry ties generally have higher observable quality: they publish more, receive more NIH grants, etc. We estimate a structural model of voting that allows us to recover each member's skill and bias associated with financial ties to a drug's sponsor or its competitors. Our preliminary results indicate that financial ties to industry are associated with both an increased probability of voting in favor of a drug as well as higher skill.


When: 04 October 2017 10:45

End date: 04 October 2017 11:45

Where: Tias building