TILPS

Abstracts

Understanding Endogenously Active Biological Mechanisms: A Philosophical Challenge
William Bechtel

By attending to thepracticesof biologists, philosophers of biology have increasingly abandoned the attempt to shoehorn biological explanations into nomological models and have begun to articulate thepractice of biologists who appeal to mechanisms to explain biological phenomena. Some philosophical accounts of mechanism have tended to follow the dominant biological practice of treating mechanisms as sequentially organized reactive systems. But in a host of areas of fields biologists are recognizing that the mechanisms they confront are neither sequential nor reactive but employ non-sequential organization (and non-linear interactions in open systems) to maintain endogenous activity. Understanding how biological organisms are endogenously active is a challenge not just for biologists but also for philosophers of science, especially the new mechanists.

 

 

Encompassing the Role of Values in Science and Expertise Using Models of Democracy: Plurality, Objectivity, and Responsibility
Jeroen van Bouwel

Being confronted with disagreement among scientific experts, the public often wonders which expert to believe on climate change, or on solutions for the financial crisis, the risks of genetically modified food, and so on. One way in which philosophers of science could help is to provide the public, the non-expert or novice, with tools to evaluate disagreeing experts, to find out which expert to trust (e.g., Goldman, 2001). Another way is to stipulate the responsibility of the scientific expert and how to deal with values in science (e.g., Rolin, 2009). In this paper, I inquire the latter way by scrutinizing Heather Douglas' account of the role of values in science and expertise and the conclusions she draws concerning the responsibility of experts (cf., Douglas 2000, 2003, 2008 and 2009), pointing at some problems and solutions. It will also provide us with the opportunity to advocate the use of models of democracy (and the methodology of political science) in (the future of) philosophy of science.

 

Extending the Philosophy of Science: Forecasting and Science Policy
Francis Cartieri

There have been numerous attempts by philosophers to characterize periods of change and stability in the history of science. However, almost no attention has been given to attempts to characterize future trends in science. Largely this is because 'breakthroughs' are unpredictable and contingent in complex ways. Despite this difficulty, and others, we are seeing an increased interest in the role that Philosophy of Science might play in guiding science policy-decisions, and any such role will require some forecasting on the part of Philosophers. This project examines the prospects for trend forecasting in the Philosophy of Science.

 

Carnap's Way Between Philosophy and Science: Understanding the Past to Illuminate the Future of the Philosophy of Science
Matteo Collodel

The constant rate of specialization and co-operation with the empirical sciences that has been acknowledged as the main characteristic trend in the philosophy of science can be seen as the outcome of an enduring influence of logical empiricism within the discipline. As the recent history of the philosophy of science has shown and contrary to the received view, Carnap's way of 'conceptual engineering' represents a rich and articulated attempt to cope with the issues raised by the problematic nature of the relation between philosophy and science and its examination can provide a fruitful understanding of the past, present and future of the discipline.

 

Are Emotions the Ultimate Motives of Social Norm Compliance?
Matteo Colombo

Emotions and social norms are intimately related. The role of emotion in norm-compliance is often spelled out in terms of motivation. Robert Sugden (2000) argues that the ultimate motives for norm compliance are resentment and aversion towards being the focus of someone else's resentment. He articulates a set of sufficient conditions for the arousal of resentment. He then gives grounds for the empirical plausibility of his hypothesis by elaborating a tale about the evolutionary roots of resentment. This paper argues that Sugden's Resentment Hypothesis isn't sufficient for the arousal of resentment, and thereby for motivating one to abide by norms.

 

Philosophy of Mathematics as Philosophy of Science
Mark Colyvan

In the recent past, philosophy of mathematics has existed quite separately from mainstream philosophy of science. In my view, this has been to the detriment of both. For example, recent discussions of explanation in philosophy of science have ignored mathematical explanation and focussed largely on accounts of explanation that seem unlikely to work in mathematics. If a completely general account of scientific explanation is to be developed, both intra-mathematical explanation and mathematical explanation of empirical phenomena must be accommodated. On the other side, it is only recently that philosophers of mathematics have turned their attention to understanding applications of mathematics in empirical science. There is a great deal of work in the scientific modelling literature that would help in understanding the problem of the applicability of mathematics in science. Indeed, much of the work that philosophers of mathematics are interested in pursuing has been conducted under the guise of understanding the role of idealisations in models in science. In this paper I will discuss some of the connections between philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science. I will argue that closer connections between the two would help advance both areas. Indeed, I will argue that the immediate future of philosophy of mathematics lies in fostering a closer relationship with philosophy of science, to the extent that a great deal of philosophy of mathematics might be thought of as part of philosophy of science.

 

Epistemology ' Formal and Empirical: Bayesian Confirmation Theory as a Case-Study
Vincenzo Crupi and Katya Tentori

Contemporary research in epistemology and philosophy of science is combining different methods of enquiry in novel ways. Formal, theoretical and normative analyses have been pursued in tight connection with empirical and descriptive approaches. Here, the Bayesian notion of inductive confirmation of hypotheses is taken as a case-study, bringing together several recent and ongoing developments on both the formal and empirical side. Methodological implications and challenges are addressed along with suggestions for future research.

 

Formal Methods in Science as a Counterbalance to Confirmation Bias
Catarina Dutilh Novaes

I argue that the use of formal methods in science may (and often does) act as a counterbalance to confirmation bias. To support my claim, I present an analysis of how reliance on the mathematical aspects of his theory effectively allowed Maxwell to suppress his own belief in the existence of ether when developing his theory of electromagnetism. I also argue that a naturalized epistemology of science should be interested not only in how scientific methodology accords with 'everyday' forms of reasoning, but also in the aspects of (actual or ideal) significant discrepancy between the former and the latter.

 

Philosophers Responding to Controversial Science: Lessons from Evolutionary Psychology and Behavioral Genetics
Kathryn Plaisance and Carla Fehr

Some scientific research is controversial because it has the capacity to harm vulnerable groups of people. In this paper, we highlight examples of research from two fields ' evolutionary psychology and behavioral genetics ' and argue that in order for philosophy of science, as a disciplinary community, to have an impact on controversial research, some community members must critically engage with scientists; furthermore, there are good practical and ethical reasons for doing so. Critical engagement, as we see it, involves developing 'interactional expertise' and conceptualizing our labor in terms of overlapping academic communities rather than solely as a set of individual efforts.

 

Genetic and Structural Philosophies of Science
Paul Franco

The question, 'How is scientific knowledge possible?' can be approached from a genetic perspective focusing on the actual generation of knowledge from experience, or from a structural perspective focusing on the interaction of the statements of our scientific theories to one another and their relation to experience. In this paper, I explain the difference between and establish the independence of these two perspectives using the Quine/Carnap debate as a case study. I then offer suggestions for how we should understand the relationship between the answers offered by the two perspectives about the possibility of scientific knowledge.

 

A Post-Kuhnian Approach to History and Philosophy of Science
Michael Friedman

What I call the dynamics of reason is an essentially historical response to the challenge to the rationality and objectivity of science arising in the wake of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions. I concentrate on developments in the mathematical exact sciences from Newton to Einstein together with parallel developments in scientific philosophy from Kant to logical empiricism, and I aim to show that Kant's original conception of scientific objectivity and rationality can be relativized and historicized in such a way that a trans-historical version of such objectivity and rationality is nonetheless preserved. I now want to look in more detail at historical developments leading up to the Kantian synthesis so as to bring both theological issues (culminating in Newton's metaphysics of space and Kant's reaction to it) and cultural and institutional events (involving the Church's very complex relationship to the new astronomy) into my historical narrative. Far from compromising the 'purely intellectual' integrity of the scientific and philosophical developments taking place in this wider context, my expanded narrative rather underscores their central importance.

 

Reflections on the Future of the Philosophy of Science, 2.0
Ronald Giere

At the 1970 meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, I presented a paper with the audacious subtitle: 'Reflections on Relevance and the Future of the Philosophy of Science.' Taking this 1970 paper as my benchmark, I first highlight some perils in projecting how a field will develop. I then note some major changes that have in fact occurred over the past forty years. These serve as a basis for some cautious projections for the near future. At the end I raise some questions as to whether all these past and projected developments are a good thing for the profession.

 

Conceptual Analysis and the Philosophy of Science
Paul Griffiths

A popular view of philosophical method is probably best articulated in the work of Frank Jackson and David Chalmers, and for that reason sometimes called the 'Canberra Plan'. On this view the proper role of philosophy is to 'define the subject matter'. Proposed reductions or explanations of phenomenon are to be assessed by consulting intuitions about possible cases to determine whether statements about that phenomenon could possibly find truth-makers in the vocabulary in which the reduction or explanation is offered. Reductions or explanations that fail to respect 'central' intuitions merely 'change the subject'. This approach has its real home in contemporary analytic metaphysics, but it has also been applied to scientific concepts, particularly in the field known as 'metaphysics of science'. I argue that for quite general reasons this program is inapplicable to scientific concepts such as 'energy,' 'species', or 'consciousness'. The nature of scientific concepts is such that a fully adequate grasp of a concept by the standards of the relevant linguistic community is typically not a sufficient basis from which to determine whether a future scientific theory would or could be an adequate reduction or explanation of the phenomenon which fall under that concept. Furthermore, an account of coe, an account of conceptual change which allows only three possibilities, filling an existing conceptual role, 'changing the subject' and a vagueness boundary between these two is inadequate to model real episodes in the history of science. The deficiency of this account of philosophical methodology is shown to stem from an excessively realistic interpretation of some idealizations made in formal semantics. Some alternatives methods for analyzing scientific concepts are sketched. There are sources of data that may allow us to say in advance of an actual scientific explanation whether an explanation of that sort could or would be an adequate reduction. These data sources include the psychology of concepts and the history of science. An alternative vision of the philosopher's role is implied by my view, at least in the philosophy of science. Philosophers should analyze the role of key concepts in scientific discourse, compare alternative conceptualizations of the same subject matter, and assess the suitability of those alternatives for various different projects. This, of course, is what many philosophers have always done.

 

Confirmation and Reduction: A Bayesian Account
Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, Roman Frigg and Stephan Hartmann

Various scientific theories stand in a reductiverelation to each other. In a recent article, we have argued that a g

eneralized version of the Nagel-Schaffner model (GNS) is the right account of this relation. In this talk, we present a Bayesian analysis of how GNS impacts on confirmation. We formalize the relation between the reducing and the reduced theory before and after the reduction using Bayesian networks, and thereby show that, post-reduction, the two theories are confirmatory of each other. We then ask when a purported reduction should be accepted on epistemic grounds. To do so, we compare the prior and posterior probabilities of the conjunction of both theories before and after the reduction and ask how well each is confirmed by the available evidence.

 

 

Intuitions, Experiments, and Analysis
Christopher Hitchcock

Philosophy of Science is a two-way street: it includes the application of philosophical methods to philosophical questions about the nature of the sciences, but it also includes the application of broadly scientific methods to traditionally philosophical problems. One example of the latter that has been gaining in popularity is experimental philosophy, which employs the methodsof social psychology to investigate the nature of concepts traditionally investigated using intuitions. I will survey the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches to conceptual analysis using examples from the theory of causation, as well as examples from ethics and epistemology.

 

Conceptual Tools for Assessing Experiments: The Notions of Internal and External Validity and Some of their Problems
Maria Jimenez-Buedo

Internal and external validity are central notions in the debates around the experimental method

both for practitioners and for philosophers of science. In the mid 1980s, Donald T.Campbell, credited for having coined these notions at the end of the 1950s warned us about important misunderstandings regarding these concepts of experimental validity. Moreover, applied methodologists insocialscienceresearch have long questioned thepertinence and usefulness of the distinction and have either proposed alternative terms or the doing away with the distinction. The paper points at the more problematic aspects of the distinction be tween the internal and external validity of experiments and presents this as a case that illustrates the dangers at place when some terms borrowed from more methodological work are imported into the philosophical debate.

 

Explicative Definition: Defending Carnap on Concept Determination
James Justus

Recent criticisms of intuitions from those working within the 'experimental philosophy' movement and others have undermined the epistemic authority of traditional conceptual analysis. But the need for an alternative normative theory of conceptual change''how concepts should be characterized and modified''is rarely addressed by this work. I argue Carnap's underappreciated theory of explicative definition provides such a theory. Analysis of definitions of complex concepts in empirical sciences illustrates and supports this claim, and counteracts the charge explication is only suitable for highly mathematical, axiomatic contexts. I conclude by defending explicative definition against recent criticisms it is 'philosophically unilluminating.'

 

Bohr's Transcendental Philosophy and the Birth of Quantum Mechanics
Jeongmin Lee

This paper provides a case study in philosophical history of quantum theory, with special emphasis on the role of Bohr's philosophy in the creation of new mechanics. I start my discussion with Bohr's use of an analogical principle in the atomic model, which was later dubbed the correspondence principle. I argue that the correspondence principle is best understood as formal or symbolic analogy in the strictly Kantian sense. By showing how new quantum formalism embodies this philosophically loaded principle, I claim that the emergence of new mechanics is unintelligible unless we take into account Bohr's transcendental philosophizing before 1925.

 

How to Reconcile General Philosophy of Science with Bayesianism: Reducing Belief Simpliciter to Degrees of Belief
Hannes Leitgeb

Where traditional philosophy of science has focussed on scientific theories and theory change, the more recent Bayesian approach to general philosophy of science starts with some "scientific agent's" degrees of belief. But is it possible to deal both with qualitative belief, which aims at truth, and quantitative belief, which is often interpreted just pragmatically in terms of betting quotients, at the same time? We prove that given plausible assumptions, one can in fact give an explicit definition of belief simpliciter in terms of subjective probability, such that it is neither the case that belief is stripped of any of its usual logical properties, nor is it the case that believed propositions are bound to have probability 1. Belief simpliciter is not to be eliminated in favour of degrees of belief, but by reducing it to the assignment of consistently high degrees of belief, both quantitative and qualitative belief turn out to be governed by one unified theory. Turning to possible applications and extensions of the theory, we suggest that this will allow us to see: how the Bayesian approach in general philosophy of science can be reconciled with the deductive or semantic conception of science; how the assertability of conditionals can become an all-or-nothing affair in the face of non-trivial subjective conditional probabilities; how knowledge entails a high degree of belief but not necessarly certainty; how primitive conditional probability measures (Popper functions) arise from conditionalizing absolute probability measures on maximal believed propositions with respect to different cautiousness thresholds; and how conditional chances function as the truthmakers of counterfactuals.

 

The Repoliticization of Philosophy of Science. On the Debate Between Helen Longino and Philip Kitcher
Anna Leuschner

As Georg Reisch (2005) showed, philosophy of science, once a highly political enterprise, was strongly depoliticized during the cold war. Over the following decades, the idea of scientific value neutrality as the only guarantor of objectivity was broadly held in this traditionally analytical field of philosophical research. Even Kuhn (1973), who had perturbed this unity by his "Structure of Scientific Revolutions", came to relativize his broadly as radically anti-positivistic interpreted conclusions by claiming in "The Essential Tension" (1977) that a list of a few capable epistemic criteria might be objective indicators for a theory's quality, its universal validity and predictive power. Nevertheless, Kuhn's concepts in "The Structure" led to challenges of all neo-positivistic concepts afterwards, as Howard (2009) points out. Hence the idea of scientific value neutrality became more and more eroded during the following decades. Since the late 1980s and during the 1990s, social-epistemological and feminist philosophers of science have begun to tackle the so-called "fact-value-dichotomy" by new political and social arguments. The journal "Social Epistemology" was founded in 1987 by Steve Fuller, and Alvin Goldman came up with his "Liaisons" in 1992. Diverse feminist objections have been made by Janet Kourany and Helen Longino. A look at the debate between the realist Philip Kitcher and the empiricist Helen Longino between 1993 and 2002 shows very clearly how the idea of value neutrality is getting replaced step by step ' not only in constructivist but also in traditional realistic theories of science ' by new contextualistic, pluralistic concepts. In comparison to "The Advancement" (1993), Kitcher makes large concessions to these advisements in his "Science, Truth, and Democracy" (2001), and he gets support by many colleagues (e.g. by Bird 2003; Brown 2004; Dupré 2004). I conclude that after a long nonpolitical period there has been a development in philosophy of science that involves more and more political considerations and methods again. The increasing acceptance of pluralistic concepts in theories of philosophy of science in general, and the development of Kitcher's position towards Longinos objections over the last 20 years in particular, indicate how philosophy of science has gradually been repoliticized.

 

The Linguistic Challenge for Reduction
Kristina Liefke

Modern linguistics constitutes a challenge for the philosophy of science. Despite its recent ascent to the rank of a 'hard' (or 'close-to-hard' science), the study of language is characterized by a notably distinct methodology and domain of research. This paper exploits the marked scientific status of linguistics: By investigating the reductive relation between categorial grammar and type-logical semantics (exploited, e.g., in Montague Grammar (MG)), we show that linguistics throws new light on some of the core issues in the philosophy of science. More than identifying a new type of intertheoretic relation, MG challenges and improves upon the received treatment of dependence relations between same-theory propositions. This is achieved through the use of logical types. We prove the positive probabilistic impact of type-aided reduction through the use of Bayesian confirmation and network theory.

 

On the Emergence of Social Norms: The Standing Ovation Problem
Chiara Lisciandra and Ryan Muldoon

A descriptive norm is a behavioral rule that spreads in a population when an increasing number of people follows it as a consequence of a conformity effect. As a case study for the emergence of descriptive norms, we consider a standing ovation effect. This effect occurs for example after a particularly good concert, when the audience members progressively stand up to express their appreciation of the performance. Our aim is to build a model of a standing ovation effect and run a computer simulation of it. What we wish to examine is how ovations might arise, and what this might tell us more generally about the emergence of descriptive norms in society.

 

Ideal Language Philosophy of Science
Sebastian Lutz

Ideal language philosophy has often been pragmatically defended as being more successful than non-linguistic, experimental, and ordinary language philosophy in solving or dissolving philosophical problems. I defend ideal language philosophy of science pragmatically as being more successful than its competitors in solving metaphilosophical problems. Specifically, I argue that the relation to science is clearer for ideal language philosophy than for non-linguistic philosophy and that ideal language philosophy's contribution to the sciences is clearer than the contributions of ordinary language and experimental philosophy.

 

Economic Discounting at the Science-Policy Interface: A Fertile Ground for Philosophical Inquiry
Fabien Medvecky

Economic discounting, an economic tool that decreases the value of future costs and benefits relative to current costs and benefits by a yearly rate, is increasingly being used in projects at the science-policy interface. Although discounting has been a standard component of cost'benefit analysis for many years, it has increasingly become a point of debate- especially those working on climate change- with much of the disagreement over discounting stemming from philosophical issues. In this paper I will discuss why discounting is so contentious and I will survey some of the points of contention on which philosophy can help shed some light.

 

Philosophies of Technoscience
Alfred Nordmann

Numerous claims have been advanced according to which contemporary research practice differs from attempts to produce theories that provide accounts of reality. Instead, post-academic, mode-2 or technoscientific research is said to revolve around making, building, and the control of phenomena. Philosophers and historians of science are skeptical about this disjunction and tend to ignore such claims of novelty. However, if one allowsthat there are complementary 'scientific' and'technoscientific' perspectives on research practice, it might appear that someof the more prominent themes in contemporary philosophy of sciene already mark the beginnings for acomprehensive 'philosophy of technoscience.' Numerous claims have been advanced according to which contemporary research practice differs from attempts to produce theories that provide accounts of reality. Instead, post-academic, mode-2 or technoscientific research is said to revolve around making, building, and the control of phenomena. Philosophers andhistoriansof science are skeptical about this disjunction and tend to ignore such claims of novelty. However, if one allows that there are complementary 'scientific' and 'technoscientific' perspectives on research practice, it might appear that some of the more prominent themes in contemporary philosophy of science already mark the beginnings for a comprehensive 'philosophy of technoscience.'

 

 

Why does DarwinMatter for Philosophy?
Samir Okasha

Numerous scientists and philosophers have argued that Darwin's theory of evolution has a special relevance for philosophy that other scientific theories do nothave. I offer a cautious defence of this viewpoint, by identifying a number of traditional philosophical issues, drawn from diverse areas including metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and decision t

heory, which can be illuminated by adopting a Darwinian perspective. Simultaneously, I offer some reflections on the sub-branch of philosophy of science known as 'philosophy of biology', which has flourished in recent years. I argue that philosophy of biology can be pursued in two quite different ways. The first way attempts to use biological theories to illuminate philosophical issues, in the manner defended in the first half of the talk; the second offers a philosophical examination of the foundations of biological science. I argue that these two approaches are complementary, and end with some suggestions about their future development.

 

 

Friedman on Implicit Definition: In Search of the Hilbertian Heritage in Philosophy of Science
Woosuk Park

Encouraged by the recent surge of interest in logical positivism, I shall discuss the problem of the relationship between Hilbert and the logical positivism. To what extent and in what respects were logical positivists indebted to Hilbert? In particular, what exactly did they learn from the notion of implicit definition as the core of Hilbert's axiomatic method? In order to answer these questions, I shall first try to fathom Friedman's mind about them. Secondly, I shall attempt to determine whether Carnap's approach to theoretical terms in science is nothing but an application of Hilbert's axiomatic method, as Bernays claims.

 

On the Scope and Future of Philosophy of Science
Massimo Pigliucci

Philosophy of science is a heterogenous intellectual activity that is made of at least four distinct areas of inquiry, each characterized by specific goals and sets of methods that are only partially overlapping with each other. My analysis of these areas yields a picture of philosophy of science as an expanding field in terms of number of practitioners and in scope and relevance to both science and society. Much of this expansion will depend on two crucial issues: how philosophers of science will connect with scientists, and how they will present their case for relevance to society at large.

 

Non-Reductive Conceptual Analysis and Causal Modeling
Alexander Reutlinger

In current philosophy of science, providing a 'theory' of causation can be taken to refer to two different projects: (1) providing an account of truth conditions of causal notions and statements and (2) providing a methodology to test and discover causal relations. These philosophical projects differ methodologically. The first project is one of conceptual analysis or explication. The second is essentially based on causal modeling (e.g., Pearl 2000, Spirtes, Glymour & Scheines 2000, Williamson 2005). It is a yet unsettled question how these methodologically different projects relate to each other? Recently, several philosophers (e.g., Woodward 2003, Hitchcock 2001, 2006) have argued that causal modeling suggests to modify the way of explicati

ng causal concepts: Explications of causal concepts should be non-reductive. In other words, the explicans of a causal notion makes use of causal notions itself. This claim is clearly at odds withtraditional methods of explication in philosophy of science, because non-reductive explications are charged to be viciously circular. Against the worries of the traditional view, I will attempt to defend the advantages of a non-reductive view.

 

Interventions: A Case Study in Formalisation
Jan-Willem Romeijn

In this paper I discuss probabilistic models of experimental intervention, and I show that such models elucidate the intuition that observations during intervention are more informative than observations per se. Because of this success, it seems attractive to also cast other problems addressed by the philosophy of experimentation in terms of such probabilistic models. However, a critical examination of the models reveals that some of the aspects of experimentation are covered up rather than resolved by probabilistic modelling. I end by drawing a number of general lessons on the use of formal methods in the philosophy of science.

 

Between Narratives and Equations:Rethinking Fisher and Wright
Alirio Rosales

The role of stories or narrativesin model constructionhas received some attention, but still is a problem for the future of the philosophy of science. According to previous work, narratives complement models by adding explanatory power, plausibility, providing causal descriptions of phenomena, or connecting models with the world. Here, I present a case study from early population genetics, where narratives played a more prominent theoretical role; instead of accompanying models, they constituted frameworks for model construction and explanation. I call such narratives causal narratives as exemplified by Ronald A. Fisher's 'mass selection theory' and Sewall Wright's 'shifting balance theory.'

 

Comparing Probabilistic Measures of Explanatory Power
Jonah Schupbach

 

Recently, in attempting to account for explanatory reasoning in probabilistic terms, Bayesians have proposed several measures of the degree to which a hypothesis explains a given set of facts. These candidate measures of 'explanatory power' are shown to have interesting normative interpretations and consequences. What has not yet been investigated, however, is whether any of these measures are also descriptive of people's actual explanatory judgments. Here, I present my own experimental work investigating this question. I argue that one measure in particular is an accurate descriptor of explanatory judgments. Then, I discuss some interesting implications of this result for both the epistemology and the psychology of explanatory reasoning.

 

 

Dynamics in the Formation of Ecological Knowledge
Astrid Schwarz

By now, the observation has become almost commonplace that ecology is a science that is characterized by plurality (Cooper 1998, Haila & Levins 1992, Kiester 1980, Shrader-Frechette & McCoy 1994, Taylor 2005). It is built of multiple research programmes that are not necessarily related to each other; concepts and theories used in the field might be incommensurable. This is in line with statements in the philosophy of science that a plurality of approaches and partial perspectives are important and fruitful and consequently need to be acknowledged by philosophical accounts (Kellert, Longino & Waters 2006). This paper argues that ecological plurality is shaped in a distinct way and can be conceptualized as a structure consisting of three so-called basic concepts. Provisionally the basic concepts might be defined as follows: Each of the three characterizes a particular historical field of knowledge that embraces practices and theories about living beings in their environments. Over time, basic concepts are flexible, they show a dynamic behaviour that is described as an oscillation. This triadic conceptual system is a suggestion for a dynamic conceptualization of ecological knowledge.

 

Metaphysics of Species for Those Wary of Commitment
Matthew Slater

Philosophers of science investigating the metaphysical foundations of various sciences must be wary of unknowingly undertaking metaphysical commitments that conflict with the science they are describing. The debates over the metaphysics of species nicely illustrate the dangers concomitant to pursuing the metaphysics of science. I shall focus on this debate as a case, arguing that difficulties in this area can be dissolved by adopting a different conception of what 'investigating the metaphysics of species' involves. I shall sketch a view of natural kinds on which particular species can be natural kinds without, in a sense, being things.

 

The Problem of Sound Inductive Inference: Bayesian Philosophers vs. Frequentist Scientists
Jan Sprenger

When scientists and philosophers consider the problem of sound inductive, statistical inference, they are often talking past each other. Moreover, they seem to be divided by a schism: Philosophers tend to appraise Bayesianism as a foundational theory of inductive inference whereas scientists often lean towards non-Bayesian, frequentist approaches. This talk explores the reasons for the lack of communication between philosophers, statisticians and practicing scientists and argues that mutual misunderstandings of the respective objectives play a prominent role. It is further shown that both positions, Bayesianism and frequentism, can be consistently maintained if contextualized in the right way. Finally, perspectives for fruitful interaction in the future are elaborated.

 

Philosophy of Science Between Rigorous Method and Interdisciplinarity
Michael Stoeltzner

My prognosis for the future of philosophy of science is that it will thrive if it combines a sound methodology with consistent interdisciplinarity. By comparing the present situation and the mid-1930s, when philosophy of science had just become a discipline and when, as is the case today, a plurality of approaches were discussed, I argue that philosophers of science should be aware that: (i) They act on a specificlevelof a complex inner-scientific process, and, simultaneously, reflect upon the conditions of the process as a whole. (ii) They combine historical long-shots at the emergence of the scientific world-view with ahistorical close-ups tracking down a specific development in a particular science. (iii) Not only does the history of science represent an experimental laboratory for general claims, but it also influences the normative standards, in the same vein as the progress of any natural science. (iv) They, finally, can count on a certain inescapability of philosophy of science for the scientists themselves.

 

The Science of Measurement: Towards an Epistemology of Metrology
Eran Tal

This paper discusses the methods of metrologists, i.e. experts in highly reliable measurement who typically work at bureaus of standards. The accuracy of quantitative results in the physical sciences crucially depends on the efficacy of metrological procedures and on the adequacy of assumptions underlying these procedures. Nevertheless, metrology has so far received only scant attention from philosophers. Here I analyze the main methods by which metrologists determine the accuracy of measurement procedures. I then present a challenge to a central assumption underlying these methods. Finally, I suggest directions of research for a future epistemology of metrology.

 

How will philosophy of science treat explanation and confirmation?
Paul Teller

Philosophers of science have, and some still do, seek 'one size fits all' analyses of explanation and confirmation of theories. We can now see such efforts to be badly misguided. Bromberger's 1965 'An approach to explanation' shows that explanation is a functional notion ' explaining something to someone functions to answer a question that has the questioner completely stumped. There will be not just one but many ways in which such intellectual distress can be relieved. Perhaps the question, how do theories get confirmed, made sense when one took a theory to be a deductively closed set of sentences. But growing sophistication about the intellectual products of science needs to be complemented with a sophisticated study of how these diverse products get evaluated. The subject matter includes everything from data models through the most abstract model building principles, with along with the reliability of instruments and research methods, discovery of phenomena and mechanisms, and the course of research programs. Well-grounded evaluation will be a contextual matter, dependent on topic, interests, and tradition. Study of both subjects promises to be richly rewarding.

 

 

The Primacy of Philosophy of Scientific Practice and its Consequences for General Philosophy of Science
Leen de Vreese, Erik Weber and Jeroen van Bouwel

The traditional approach to philosophy of science can be characterized as follows: it is all about 'general' philosophy of science, using traditional methods such as conceptual analysis and formal modelling to build definitions and models that aim to solve central epistemological 'problems' in a unique, overall approach. We support the need for a 'practical turn' in philosophy of science and will promote the primacy of a 'philosophy of scientific practice'. We illustrate this alternative approach, and its consequencesfor general philosophy of science, using our own recent work on causation and explanation in the practice of the special sciences.

 

Self-Defeating Action and Hyperbolic Discounting
António Zilhão

According to a widely held view, the traits that are supposed to set our mind and the actions it originates apart from other animal minds and behaviours are the pursuit ofglobal maximization and strategic planning. These two traitsare, however, deemed to beonly imperfectly realized in us by theoreticians such as Elster and Ainslie. Qua global maximizers, the pattern

of our time preferences should instantiate some exponential discount function of the future. But our instinctive time preferences seem to instantiate a hyperbolic one. Acting in agreement with a hyperbolic discount function is self-defeating. Being aware of our own imperfection, we are supposed, according to these authors, to have developed indirect means allowing us to overcome our primary inconsistency. I contend that the domain of non-pathological self-defeating action is much broader than the domain that admits being explained in terms of the alleged hyperbolic pattern characterizing our discount function and that therefore we need to develop a more inclusive approach to deal with the problem of self-defeating action.

 

 

 

Philosophy of Science and the Landscape of Modalities
Thomas Müller

Many central concepts of philosophy of science are `modally thick', involving at least a prima facie commitmerima facie commitment to modality in the form of unrealized possibilities. Laws of nature, counterfactuals, probability, and causation are cases in point. Empiricist worries have fueled a long debate about the seriousness of such apparent modal involvement, and deflationary accounts such as the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account of laws have found widespread acceptance. On the other hand, the importance of modal concepts in metaphysics, in philosophy of language, and in action theory is growing. Some modally thick concepts, such as the concept of an intervention, are also making a fresh appearance in philosophy of science. Before this background, it pays to take a closer look at the landscape of modalities. After all, there is a number of different notions of possibility, including logical, mathematical, metaphysical, physical, technological, and real (historical) possibility. This latter notion captures possibilities in concrete circumstances, which (as we all know) vanish when they are not actualized; the others are more abstract. Can they be understood as abstractions in a useful way? Are some of them reducible to others? And if so, which are the fundamental ones? In my talk I will survey the landscape of possibilities and their interrelations. My aim is to show how discussions about the interrelation of different kinds of modality can help one to determine the proper place of the modally thick concepts of philosophy of science.

The Future of Psychoneural Reduction: A Defense of Pluralism
Markus Eronen

An enduring problem in philosophy of science is whether higher-level sciences can be reduced to lower-level sciences. In this paper, I defend pluralism and argue against reductionism in the case of psychology and neuroscience. In the first part, I discuss three accounts of psychoneural reduction: New Wave Reduction, functional reduction, and metascientific reduction. I show that they are philosophically problematic and at odds with scientific practice. In the second part, I defend a form of pluralism in neuroscience and psychology, showing that it is supported by scientific practice and ontologically unproblematic.