Alex Possajennikov
| Date of Ph.D. defense: | March 8, 2000 |
| Title of thesis: | Learning and Evoution in Games and Oligoploy Models |
| ISBN: | 90 5668 064 1 |
| Promotor: | Prof.dr. Eric van Damme |
Abstract:
Dynamic models of adjustment, as well as static models of
equilibrium, are important to understand economic reality. This
thesis considers such dynamic models applied to economic games. The
models can broadly be divided into two categories: learning and
evolution. This thesis analyzes reinforcement learning and
imitation dynamic on the learning side and the indirect evolution
approach on the evolution side. It demonstrates the relation between
the concept of Nash equilibrium and the long run outcome of the namic
processes. The applications of the dynamic models to economic games
include, among others, Cournot oligopoly and merger games.
Global / English