Paul de Bijl
| Date of Ph.D. defense: | April 26, 1996 |
| Title of thesis: | Essays in Industrial Organization and Management Strategy |
| ISBN: | 90 5668 012 9 |
| Promotors: | Prof.dr. Helmut Bester and Prof.dr. Eric Van Damme |
Abstract:
This thesis contains five essays in the theory of industrial organisation and management
strategy. An introduction makes the main ideas accessible to non-specialists by presenting the
essays as fictitious cases. The first essay investigates strategic disclosure of verifiable
information. The disclosed information concerns a hidden action, and the transmission of
information takes place in a noisy environment. The second essay explores how search costs
and informational asymmetries influence the possibilities for entry in markets for search goods.
The model that is used analyzes signaling with common information. The third essay presents a
principal-agent model in which the agent enjoys working. The principal, instead of designing a
pecuniary incentive scheme, can appeal to the agent's private benefits by giving him a say in
the job the agent has to do. The fourth essay applies this idea in order to study the strategic
impact of organisational structure. Possible linkages between internal organisation and market
strategy are highlighted. The last essay focuses on the prices selected by a monopolist who
sells a durable good and repairs it in the case of breakdown. The monopolist can circumvent
inefficiencies by inviting a competitor in the repair market or by leasing the good instead of
selling it.
Global / English