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Anna-Katharina Wick

Date of Ph.D. defense: 16 December 2008
Title of thesis: Conflicts, Development and Natural Resources: An Applied Game Theoretic Approach
ISBN: 978 90 5668 229 3
Promotores: Prof.dr.ir. E.H. Bulte

Abstract:
Conventional economic reasoning suggests that increasing a country's stock of assets provides greater opportunities for economic development. Somewhat paradoxically, a substantial body of empirical evidence suggests that natural resources tend to hinder, rather than promote economic growth. In a similar vein, albeit possibly less puzzling, it has been suggested that resource-rich countries tend to suffer more from violent conflict than their resource-poor counterparts. A compelling claim has been developed that certain resources might trigger civil wars and support rebel groups in their efforts to fight the government. For these reasons, natural resource abundance has been called a 'curse' for development rather than a blessing.

In the field of conflicts over natural resources much work has been done to establish empirical facts and find regularities about such events. Research into the proximate causes of such conflicts has been rather speculative though. It is the contention of this thesis that formalizing these processes with the help of theoretical models is essential to a deeper understanding of the issues. Thus the largest part of the present thesis is devoted to gaining insights on the issue of conflict over natural resources in a formal, rational choice model of strategic interaction.

The main contributions of this work lie in identifying several features that crucially determine the degree of conflict in the presence of natural resources. It is found that certain characteristics of resources (in particular their geographical concentration) matter, along with the amount of resource rents that are open for grabbing. Also, it is shown formally how the relative strength of the two contestants (usually the government and the people) plays a critical role in determining conflict and policy outcomes.

This thesis also provides a critical view on a part of preceding resource curse results, namely the negative association between resources and economic performance. Arguing that the empirical literature on the topic up until now has ignored serious econometric concerns, a different approach is offered solving some of the problems. Surprisingly, the results question the common wisdom in the field, and as such invite future research to investigate this matter further.

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