European Values Conference 2022
A look at the past, present and futures

Monday 9 May 2022 (House of the Dutch Provinces, Brussels)
Livestream via https://youtu.be/btputyTdYdw

Chair: Tim Reeskens

12:00-13:15	Lunch at 'The Twelve'
13:15-13:45	Opening conference by Wim van de Donk (Rector Magnificus of Tilburg University), Ruud Luijkx and Tim Reeskens
13:45-14:15	JRC Report 'Values & Identities' by Mario Scharfbillig
14:15-14:20	Essay by Marga van Zundert, Author of Atlas of European Values
14:20-15:00	Presentation 'Atlas of European Values' by Loek Halman and Inge Sieben
	First copy presented by Wim van de Donk and reflection by Mr. Robert de Groot, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the EU
15:00-15:30	Coffee break
15:30-16:30	Plenary debate on gap between politics and citizens by Tom Berendsen (Member of European Parliament), Mario Scharfbillig, and Quita Muis (moderated by Tim Reeskens)
	Opportunity to ask questions via live chat
16:30-17:00	Closing remarks by Tanya Hristova, mayor of Gabrovo Municipality, member of the European Committee of the Regions
17:00-19:30	Drinks and dinner at 'The Twelve'
19:30	Travel to van der Valk Hotel

Tuesday 10 May 2022 (Tilburg University, Tilburg)

Chair: Inge Sieben

9:00	Travel to Tilburg University
9:30-11:00	Plenary session 1
11:00:12:00	Keynote Monika Sie
	Livestream via https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/campus/live-broadcast/auditorium
12:00-13:00	Lunch
13:00-14:30	Parallel sessions 2+3
14:30-15:00	Coffee break
15:00-16:30	Plenary session 4
16:30-17:30	Keynote David Voas: "The transmission of religious values" and farewell to Loek Halman
	With introduction by Wim van de Donk, Rector Magnificus
	Livestream via https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/campus/live-broadcast/auditorium
17:30-18:30	Drinks at Foyer (aula)
18:30-21:30	Dinner at Faculty Club
21:30	Travel to van der Valk Hotel

General program takes place at the Auditorium of the Cobbenhagen Building, for parallel sessions, please see session overview for room number.

Wednesday 11 May 2022 (Tilburg University, Tilburg)

Chair: Ruud Luijkx

9:00	Travel to Tilburg University
9:30-11:00	Parallel sessions 5+6
11:00-11:30	Coffee break
11:30-12:00	Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence of European Values
	Livestream via https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/campus/live-broadcast/auditorium
12:00-13:00	Lunch
13:00-14:00	EVALUE: European Values in Education
University	With introduction by Jantine Schuit, Vice Rector Magnificus Tilburg
	Livestream via https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/campus/live-broadcast/auditorium
14:00-15:30	Parallel sessions 7+8
15:30-17:00	Closing reception

General program takes place at the Auditorium of the Cobbenhagen Building, for parallel sessions, please see session overview for room number.

Tuesday 10 May 2022 – 9:30-11:00
Session 1: Solidarity in Turbulent Times **Room: CZ6 (Cobbenhagen building)**
COVID-19 and orientations towards solidarity: the cases of Spain, Hungary, and Romania (Bartolome Peral, Voicu, Rosta, Rusu, Vasile, Comsa & Tufis)
Living without "others"? (In)Tolerance of people in Visegrad Four countries to different groups of people in a comparative analysis (Chorvat & Madlenak)
Gender ideology in Europe: Plotting normative types in a multidimensional space (van Damme & Pavlopoulos)

Tuesday 10 May 2022 – 13:00 – 14:30	
Session 2: Religiosity **Room: CZ6**	**Session 3: Politics** **Room: CZ110**
Between Romania and Hungary: religiosity among Hungarians in Transylvania (Rosta, Kiss, Voicu)	Gender gap in protest potential: the impact of cohort value change and contextual factors in Europe (1981-2020) (Lavrinenko)
The multifaceted relationship between individual religiosity and attitudes toward immigration: A comparative perspective with European Values Study 2017 data (Ladini, Biolcati, Molteni, Pedrazzani & Vezzoni)	Post-Soviet Civil Society in Transition: Leftist Social Movements in Lithuania (Dauksaite)
Secularization and the religious factor in Europe: Obedience and Autonomy as Important Child-Rearing Qualities (Sieben & Ivanova)	"Co-nationals, first!"- Unpacking the Link between Nationalism and Native Favouritism in Europe: a Theoretical Model and Evidence using Survey Data (Guglielmi)
Do 'Spiritual' Self-Identifications Signify Affinity With New Age? (Tromp, Pless & Houtman)	

Tuesday 10 May 2022 – 15:00-16:30
Session 4: Methodological and Empirical Challenges to Value Change **Room: CZ6**
A community of shared values? Dimensions and dynamics of cultural integration in the European Union (Akaliyski, Welzel & Hien)
Is the Epidemiological Approach to Testing Value Transmission Using Migrant Samples Valid? Problems, challenges and solutions (Schilpzand)
Assessing Value Change in Adults Using Longitudinal Panel Data (van der Laan & Reeskens)
European values and "Europeanness" in the eyes of Central-Eastern Europeans (Konieczna-Sałamatin & Sawicka)

Wednesday 11 May 2022 – 9:30-11:00	
Session 5: Work and Welfare **Room: CZ109**	**Session 6: Morality** **Room: CZ110**
Work ethics in nine countries during 20 years: entrepreneurs vs non-entrepreneurs (Velli)	The Evolution of Morality across Three Decades: Different Pathways for Universal and Culture-specific Moralities (Tormos, Vauclair, Dobewall, Akaliyski & Fairbrother)
Preferences for redistribution and wealth inequality around the world (Olivera & Andreoli)	Changes in Moral Values: A Study across 30 European Countries (Volkova)
Solidarity and Identity – Twins, Siblings, or Only Loose Acquaintances? An Assessment of Their Relationship with EVS 2017 Data (Quandt)	Mechanisms of values traditionalization in Post-Soviet countries on the example of Belarus (Artsiomenka-Melyantsova)
Why do Europeans differentiate more in their solidarity with beneficiaries of social policy? Increased conditionality in solidarity in the 21st century explained (Roosma)	

Wednesday 11 May 2022 – 14:00-15:30	
Session 7: Values in Education **Room Portretroom (Cobbenhagen building)**	**Session 8: Polarization** **Room: CZ112**
Values Education by using maps and scatterplot tools related to data of the European Values Study (Krause & Madlenak)	Education, Value Orientations, and Contemporary Cleavage Structures: Exploring the Links (Heinrich)
Conceptual maps of Europe: How clustering, dimensionality reduction and visualization can provide further insight on the opinions expressed within a survey (Mchedlidze)	Ideological polarization and political activism (Wallman Lundåsen & Ryan)
Values of young people in Europe and their way of life; introducing educational strategies (van Dijk-Groeneboer)	Alignment: Identity-based Polarization in Europe (Muis)
Assessing Character in Higher Education (Leesen)	

Session 1: Solidarity in Turbulent Times
Chair: Ferruccio Biolcati

Room: CZ6, Cobbenhagen building

1.1. COVID-19 and Orientations towards Solidarity: The cases of Spain, Hungary, and Romania
Edurne Bartolome Peral (University of Deusto), Bogdan Voicu, Gergely Rosta, Horatiu Rusu, Marian Vasile, Mircea Comșa, & Claudiu Tufis

Solidarity is core to Europe's societal organisation and was intensively addressed in recent research. Using data collected before and during the lockdown in spring 2020, we examine whether value orientations towards solidarity changed in three countries (Spain, Hungary, and Romania). Before the pandemic, people in Spain expressed higher solidarity than people in Hungary and Romania. Our argument claims that when facing uncertainty, people react negatively, and turn to egocentric values. However, successful state intervention decreases uncertainty and boosts solidarity. Personal experience of a crisis increases caring for others, at least in the short term. Our findings reveal increasing solidarity in Hungary and Romania and stagnant levels in Spain, thus decreasing the distance between these societies. Direct exposure to the virus and the negative experiences associated with it are related to higher solidarity but in different ways across countries. In Spain and Romania, personally knowing someone who is infected corresponds to higher levels of solidarity, while in Hungary being in confinement is associated with increased solidarity. The duration of the lockdown matters. In Romania and in Hungary, high levels of solidarity at the beginning of the lockdown decreased over time but started to increase again after several weeks into the lockdown.

1.2. Living without "Others"? (In)Tolerance of People in Visegrad Four Countries to Different Groups of People in a Comparative Analysis
Ivan Chorvat (Matej Bel University) & Tibor Madleňák

In our paper we focus on the development of attitudes towards various groups of people in Visegrad Four countries (Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary), especially those who are traditionally viewed as "different" (People of a different race, Migrants, Muslims, Roma people, and Jews). The analysis of EVS data shows that attitudes towards people who are different, measured by the question Q6 in EVS questionnaire 2017 ([which] groups of people... you would not like to have as a neighbors) change over time in the V4 countries, but their dynamics is very similar, which is especially true in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. Slovak and Hungarian society showed the highest level of tolerance to selected groups in 2008, Czechs were the most tolerant of most groups in 1999, but since then xenophobic and racist attitudes in all three countries have grown significantly and peaked in the last wave of EVS in 2017. The Polish story is a little different (except for attitudes towards Muslims, where their dynamics copy the development in other countries) and is a mirror development compared to the development in the Czech Republic (with peaks mainly in 1999 and the lowest values in the last wave). In the second part of the paper, we will compare the V4 countries with some selected countries of Western Europe. Finally, we will analyze the reasons (political, international, historical, and

cultural) that could explain the development of attitudes towards people traditionally perceived as "others" in the V4 countries in the period 1990 – 2017.

1.3. Gender Ideology in Europe: Plotting Normative Types in a Multidimensional Space
   Maake van Damme (CED, Autonoma University Barcelona) & Dimitris Pavlopoulos

Two recent articles (Grunow, Begall, & Buchler, 2018; Knight & Brinton, 2017) suggest that gender ideology is multidimensional. This finding is at odds with previous considerations that dominated the field. Specifically, previously, many scholars were seeing gender ideology as a continuum varying between traditionalism and egalitarianism and assumed that gender role attitudinal change was taking place due to cohort replacement and that this would lead to a cultural convergence across countries. Such a finding of multidimensionality is of utmost importance because, if robust, it can be used in future comparative (multilevel) research. However, these two articles present different results on which gender ideology profiles are dominant in Europe. Using the European Value Study, we replicate, reflect upon, and extend these LC analyses and address the question of generalizability and content- and criterion-related validity. Replication is an exercise that thus far has received little attention in sociology, even though it has substantial value, especially when results are to be used in further research. Although, we could replicate both articles almost perfectly, we came across certain limitations. Most importantly, our replication indicated that it is very difficult to replicate without validate. Therefore, we extended their analyses, and included not only more countries to enhance generalizability towards the EU, but we also used a slightly different operationalization of the concept of gender ideology. After carefully selecting seven items that cover four dimensions of the concept of gender ideology defined by Davis and Greenstein (2009) for 24 countries, we come to a five-cluster solution that synthesizes theoretically and empirically the results of the two articles for the EVS 2008 data. We label these five classes as 'sameness feminist', 'difference feminist', 'third wave feminist', 'traditional', and 'new traditional' and we clarify the place of each of these classes in a multidimensional space. This three-dimensional space is defined by an axis of joint versus male 'ladder' privilege in the public sphere (the x-dimension), joint versus female 'web' virtue in the private sphere (the y-dimension), and finally an axis of essentialism, i.e. to what extent do people belief that gender roles are based on gendered traits or are individual choices (the z-dimension). With this paper, we believe that we have provided appealing evidence that multidimensionality exists and that use of the gender ideology items in a unidimensional measure to capture gender ideologies is outdated. Instead, scholars should at least specify on which gender ideology class/type they are comparing countries and include a ranking, score, or a normative typology accordingly. To assist scholars in this, we provide normative context scores on each of the five gender ideology types. And for those who might want to use a clustering of countries ("five worlds of norms" that may be mutually influenced by the more general institutional context of welfare states), we suggest a clustering based on the ranking of countries on each of the five classes.

Session 2: Religiosity
Chair: TBA

Room: CZ6, Cobbenhagen building

2.1. Between Romania and Hungary: religiosity among Hungarians in Transylvania
  Gergely Rosta (Pázmány Péter Catholic University), Dénes Kiss & Bogdan Voicu

The tension between religiosity and modernity is of core importance when examining the changing place of religion in modern societies (Halman & Pettersson, 2003; Halman & Riis, 2003; Hervieu-Léger, 2010). The decreasing salience of religiosity in contemporary societies is different with respect to public and private spaces (Halman, Pettersson & Verweij, 1999), which makes important inspecting differences between societies that provide common paths but different public contexts. Postcommunist contexts are highly relevant, given the speed of transformations in the 1990s and afterwards (Tomka, 2010; Voicu, 2007). Hungary and Romania, connected through the large Hungarian minority in Transylvania provide an excellent area to study how religiosity changes.

In our study, we examine the religious characteristics of the Hungarians in Transylvania, who once used to be part of the state-forming nation in Hungary but have long been an ethnic minority in Romania. We raise the question about the position of this group in terms of religiosity between the Romanian and Hungarian societies. Our analysis investigates to what extent the Hungarians in Transylvania can be considered to be in an intermediate position between the Romanian and the Hungarian society in terms of religiosity.

Religiosity is examined empirically, in the dimensions of belonging, practice and faith, following Pollack and Rosta (2017). Our analyses are based on the databases of the European Values Study (EVS) 2017. Both Romania and Hungary have been participating in the survey conducted every nine years since 1990. The data that we employ is collected in 2018, in both countries, from national representative samples of roughly 1500 respondents. An additional survey with the same EVS questionnaire was conducted in 2019 in Transylvania on a probabilistic sample of roughly 1100 respondents, representative for the Hungarian minority.

2.2. The Multifaceted Relationship between Individual Religiosity and Attitudes toward Immigration: A Comparative Perspective with European Values Study 2017 Data
  Riccardo Ladini (University of Milan), Ferruccio Biolcati, Francesco Molteni,
  Andrea Pedrazzani & Cristiano Vezzoni

When analysing the relationship between individual religiosity and attitudes toward immigration, empirical research often leads to contrasting findings. To solve such a puzzle, our contribution aims at providing evidence toward the two possible effects that religiosity can exert on attitudes toward immigration. On the one hand, belonging to a religious community could reinforce the social identity, leading to negative attitudes toward outgroups. On the other hand, religious commitment makes adhering to religious teachings which promote altruistic values, such as the acceptance of others. Since the two mechanisms pertain to different dimensions of religiosity, we argue that the use of a typology that combines affiliation and church attendance allows testing the two hypotheses as complementary. In particular, such a procedure allows

distinguishing observant religious individuals from those who declare to be affiliated to a certain religion but are low committed to it – the most frequent profile in most European countries. The latter are those individuals whose religiosity is defined in terms of cultural and culturalized religion. Preliminary analyses on the Italian context show that strongly-committed religious people and non-religious people show the most positive attitudes toward immigration, while culturally-religious ones show the most hostile attitudes toward immigration, as they identify with the Catholic religion but tend not to adhere to religious teachings.

The present work aims at going further by analyzing the moderating role of the religious context in the relationship between the typology of individual religiosity and attitudes toward immigration. Various contextual characteristics can moderate that relationship, such as the stage occupied by the country in the secular transition process and the historical and political legacy (e.g., the legacy of communism). The former is supposed to be relevant given that in more secularized countries people showing a high religious commitment represent a minority and their adhesion to religion is more likely to be intended as a strongly felt choice. Accordingly, they could constitute a small but cohesive community that adheres to religious teachings; thence, this can result in bigger differences between observant religious people and culturally-religious ones. For what concerns the historical and political legacy, we hypothesize a different relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward immigrants in post-communist countries when compared with non-post-communist ones, as the formers are experiencing a stronger relationship between religion and politics, and religious and national identities overlapping to a larger extent.

To test our hypotheses, we will analyse European Values Study 2017 data through multilevel linear regression models, in which individuals are nested into countries.

2.3. Secularization and the Religious Factor in Europe: Obedience and Autonomy as Important Child-Rearing Qualities
Inge Sieben (Tilburg University) & Katya Ivanova

Previous research, mostly US based, shows that religious beliefs and practice are related to parental values: religious individuals value obedience more and autonomy less as an important quality to teach children at home than their non-religious counterparts. One wonders how this 'religious factor' is in secularized Northwestern Europe. According to secularization theory, the association between being a religious person and the preferences for obedience and autonomy will weaken due to the loss of social significance of religion. An alternative theoretical perspective however predicts that this only happens in the first stage of secularization, after which the association might increase again as religious identities of those who remain religious may be strengthened in a secular world. Employing EVS data of Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands for the period of 1981-2017, we find evidence for this U-shaped pattern in Germany, Great Britain and, for obedience only, in France. However, in Denmark and the Netherlands, the patterns are quite mixed and not in line with the theoretical perspectives. Future research could focus on the heterogeneity of both the religious and non-religious population to explain the trends observed.

2.4. Do 'Spiritual' Self-Identifications Signify Affinity with New Age? Survey Evidence from the Netherlands
Paul Tromp (KU Leuven), Anna Pless & Dick Houtman

This paper examines nationally representative survey data from the Netherlands collected in 2015 (N=2,197) to study whether the 'spiritual but not religious' embrace New Age spirituality and reject traditional Christian religion, whereas the 'both religious and spiritual' adhere to traditional Christian religion and understand spirituality in a non-New Age fashion (i.e. spirituality in a Christian sense). Yet, we find just as much affinity with New Age spirituality among the 'both religious and spiritual' as among the 'spiritual but not religious'. This is because the more liberal and progressive Christians in the former category embrace New Age spirituality, too, while their more conservative and traditional Christian counterparts in this 'both religious and spiritual' category rather dismiss it. Both within Christian religion and beyond it, then, self-identifications of 'being spiritual' have become quite reliable shortcuts to identify sympathy with what used to be called 'New Age' in the past.

Session 3: Politics
Chair: Edurne Bartolomé Peral

Room: CZ110, Cobbenhagen building

3.1. Gender Gap in Protest Potential: The Impact of Cohort Value Change and Contextual Factors in Europe (1981-2020)
Olga Lavrinenko (University of Warsaw)

Many cross-national studies of protest take gender for granted as one of the socio-demographic variables. Overall, they find that women have a lower protest potential than men, especially when geographical coverage goes beyond the Western world. The research focused on the gender gap in protest suggests that this gap is narrowing thanks to the spread of higher education, women's labor force participation, and emancipative values. Nevertheless, women still tend to participate in more peaceful protests such as petitions and boycotts, avoiding more confrontational protests such as demonstrations, strikes, and occupying buildings. Although the theoretical and empirical literature examines the impact of gender on protest, and the relationship between the rise of emancipative values and protest, the frame for the study of protest that posits the intersection of gender, age cohort, and emancipative values needs further exploration.

I employ multilevel cross-classified random effects models with individuals nested within birth cohorts and within EVS waves to test the frame. In this paper, I focus on the impact of values on the difference in protest potential between men and women of different age cohorts over time and pose three hypotheses. Hypothesis 1: Post-materialist values will increase protest potential among women and men of all cohorts. Hypothesis 2: Post-materialist values will increase protest potential among women of all cohorts, but not among men. Hypothesis 3: Post-materialist values will increase protest potential among the youngest cohort of women, but not among the youngest men.

To test these hypotheses, I draw on the European Values Study integrated dataset (1981-2020) with a total number of 189 339 individual-level observations. Individuals are nested in 12 birth cohorts (ten-years age gaps) and 40 years (1981-2020). During 40 years, five EVS waves were conducted: 1981-1984; 1990-1993; 1999-2001; 2008-2010; 2017-2020. The response variable is a protest potential scale, consisting of potential participation and past participation in signing a petition, attending lawful demonstrations, joining in boycotts, and strikes. Birth cohort and year are specified as macro-level variables and introduced as random effects to the regression. Individual-level variables include age of the respondent, emancipative values index, education, labor force participation, interest in politics. Also, I draw on World Bank and V-Dem as data sources for control contextual variables: type of political regime, economic development, income inequalities, percentage of female legislators, power distributed by gender.

3.2. Post-Soviet Civil Society in Transition: Leftist Social Movements in Lithuania
Laura Daiksatu (Vilnius University)

The existing discourse on leftist movements in post-Soviet countries characterizes them as weak and isolated. This research analyzes the case of Lithuania, which has had parliamentary left

parties since the democratic transition. Despite this, a new leftist movement recently began to emerge. Therefore, I answer the question, how can we explain the emergence of new leftist political groups in the context of a continued prominence and authority of the "old" left in the Lithuanian government? I analyze the case on several levels. The macro-level analysis is based on the European Value Study (EVS) 3rd pre-release of 2017 data, while for meso/micro-level analysis I conducted 8 interviews with the members of the new leftist movement. The research reveals that a precarious society was formed by those who lost out in the democratic transition. The opportunity for the leftist movement to arise was due to a sense of disappointment stimulated by the long-lasting inefficiency of political parties and their inability to deal with precarious conditions in the country. The new leftist movement was formed recently because of the frustrations of the first post-Soviet generation, rising from the discrepancy between dominating class-based capitalist politics and social issues, including identity politics, which stimulated the search for alternative explanations of the socio-economic structure. Moreover, because of the nature of this generation, the new leftist movement is dual -- an anti-austerity-care movement, fighting not only for the improvement of the precarious conditions they are facing but also taking care of the most vulnerable ones and thus creating a more inclusive and equal democracy.

3.3. "Co-nationals, first!"- Unpacking the Link between Nationalism and Native Favouritism in Europe: A Theoretical Model and Evidence Using Survey Data
Simona Guglielmi (University of Milan)

All over Europe, the idea is increasingly taking hold that cultural diversity, in particular if associated with international migration, is problematic or undesirable. A narrative showing a nationalism staked on the separation and contrast between natives and foreigners is growing. Furthermore, opposition to immigrants intertwines with the attempt to construct and/or reaffirm a collective identity around an ethnic majoritarian conception of national identity. This trend is summed up by the motto «Co-nationals, first! », suggesting a nativist conception of the nation and diversity as a threat. According to this view, support for discriminatory measures targeting immigrants seems to be the direct consequence of «preference for the "native" exclusively on the grounds of "being native"».

Against this background, the paper focuses on the link between nationalism and support for native employment priority in mass public opinion. Theoretically, I propose an original model, the National Identity Threat Trust model (NITT). The main claim is that national identity, directly and indirectly, influences preferences on issues such as restrictions based on immigration status: directly, as a specific form of ingroup favouritism that arises in competitive intergroup contexts, as purported by Social Identity Theory; and indirectly because national identity (the affective and normative dimensions) may contribute to a deteriorating climate of intergroup relations. The empirical test of the argument is done by a structural equation modelling (SEM) on survey data from the last wave of EVS (2017-2020). A comparative approach is adopted. The study includes Northwestern (France, Germany) Central-Eastern (Hungary, Poland) and Southern Europe (Greece, Italy). Cross-national invariance is tested using Multi Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis (MGCFA).

Expectations depicted by the NITT model are based on two theoretical sources. The first is the debate within sociology and political science on the different ideas of nationhood and "new" nationalism driven by immigration, while the second consists of socio-psychological models of intergroup relations. I consider two sources of attitudes to explain support for natives' priority:

national identity and intergroup social climate. According to the "Group Identity Lens Model", I expect that national identity components (both affective and normative dimensions) constitute the frame in which intergroup social climate (perceived threat and trust-related emotions) become salient. In turn, they influence attitudes towards native favouritism. I distinguish between ethnic majoritarianism and civility based on the literature on the different conceptions of national belonging. Moreover, regarding the affective dimension of national identity, following the literature on multiple identities, I consider the role of both national and supranational territorial attachment.

Empirically, a structural equation model is specified consisting of: 1) the measurement model, which includes five latent variables (ethnic majoritarianism, civility, globalism, distrust of foreigners, realistic threat); 2) the structural/causal model which, based on the theoretical assumptions, links the five latent variables seen above and three observed variables (national attachment, symbolic threat, native employment priority). Preliminary analysis of Italian data showed that the NITT model might contribute to a better understanding of the mechanisms underpinning the formation of immigration policy preferences based on nativist criteria.

Session 4: Methodological and Empirical Challenges to Value Change
Chair: Markus Quandt

Room: CZ6, Cobbenhagen building

4.1. A Community of Shared Values? Dimensions and Dynamics of Cultural Integration in the European Union
Plamen Akaliyski (UC3M), Christian Welzel & Josef Hein

The series of recent crises (EURO, refugees, backsliding, Brexit) challenge the self-portrayal of the European Union (EU) as a community of shared values. Against this backdrop, we analyse European Values Study data from 1990 till 2020 to assess the level and change in publics' acceptance of the EU's officially propagated values: personal freedom, individual autonomy, social solidarity, ethnic tolerance, civic honesty, gender equality and liberal democracy. We find that EU publics support these values strongly and increasingly over time. The EU-member publics are also remarkably distinct culturally from Eastern European non-EU-nations, especially concerning individual freedoms and gender equality. Simultaneously, however, member nations internalize EU-values at different speeds – alongside traditional religious fault lines that continue to differentiate Europe – in the following order from fastest to slowest: (1) Protestant, (2) Catholic, (3) Ex-communist and (4) Orthodox countries. In conclusion, the EU writ large evolves into a distinct value-sharing community at different speeds.

4.2. Is the Epidemiological Approach to Testing Value Transmission Using Migrant Samples Valid? Problems, Challenges and Solutions
Annemiek Schilpzand (Radboud University Nijmegen)

The influence of cultural values in economic literature is ever growing. The problem with using cultural values is that it is hard to disentangle other confounding factors that inadvertently influence the relationship one is researching. The epidemiological approach overcomes this problem by using the cross-border 'portability' of cultural values. Migrant parents transmit their ancestral country culture to their children, who are born and raised in a different country and cultural environment. The transmitted cultural values can then be isolated from the confounding factors of the destination country. The downside of this approach is that migrants might not be representative of the culture of their ancestral country. We test the epidemiological approach's reliance on migrant samples by making use of cultural values of migrants and comparing that to the cultural values of natives of their ancestral country. For this test we use both the European Values Study and the European Social Survey to analyze two types of values: trust and religiosity. Our findings indicate that a significant deviation between migrants' and natives' values is not present for trust but is present for religious values. We specifically find that religious values are consistently underestimated when using natives' cultural values. The findings are robust to using different data and omitting possible outliers. The results indicate that the alleged misrepresentation of the epidemiological approach leads to an underestimation of the relation.

4.3. Assessing Value Change in Adults Using Longitudinal Panel Data
Gerwin van der Laan (Tilburg University) & Tim Reeskens

Although values are presumed stable within individuals (Rokeach, 1973), research increasingly analyzes their longitudinal intraindividual structure. Changes may occur in adolescence, during which relative stability is presumed to develop (Pöge, 2020). Moreover, impactful changes in the personal environment are argued to cause structural changes in values (Bardi et al., 2009).

While up to the start of this millennium research on value change was predominantly theoretical (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004), recent work added empirical observations to the debate. For example, Foad et al. (2021) analyze self-reported value change, measured at a single point in time. Reeskens et al (2021) avoid the risk of recall bias by comparing value ratings before and during the coronavirus pandemic. Similarly, Bardi et al. (2009) proxy for stability through the absence of differences between adjacent time points.

We use trait-state modelling to assess the relative stability of values (Loncke et al., 2017; Prenoveau, 2016). The Trait-State-Occasion (TSO) modelling operationalizes stability in a different manner than extant literature and offers additional insights into the longitudinal value structure. The TSO model decomposes the manifest value indicators in three distinct components. First, a so-called trait component is assumed stable in an individual over time, but varies across individuals. Since situational factors may lead to temporary changes in values, equating no change in manifest variables to stability is a restrictive definition of the trait. In TSO modelling, covariance between indicators that is observed across measurement moments is considered stable. The TSO model allows to calculate the consistency of the data, that is: the share of variance in observed indicators which is stable across time. If values are relatively stable we should observe high consistency.

Second, there is variance uniquely attributable to a measurement moment. This component includes situational variations around the trait. Pöge (2020) also distinguishes situational from trait-like variation in adolescents using TSO modeling. Our sample includes older age groups in which a stable trait should be expected more than in adolescents whose value systems are yet to evolve. Our approach, like Pöge's (2020), allows to distinguish stable from time-varying variance. Third, and in addition to Pöge (2020), we model autoregressive pathways between adjacent occasions. That is, we research whether situational factors in a person's environment continue to influence their values beyond the time point at which the situational factor occurs. In adolescents, such autoregressive pathways are likely to capture the development in values, but in mature age groups they more likely pick up transfers from situations occurring at one measurement moment to subsequent measurements.

Our trait-state modelling approach to value change hence contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we measure the share of the variance in values within individuals which is stable over time. Second, and conversely, we establish whether part of the variance in values is situational. Third, we document whether situational variance in values transfers to subsequent measurement moments.

4.4. European Values and "Europeanness" in the Eyes of Central-Eastern Europeans
Joanna Konieczna-Sałamatin (University of Warsaw) & Maja Sawicka

The process of European integration in the CEE countries can be perceived as a 'second modernization', after the systemic breakthrough in the nineties. The process had diverse speed

and different outcomes when we consider the countries which have become members of the EU (Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary) and those which are outside of the EU (the Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia). We propose a conception of the process of European integration as a 'triple modernization' encompassing economic, institutional, and cultural changes. Using a mixed methods approach based on qualitative data (for Poland and Ukraine) and quantitative data generated through the EVS from all the countries under interest, we present the diversification of attitudes connected with each of the three aspects of modernization. Thus, we not only reconstruct the attitudes towards the EU and measure their prevalence, but, in the case of Ukraine and Poland, we also go beyond the quantitative level to identify and present meanings ascribed to the economic, the institutional and the cultural aspect of European integration. We reveal that the societies under study tend to generally accept the peripheral status of their countries in the economic context and expect financial support from the core countries of the EU. Simultaneously, however, within the cultural context, there exists a marginal but salient attitude that is based on an opposition towards cultural pressures and on a claim to an active role in the shaping of the European axiological agenda. Distinguishing the three aspects of a general process of European integration allows us to address a puzzle: why societies which are generally supportive towards their membership in the European Union – the Polish society is a paradigmatic case in this regard – simultaneously lean in their political choices towards anti-European political parties? We claim that the diversification of attitudes towards each aspect of European integration seen should be seen as a source of tensions in Polish and other CEE societies, and seem to lead to a questioning of the very idea of European integration and adoption of European values.

Session 5: Work and Welfare
Chair: Susanne Wallman Lundåsen

Room: CZ109, Cobbenhagen building

5.1.   Work Ethics in Nine Countries During 20 Years: Entrepreneurs vs Non-Entrepreneurs
Velli Parts (Taltech)

Work ethic is based on the belief that work has an intrinsic value; and essentially represents the degree to which individuals place work at or near the centre of their lives. This study analyses work ethics and the importance given to work and other life dimensions (namely family, leisure time, friends, politics, and religion) in nine countries (Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland) during last 20 years. Using data from three waves of European Values Study (1999-2001, 2008-2010, 2017-2020) we focus on the question how similar are entrepreneurs in terms of their relationship to work compared to non-entrepreneurs in those societies. As entrepreneurs are often considered agents of change responsible for economic growth and prosperity in society being at the same time somewhat different in their personalities (more proactive and achievement oriented), the link between entrepreneurship, culture and values has gained research attention worldwide. However, most studies thus far focus on trends delineating the stability or change in work ethics across countries (and occasionally among various sub-groups), but we suggest it is patters or how the importance assigned to various life dimensions (work, family, leisure time etc.) is combined that should be addressed.

Our analyses show that (1) in general, work ethics in those nine countries has grown stronger during last two decades – i.e. compared to the beginning of 21st century people in all nine countries we studied agree a bit more that work is a duty towards society, people who don`t work turn lazy, and it`s humiliating to receive money without having to work for it; (2) trends towards stronger work ethics is not linear (in Netherlands, Germany and Sweden work ethics was strongest in 2008-2010); (3) work ethics in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland was stronger compared to Netherlands, Germany, and Scandinavian countries in 1999-2001; (4) Denmark, Lithuania, and Poland endorse strongest work ethics in in 2017-2020; (5) valuation of work ethics by entrepreneurs is generally not different from society in general, although in Scandinavian countries during various time points entrepreneurs favour stronger work ethics; (6) greater share of entrepreneurs in Netherlands, Germany and Scandinavian countries as well as Poland saw family as very important in life during 1999-2010 compared to Estonia and Latvia; (7) seeing friends, leisure time, and politics as very important in life has no clear pattern among entrepreneurs longitudinally and between countries; (8) proportionally more German, Latvian, and Polish entrepreneurs see work as very important life role; (9) 30% and more Polish entrepreneurs consider religion very important in life whereas in other countries 5-15% agree with that.

5.2.   Preferences for Redistribution and Wealth Inequality around the World
Javier Olivera (LISER) & Francesco Andreoli

The goal of this paper is to assess the role of wealth inequality on shaping individual preferences for redistribution. Several papers have used measures of income inequality and redistribution at

the country level and across periods to account for the effect of income inequality on preferences for redistribution. These studies were originated to test the main prediction of the median voter theorem (Meltzer and Richard 1981): that the level of income inequality positively affects the size of income redistribution in the country. The idea is that increasing income inequality should trigger a higher demand for redistribution, captured by the attitudes towards redistribution expressed by the individuals.

The results of these studies are mixed, although most of them find a positive effect or a rather small effect of income inequality on preferences for redistribution. However, it is possible that other economic inequalities can be more influential on the level of redistribution demanded. This is the case of wealth. Wealth is a key component of household welfare. Wealth can expand the possibilities of individual choices with respect to consumption, human capital and other capital investments, occupation and leisure, and it can also protect households from the consequences of negative shocks to income. Wealth has important insurance properties that can even compete with traditional forms of redistribution provided by the welfare state (Ahlquist and Ansell (2017) and Ansell (2014)). Individuals can achieve insurance through the market accumulating wealth or through standard tax-benefits policies. Therefore, the distribution of wealth can be an important driver of preferences for redistribution.

As a growing body of evidence shows, we are witnessing a sustained increase in wealth inequality that may arguably weaken social cohesion and other types of pro-social behaviour, in which preferences for redistribution can be included. This paper analyses redistributive preferences of the individuals of 90 countries participating in the European Values Survey (EVS), World Values Survey (WVS), Life in Transition Survey (LITS), and the European Social Survey (ESS) during 2000-2020. The sample size amounts about 550,000 individuals in all available surveys, which are nationally representative of the country adult population. Measures of wealth inequality and portfolio composition at the country are retrieved from the Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook. We will perform various linear regressions exploiting differences across time and countries, and will analyse a causal link from wealth inequality to redistributive preferences by exploiting an Instrument Variable (IV) approach. We will use housing and financial prices as well as macro-prudential measures (that regulates the amount of credit in the country) as potential IV for the identification of causality.

5.3. Solidarity and Identity – Twins, Siblings, or Only Loose Acquaintances? An Assessment of Their Relationship with EVS 2017 Data
Markus Quandt (GESIS Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences)

The European Values Study avails of a unique question battery on solidarity attitudes. However, this battery has been used for comparative research only relatively rarely. These existing applications were mostly related to welfare state attitudes and their variation across European welfare regimes.

We will instead look at a more foundational relationship at the individual level, which is the relationship of solidarity to feelings of identification. We employ a conception of attitudinal solidarity that focuses on the basic willingness to help others in need and thus abstracts from specific situations of neediness. The EVS solidarity measure has the advantage of allowing to differentiate this willingness by how wide a circle of recipients the respondents might offer their support to. This enables us to investigate the claim that solidarity and identification should be mutually dependent. The degree to which that is the case could in perspective shed light on

important questions such as how easily solidarity with unknown strangers would erode when this solidarity is being actively requested (the lesser the identification with distant members of the same society, the faster the erosion), or whether the experience of receiving solidarity might increase feelings of identification, and if that effect also works for more remote solidarity relationships, such as across borders within the European Union.

Prior research with EVS 2017 data (Quandt/Lomazzi, in print) has shown that average solidarity attitudes and identification patterns at the level of whole societies indeed have weak but mostly consistent mutual associations, so that a more encompassing scope of identification goes along with higher readiness to support socially distant persons. For the proposed presentation we will check how much this macro-level association is carried by parallel micro-level associations, and specifically, if such associations are uniform across different societal groups that might have their own 'internal' cultures. Further, we will test the associations of both solidarity attitudes and identification patterns with external variables to assess whether they can be seen as part of the same attitude 'syndrome' at the micro level, or whether they are potentially driven by different factors.

5.4. Why Do Europeans Differentiate More in Their Solidarity with Beneficiaries of Social Policy? Increased Conditionality in Solidarity in the 21st Century Explained
Femke Roosma (Tilburg University)

Since the seminal work of Van Oorschot on deservingness perceptions among citizens of European welfare states in 2006, studies examining deservingness of target groups of social policy have expanded. In this study Van Oorschot uses data of the European Value Survey (EVS) from 1999 and finds that people show most solidarity with elderly people, and with people who are sick and disabled, while concerns about the living conditions of the unemployed and immigrants are lowest. In addition Van Oorschot examines to what extent people differentiate in their solidarity for different target groups of social policy, claiming that people who differentiate more, are more conditional in their solidarity.

In this paper I build on the work of Van Oorschot (2006) in two ways. First of all, utilizing the availability of two new ways of the EVS survey (in 2008 and 2017), I study the trends in the conditionality of solidarity; do Europeans differentiate more or less in their feelings of solidarity for different target groups? And what are underlying patterns in feelings of solidarity towards these different target groups? Second, making use of an increased amount of contexts (countries in different years), I try to explain variation in conditionality of solidarity with economic circumstances and social policy characteristics. Do better economic conditions and more selective welfare states contribute to the increased levels of conditionality in feelings of solidarity?

Preliminary results show that conditionality in solidarity has increased since 1999; people differentiate more in their solidarity with target groups of social policy. Solidarity with the elderly and sick and disabled has increased, while solidarity with the unemployed has decreased in the past two decades. The perceived deservingness of target groups seems to be drifting apart. In addition, results show that in times of economic prosperity people differentiate more in their solidarity towards target groups, seemingly because people are less concerned with the living conditions of the unemployed under these circumstances. Moreover more generous social protection spending makes people differentiate less among different target groups of social policy; people are more concerned with the living conditions of the unemployed and less with

the conditions of the elderly and sick and disabled in contexts with higher social spending levels. Remarkably, higher degrees of spending on means-tested benefits (as a percentage of total social spending) lowers the level of conditionality in solidarity. Means-tested social spending increases levels of solidarity for all target groups, but mostly for the unemployed.

Session 6: Morality
Chair: Riccardo Ladini

Room: CZ110, Cobbenhagen building

6.1. The Evolution of Morality across Three Decades: Different Pathways for Universal and Culture-specific Moralities
   Raül Tormos (Generalitat de Catalunya), Christine-Melanie Vauclair, Henrik Dobewall, Plamen Akalyiski & Malcolm Fairbrother

This study examined the development of moral attitudes over time from a comparative perspective. Delving into the moral universalism and relativism debate, we show that the evolution of moral attitudes depends on the moral issues investigated. Using items from the Morally Debatable Behaviors Scale (MDBS) fielded in the World Value Survey and the European Values Study (WVS-EVS integrated dataset 1981-2020), we found that the two cross-cultural dimensions of moral issues found by Vauclair & Fischer (2011), attitudes towards (1) dishonest–illegal and (2) personal–sexual issues, do evolve differently over time following a predictable pattern across countries. Drawing upon evolutionary and value theories, we expected that the former moral domain, not related to cultural values, would experience smaller variations over time, whereas the latter, influenced by cultural conceptions of the self, would undergo clear foreseeable changes. We used random effects within and between models (REWB) with socioeconomic contextual independent variables (both time invariant and time varying) and the two moral domains as assessed through the MDBS as dependent variables to test our hypotheses. After controlling for individual-level differences in moral attitudes, our findings confirmed that attitudes towards dishonest–illegal issues were more stable over time irrespective of the country; whereas attitudes towards personal–sexual issues underwent deeper transformations and the cross-country variation was higher. In particular, nations that enjoyed more economic prosperity during the period of observation experienced increasing levels of tolerance and openness in the personal and sexual issues domain.

6.2. Changes in Moral Values: A Study across 30 European Countries
   Anastasiia Volkova (University of Helsinki)

This paper investigates the changes in moral values across 30 European countries, using data of the Morally Debatable Behaviors Scale (MDBS) in the European Values Study (EVS). The MDBS attempts to measure moral values by asking justifications of different actions and events, from claiming social benefits to euthanasia. Results of multi-group confirmatory factor analysis followed by validity tests prove that the MDBS measures the leniency of moral judgments. However, because of the change in values and several methodological shortcomings, the model performs worse in the last wave of data. On the larger scale, as the MDBS consists of questions on sensitive topics, the model fit may have worsened due to social desirability and non-response biases, with items having highly non-normal distributions. Several suggestions on how to approach the MDBS's measurement invariance are demonstrated with the usage of 2008 and 2017 EVS waves. Furthermore, it seems that the moral values associated with fairness and the legal system ("public morality") remained stable over the decade, while justifications of rights to life, sex, and death choices ("private morality") have undergone significant changes in some

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countries. These findings support the results of previous research, arguing that while public morality is universal, private depends on cultural contexts. The paper explores several country cases that provide possible explanations for such changes in personal-sexual moral values. Overall, it is presented how the MDBS can be used to analyze and visualize value change across Europe, drawing on insights from survey methodology and comparative social research.

6.3. Mechanisms of Values Traditionalization in Post-Soviet Countries: The Example of Belarus
Alena Artsiomenka-Melyantsova (Belarusian State University)

The paper examines "scarcity" and "socialization" hypotheses for the continuing process of value traditionalization in Belarus. The dynamics of two main components of traditional views (attitudes towards religion and family) according to EVS shows that popularity of traditional values continues to grow. The share of religious people increased from 27,5% in 2000 to 36,9% in 2017 (in Russia it increased as well from 66,9% to 77,1%, but in neighbour Poland the trend is opposite and the share of religious people decreased from 93,9% to 86,5%). The importance of family is growing in Belarus as well. The share of answers that family is "very important" increased from 78,5% to 89,4% (in Russia and Poland it slightly increased from 76,2% to 77,4% and from 91,1% to 93,9%, accordingly).

To reveal the mechanisms of this transformation we analyse the dynamics in different groups by settlement size indicating the standards of living in Belarus (a scarcity hypothesis) and in different age cohorts (a socialization hypothesis). A scarcity hypothesis says that nowadays standards of living can influence current values in society. People in smaller settlements in Belarus have traditional views more often. The share of religious people in settlements with less than 5000 dwellers is 39% when the level in the biggest cities with more than 500 ths is 34,9%. However, we can see that the level of religiosity increases in all types of settlements (e.i. in cities with 100-500 ths from 21,5% in 2000 to 31,4% in 2017). The share of people who evaluate family as very important slightly differs from 91,3% in the smallest settlements to 90% in the biggest ones, but the trend of growing importance is common for all of them (e.i. in cities with 100-500ths from 82,9% in 2000 to 86,5% in 2017). Thus, the hypothesis of scarcity is proved but the tendency of growing traditional values can't be explained with it.

The comparison of age cohorts shows that younger cohorts have postmaterialist views more often than older ones (the share of religious people 1936-1945 year of birth cohort is 50% however among people born after 1995 is only 21%). But during these years the level of religiosity increased in each cohort (e.i. in 1976-1985 cohort from 25% in 2000 to 30% in 2017). The share of those who treat family as very important decreased from 88,4% in 1936-1945 to 79% after 1995. However, the importance of family is growing in each cohort (e.i. in 1976-1985 cohort from 73,4% in 2000 to 92,9% in 2017). These results prove the hypothesis of socialization according to which the generations socialized in more comfortable and safe conditions have less traditional views, but it can't explain the current trend.

The conducted analysis shows that both hypotheses of scarcity and socialization are applicable for value changes in Belarus, however they are not enough to explain it and some other conditions of "fast" and "slow" value changes such as media effects and government policy should be taken into account.

Session 7: Values in Education
Chair: Inge Sieben

Room: Portretroom, Cobbenhagen building

7.1. Values Education by Using Maps and Scatterplot Tools Related to Data of the European Values Study
Uwe Krause (Fontys University of Applied Sciences) & Tibor Madleňák

Values education is a challenge for geography education in this day and age. Dealing with controversial issues is a key aspect of powerful knowledge and powerful geography teaching. However, teachers tend to avoid these issues in classroom settings. One of the reasons is the lack of suitable tools and teaching strategies. By using the data of the European Values Study, the project European Values in Education offers web-based map and scatterplot tools, as well as teaching materials with the aim of supporting teachers to deal with controversial issues such as migration or environment. During the session, preliminary evaluation results about how the offered tools help teaching and learning will be presented.

7.2. Conceptual Maps of Europe: How Clustering, Dimensionality Reduction and Visualization Can Provide Further Insight on the Opinions Expressed within a Survey
Tamara Mchedlidze (Utrecht University)

Researchers in information visualization investigate clear, understandable and easily interpretable ways to represent complex data sets. This research leaded to the use of cartographic metaphor for the representation of high-dimensional data sets. Such maps depict abstract entities using cities and countries and use cartographic features, such as distances between the cities, city colors, country sizes, to depict the similarity and the importance of the corresponding entities. Map metaphor for the visualization of high-dimensional data sets enjoys the benefit of human familiarity with geographic maps.

In our recent project OpMap, we have employed a map metaphor to visualize the results of the survey on the Veggie Debate: the intense and multi-aspect debate of the question whether one should follow a vegetarian diet. This map was exhibited in the ZKM - center for art and media Karlsruhe. The visitors of ZKM could observe the map on a large projector screen, fill in the survey and observe their position on the map. The map was constantly changing as more and more visitors were filling in the survey.

My current project being implemented with students at Utrecht University targets to create metaphoric maps of European values based on the EVS data. Besides the technical challenges (e.g. the data set is very large), the design choices (e.g. how to deal with missing data), there are ethical dilemmas — is it ethically correct to apply certain algorithms on EVS data and present the Europeans with visualizations that clearly depict groups of people clustered based on their opinions?

In this talk I will give examples of the use of map metaphor for visualizing high-dimensional data sets, describe the algorithms and visualization techniques that lie behind the OpMap

visualization, and conclude with discussing technical and ethical dilemmas that arise in the process of applying map metaphor to EVS data set.

7.3. Values of Young People in Europe and Their Way of Life; Introducing Educational Strategies
Monique van Dijk-Groeneboer (Tilburg University)

In the longitudinal research in the Netherlands (five yearly survey amongst secondary school pupils, since 1997. Van Dijk-Groeneboer 2001, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2019) core values are searched for and compared over the years. Since 2017, also data is gathered with the same questionnaire amongst 300 Czech pupils, 300 Saxonian (German) pupils, 160 Slovakian pupils and 900 Polish pupils that can be compared with the 2200 Ditch pupils that completed the survey. Although statistically significant equations can not be made for various reasons, the explorative study on individualistic values like "be free and independent", "enjoying life" and "be happy with myself", next to more social values like "be a good person" "be there for others" and "help people with troubles" does allow some theoretical thinking on the diversity of Europe and the challenges for being young nowadays in countries with very different historical backgrounds, rooted cultures and political circumstances.

In this survey, also religious items were introduced, and the role religion or faith has in life and the religious background of the young seem to make a difference when comparing the mentioned values. Despite the secularization taking place in almost entire Europe zooming in on the religious roots - that go way back in the generations and still are noticeable in the values the young of todays' Europe regard as important - is relevant to keep in mind when building with and on behalf of them for the future of Europe. Also, the focus on belonging to institutions, or the skeptical attitude towards them, is very good to be aware of when looking at the political discussions and the polarization taking place in many countries.

Results of the European Values Study show (Sieben 2019) that the Dutch trust humans more, are more proud to be Dutch, belief in a personal God less and are convinced that no God or life force exists over the years (1981 – 2017). In this Study people over 18 are included and in the Survey described here people 15- 18 are the respondents. Therefore, the survey can be an addition to the European Values Study and may give a more complete image of the values and identity of young people. Also, questions are formulated to focus future research on and learning strategies to work with these young people to let them be the creative builders of future Europe.

Having said this, I introduce in this paper research about dealing with values in secondary schools that helps focusing on values and dialogues in the classroom in this regard, where in the Netherlands now the concept 'citizenship education' is the key word (Heijstek 2021). Educational strategies to open up the discussion on the precarious issues of values, identity and religion are practiced and researched (Kienstra 2019, Van Dijk 2020) and might be an example to transfer to other countries in the search for letting young people grow to become resilient professionals with strong identities and awareness in this above all.

7.4. Assessing Character in Higher Education
Tessa Leesen (Tilburg University), Alkeline van Lenning & John Gelissen

The traditional pillars in any university training are the acquisition of content knowledge and (academic) skills. However, the educational vision of Tilburg University has the ambition to turn students into graduates with 'knowledge', 'skills' and 'character'. This ambitious educational vision poses the following challenge: "How to assess students' character?"

Assessing to what extent students have attained character at the end of their study is a challenging enterprise (Arthur, 2020, p. 1). Since the development of citizenship is a constant and never-ending quest, its assessment cannot simply consist of a checklist with boxes that need to be ticked. Its development requires close monitoring over a longer period of time. The aim of our research is to design and implement an assessment method to measure character within the context of higher education. For this purpose, we combine insights of the educational theory of learning gain with those of the psychological theory of narrative identity.

Learning gain, as defined by McGrath (et al., 2015, p. xi), is "the distance travelled" or "the difference between the skills, competencies, content knowledge and personal development by the student at two points in time". The assessment of learning gain requires the collection of longitudinal data to monitor students' individual trajectories. In our research, we focus on three character-related areas of learning gain that have cross-disciplinary relevance: intellectual, personal and civic learning gain. In order to avoid reaching patronizing conclusions regarding a graduate's character, it is imperative to involve students themselves in the evaluation process. Therefore, our research opts for self-reporting methods that build upon the theory of narrative identity.

In a small-scale research pilot at UC Tilburg in 2019, we constructed a narrative questionnaire to map students' learning gain. In the presentation, we will discuss, but also critically evaluate the findings from the research pilot. This critical evaluation allowed for a redesign of the research and has recently translated into an NRO-funded research project: "It's not all about good grades: Assessing Intellectual, Personal and Civic Learning Gain in Higher Education".

Session 8: Polarization
Chair: Tim Reeskens

Room: CZ112, Cobbenhagen building

8.1. Education, Value Orientations, and Contemporary Cleavage Structures: Exploring the Links
Tassilo Heinrich (University of Regensburg)

"Social conflicts dominating in liberal democracies today are mostly about globalization, immigration, or climate change policies, which at their core pose, at least to some, a threat to the established way of life. These conflicts pit cosmopolitans against communitarians, liberals against authoritarians, people with open hearts and minds against those with closed ones. Inherent to these opposing groups are differences in value orientations. Not only do they impact political attitudes and voting behavior, which are important for cleavage formation, but they influence general look on life, choice of friends and life partners, as well as cultural tastes. In general, values build the core of personal and social identities.

The rise of liberal, cosmopolitan, and post-materialist value orientations is attributed to the expansion of (higher) education. Educational attainment is linked to fostering cognitive performance, psychological security, and socialization processes, which provide the better educated with the abilities to cope with the uncertainties of modern ""risk societies"" (Beck 1986). More open, liberal, and tolerant value orientation are beneficial in societies which put premiums on flexibility and transferability of skills due to ever changing demands.

However the formation of a full cleavage not only demands differences in social structure and value orientations, but some kind of social closure of the opposing groups as well. Recent studies show an inheritable effect of education and an effect of education on mating preferences. Hence the number of families with mixed educational backgrounds is shrinking.

This research project tests the hypothesis of an increasing impact of educational differences on cleavage structures empirically with data from the

European Social Survey and European Value Study. By applying Baysian Multi-level Structural Equation Models, I trace the effect of education and its ability to close social circles on value orientations, as well as the joint effect of educational attainment of social circles and value orientations on vote choice over time. Preliminary results indicate a strong impact on higher education on cultural values, whereas its impact on economic values is mixed. Furthermore, the results show that vote choice is increasingly correlated with education and value orientations, replacing class as the dominat factor for vote choice. The impact of the social circles on value orientations and vote choice however remains limited. In sum, value orientations are mainly driven by educational attainment and their joint effect impacts vote choice strongly. Apparently, a new cleavage has established itself in liberal democracies, which in itself is no ground for concern, as long as both groups keep supporting the democratic institutional order."

8.2. Ideological Polarization and Political Activism
Susanne Wallman Lundåsen (Linköping University) & Alexander Ryan

Our primary aim is descriptive insofar as we describe levels of political activism across European countries as well as individual level predictors of activism. To do so, we primarily rely on data from the European Values Study's fifth (2017) wave. When it comes to changes in political activism over time, we compare levels of activism in the most recent EVS wave with data from the previous three waves in 1990, 1999, and 2008. First, we descriptively outline levels of political activism and ideological polarization across the countries and over time. Second, we use multilevel logit regression analyses to test for predictors of political activism. Previous research on ideological polarization have typically distinguished between polarization in terms of attitudes gravitating towards opposite poles ("polarization"), and greater sorting of attitudes along partisan lines (i.e., partisan sorting) (e.g. Hetherington 2009).

8.3. Alignment: Identity-Based Polarization in Europe
Quita Muis (Tilburg University)

Concerns about rising opinion polarization due to 'identity politics' seem to be at odds with scientific evidence. While previous research primarily focused on increased between-group differences, this chapter investigates whether group identification has induced opinion alignment within groups, as predicted by the Social Categorization Theory. Based on European Values Study data from nineteen countries (1990-2017), I conclude that polarization is still a political, rather than a social phenomenon. That is, especially partisan sorting has increased in Europe, roughly in accordance with the more extreme trends in elite polarization. Other manifestations of alignment, such as constraint, are occurring to a lesser extent, while social sorting is increasing somewhat in newer democracies particularly, but decreasing in most older ones. Media usage does not seem to be strongly associated with these developments. However, patterns are by no means unambiguous; only in Poland and Slovenia all manifestations of alignment are increasing, while in Romania and Great Britain, alignment is decreasing in all its forms. Yet, worries about rising polarization are not fully unfounded, as ideology seems to increasingly represent a social identity rather than a set of policy preferences, which could strengthen social and political conflict.