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Jan Stoop

Date of PhD defense: 16 March 2011
Title of thesis: Laboratory and Field Experiments on Social Dilemmas
ISBN: 978 90 5668 275 0
Promotor: Prof.dr. Daan van Soest
Prof.dr.Charles Noussair

Abstract:
The main objective of this thesis is to study the effects of informal institutions on social dilemmas by means of economic experiments. The second chapter gives an overview of influential theoretical models on cooperation in absence of informal institutions. Chapters 3 and 4 study the effects of reciprocity in reward in a common pool resource game, implemented in a conventional computer laboratory using student subjects. The thesis proceeds by testing the robustness of laboratory results on social dilemmas in a field setting, a privately owned recreational fishing facility. Chapter 5 tests the external validity of the Public Goods game by implementing a very similar game at the fishing pond. Chapters 6 and 7 study the effects of monetary punishment, and non-monetary punishment and reward on cooperation in social dilemma games. The social dilemmas that are studied are two variants of the Public Goods game and a dynamic common pool resource game.
One of the central conclusions of this thesis is that none of the studied informal institutions promotes cooperation. If subjects have the possibility to reciprocate to rewards received, subjects shift their attention away from the social dilemma towards a mutual exchange of reward tokens with one or two group members. Next, the external validity of the Public Goods game is poor. Both students and recreational fishermen show a considerable degree of cooperation in the laboratory, but cooperation is absent in the field setting, as predicted by standard economic theory. This result is driven by the difference in activity between the laboratory and field setting. Finally, the studies in chapters 6 and 7 show that none of the instruments tested (monetary and non-monetary punishment and reward) have any effects on cooperation in the social dilemma field experiments.

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