Research Tilburg Law School

Our mission is to understand and improve the role of law in tackling societal problems now and in the future.

TILEC Seminar: Caio Mario da Silva Pereira Neto

Towards a layered approach to relevant markets in multi-sided transaction platforms
10:45-11:45, M 1003

Caio Mario da Silva Pereira Neto is a Professor at FGV Law School (São Paulo - Brazil).  He holds a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) from the University of São Paulo, as well as Masters (LL.M.) and Doctorate (J.S.D.) degrees from Yale Law School (USA). He is an affiliated fellow of the ISP - Information Society Project (Yale) and alum of the Summer Doctoral Program at the Oxford Internet Institute. He served as visiting professor at the University of Florida (Gainsville, FL – EUA) and he is currently visiting researcher at King´s College London (KCL). His research agenda is focused on Competition Law and Regulation, with books and articles published in Brazil and abroad. He has spoken in national and international forums, including the ICN General Conference, ICN Cartel Workshop, ABA Antitrust Spring Meeting, the BRICS Conference on Competition Law and the Information Society Project at Yale. In public service, Dr. Pereira Neto held office as Director for Competition at the Secretariat of Economic Law of the Ministry of Justice (SDE), where he was responsible to coordinate antitrust enforcement in Brazil (1999-2000). In private practice, Prof. Pereira Neto is a founding partner and co-heads the antitrust and regulation group at Pereira Neto | Macedo Advogados (PNM).


The American Supreme Court decision in Ohio v. American Express (AMEX) will shape the future of US antitrust enforcement on multi-sided platforms. In a controversial landmark ruling both the Court’s majority and minority battled over definitions of relevant markets in the complex industry of electronic payments: the majority affirming that “transaction platforms” always constitute a single “two-sided relevant market” and the minority arguing that electronic payments are regular complementary goods subject to traditional “one-sided” analysis. This battle was the single most important element leading to the final ruling of the case. This article challenges both views defended by the split Supreme Court and proposes a novel, multi-layered approach to define relevant markets in multi-sided transaction platforms, one that is focused on how the indirect network effects shape the competitive constraints faced by the multiple firms operating within such platforms. This approach acknowledges the importance of indirect network effects in multi-sided markets, but also stresses how, depending on the structure of the platform, constraints coming from network effects vary in intensity and may not effectively limit a firm’s ability to raise prices on a single-side of the platform. This perspective allows for the separation of one-sided and two-sided transaction markets, so that even transaction platforms may allow for the definition of multiple layers of competition – a proposition that helps bridge the divide between the majority and minority opinions in AMEX and in scholarship more generally. Understanding that transaction platforms may encompass multiple spaces of competition, leading to potentially different relevant markets, is essential to grasp the full competitive dynamics of such platforms. From this perspective, the article then moves on to discuss the rich international experience of the EU and Brazil in the application of competition law to of electronic payments’ markets as examples of cases in which authorities sometimes correctly applied and sometimes fell short of this multi-layered view. It concludes by outlining how to expand the applicability of the proposed multi-layered approach to cases involving other transaction platforms, such as marketplaces and mobility apps.

When: 03 April 2019 10:45

End date: 03 April 2019 11:45