Jana Vyrastekova
| Date of Ph.D. defense: | March 22, 2002 |
| Title of thesis: | Cheap Talk and Spiteful Preferences in Ultimatum Games: Experiments and Evolutionary Rationale |
| ISBN: | 90 5668 095 1 |
| Promotors: | Prof.dr. Dolf Talman |
| Prof.dr. Stef Tijs | |
| Dr. Jan Potters |
Abstract:
Does the possibility to talk to people we interact with change the outcomes
of our interactions? Communication as a coordination device is the topic of
the first part of this thesis. We study the effect of "cheap talk", where
sending a particular message does not affect the material outcomes of the
game per se. We consider the onset of communication in an experimental
repeated game. The players share one language, and they send strategy
proposals that might help them to coordinate on the efficient equilibria. We
also present an evolutionary model of communication in coordination games
where the meaning of the messages is not fixed exogenously. Under which
conditions does communication prevail? In the second part of the thesis we
study social preferences in ultimatum games. Recent theories in behavioral
game theory are built on the assumption that individual's preferences in
games have to be specified with respect to the material outcomes of all
players, and not just the player's own material outcome like in the paradigm
of modern economics. We extend the literature by an experimental study on
three-person ultimatum games, going beyond the games which these theories
have been based upon, and suggest an evolutionary foundation of the behavior
we observe.
Global / English