Marco Hoeberichts
| Date of Ph.D. defense: | December 11, 1998 |
| Title of thesis: | The Design of Monetary Institutions |
| ISBN: | 90 5668 044 7 |
| Promotor: | Prof.dr. Sylvester Eijffinger |
Abstract:
Monetary institutions differ considerably between the main industrial countries. Differences
in preferences, labor market characteristics, political stability and the structure of the
economy make that different countries have different needs. These different needs are also
reflected in the design of monetary institutions or, more specifically, central banks. This
book takes a political economy view on monetary policy making. Our starting point is that
the central bank and rational agents in the private economy interact strategically. The
central bank sets monetary policy (usually the rate of inflation) and the private agents
rationally form expectations about the rate of inflation. The monetary policy maker has an
information advantage about the state of the economy and in the last part of this book also
about its own preferences. Using this simple game-theoretic framework, we analyze the
effects of different institutional set-ups on macroeconomic policy outcomes.

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