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Tilburg Law and Economics Center

TILEC supports and stimulates academic research on the governance of economic activity. It fosters academically path breaking and practically relevant research and aims to be a leading center worldwide.

TILEC Seminar: Kevin Davis (NYU School of Law)

Multijurisdictional Enforcement Games
10:45-11:45, T 50A

Kevin Davis is Beller Family Professor of Business Law at New York University School of Law. His current research focuses on quantitative measures of the performance of legal institutions and anti-corruption law. Before joining NYU he was a member of the faculty at the University of Toronto, Faculty of Law. His recent publications include: Transnational Anti-Corruption Law in Action: Cases from Argentina and Brazil, 40 Law & Social Inquiry 664–699 (2015) (with Guillermo Jorge and Maíra Machado); Legal Indicators: The Power of Quantitative Measures of Law, 10 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 37–52 (2014); Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 11 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 409–445 (2014) (with Stephen Choi); Contracts as Technology, 88 New York University Law Review 83–127 (2013); and, Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance, 46(1) Law & Society Review 71–104 (2012) (with Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Merry).

Multijurisdictional Enforcement Games

Economic analyses of law enforcement generally focus on situations in which law is enforced by a single public agency in a single jurisdiction which faithfully follows its announced enforcement strategy. This does not reflect the reality of enforcement aimed at corporate crime, which commonly involves multiple agencies, often based in different jurisdictions. This chapter will discuss the analysis of multijurisdictional law enforcement, with particular reference to cases concerning foreign bribery. The premise is that this kind of interaction can be modelled as a dynamic multi-player game in which the players include both enforcement agencies and firms. The first step is to describe the structure of the game: the range of possible players, the actions open to them, and their preferences over outcomes, as well as when the players act and what they know about other players’ actions. The next step is to discuss how the enforcement game is likely to be played, meaning what strategies firms and enforcement agencies are likely to adopt. In principle, this kind of analysis can be used to formulate testable hypotheses about outcomes of interactions between regulators and firms. Unfortunately, opportunities to evaluate these kinds of hypotheses empirically are limited because many aspects of the structure of the game are difficult to observe, and firms’ misconduct and regulators’ enforcement activities typically are only observable when they result in formal sanctions. The chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the challenges inherent in normative analysis of the outcomes of multi-jurisdictional law enforcement games.

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When: 13 December 2017 10:45

End date: 13 December 2017 11:45

Where: Tias building