Cost incentives for doctors: a double-edged sword

Christoph Schottmüller

Also available as TILEC DP 2011-041 | http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930864
Cost incentives for doctors:  
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Christoph Schottmüller†  

September 15, 2011  

Abstract  
Incentivizing doctors to take the costs of treatment into account in their prescription decision could lead to lower health care expenditures and higher welfare. This paper shows that also the opposite effects can result. The reason is a misalignment of doctor and patient incentives: Because of health insurance, the patient does not take the costs of treatment fully into account. This misalignment hampers communication between patient and doctor, e.g. the patient may overstate the intensity of symptoms. It is shown that cost incentives for doctors increase welfare if (i) the doctor's examination technology is sufficiently good or (ii) (marginal) costs of treatment are high enough. Optimal health care systems should implement different degrees of cost incentives depending on type of disease and/or doctor.

JEL: D82, D83, I10

Keywords: cheap talk, communication, health insurance, market design

1. Introduction

It is well known that insurance creates moral hazard: In the health sector, insured people would like to have more expensive treatments than socially optimal. On the other hand, treatments are normally prescribed by doctors. If doctors took the costs of treatment into account in their treatment decision, the moral hazard problem should disappear. The tradition in the medical profession, however, is to view oneself as advocate of one’s patients. Consequently, the patient’s wellbeing is put first and costs

*I want to thank Jan Boone for comments on an early draft of this paper.
†Department of Economics, Tilec and CentER, Tilburg University, email: christophschottmueller@googlemail.com
are only secondary. What is more, doctors are often explicitly hostile towards cost incentives in doctor remuneration. The German chamber of doctors, for instance, writes in its principles of health policy\footnote{Translation by the author. Original title and source: "Gesundheitspolitische Leitsätze der Ärzteschaft-Ulmer Papier" Beschluss des deutschen Ärztetags 2006, Anlage 1, p. 6, \url{http://www.bundesaerztekammer.de/downloads/UlmerPapierDAET111.pdf}}

\[\ldots\] the role of the doctor as advocate for his patient must not be restricted \[\ldots\] The state must not establish financial schemes (e.g. bonus-malus system) which could suggest to the patient that materialistic, self-serving aspects are also of importance for medical decisions.

It is important to understand whether the doctors' concerns are mainly self-interested, e.g. worries about reputation and pay, or whether financial incentives for doctors could have a negative impact on social welfare. Put differently, can patient advocacy be interpreted as an efficient institutional response to the particular structure of the health care market? Answering this question will also give some insight into the optimal design of health care markets. In particular, in which parts of the health care system should cost incentives for doctors be employed and where are cost incentives less likely to succeed?

This paper focuses on the communication between patient and doctor. The patient's input, e.g. describing his symptoms and their intensity, is vital to reach the right diagnosis.\footnote{The importance of communication is also stressed in the aforementioned document of the German chamber of doctors where it is stated that "health can neither be commanded nor produced since health depends crucially on the patient's collaboration." Also there is a whole string of the medical literature dealing with doctor-patient communication, see Stewart (1995) for a survey.} The main mechanism I explore in this paper is the following: Patients are (fully) insured. If doctors take costs into account in their treatment decision, their objectives and the objectives of their patients are no longer aligned.\footnote{Negative effects from cost incentives on the doctor-patient relationship are also established in the medical literature, see for example Rodwin (1995), Kao et al. (1998) or Gallagher and Levinson (2004).}

Such a misalignment undermines the patient's trust in his doctor which in turn affects communication negatively.\footnote{There is no doubt that patients understand this nexus: According to Gallagher et al. (2001) 73% of their respondents dislike the idea of a cost control bonus for their doctor and 91% favor disclosure to the patient if such a bonus was in place. Furthermore, 95% of those who dislike the bonus stated that the bonus would lower their trust in their physician.}

More technically, in a setting where the patient has private information, e.g. about his symptoms and their intensity, he has the possibility to exaggerate his symptoms (or their intensity) in order to get a more expensive treatment. Of course, the doctor will anticipate such strategic exaggerating. This anticipation gives the patient further incentives to exaggerate and so on. The appropriate model to analyze such a “rat race” is the cheap talk framework. This paper will therefore extend the canonical cheap talk model to the imperfect information setting typical for the health sector. Although a complete breakdown of communication can be prevented, communication will be worse in
equilibrium because of the misalignment of interests, i.e. less information is transmitted from patient to doctor. It is shown that this communication effect can make a system without cost incentives preferable from a social welfare point of view. If the patient’s collaboration is hardly needed, a system with cost incentives is preferable. For example, a doctor can easily establish that a patient has a broken leg by having an X-ray. The symptoms reported by the patient are less important in this case. If, on the other hand, an illness might have a psychological background, the patient’s collaboration is essential and a system without cost incentives might be preferable.

The main idea of the paper is a tradeoff between having the best information to base the decision on and having the socially best decision rule. A related tradeoff is known in organization theory. Alonso et al. (2008) ask how much autonomy division managers should have. Giving division managers more autonomy results in better information use in decision making but less coordination across divisions. In my paper, the only way to get better information (from the patient) is a socially less desirable decision rule for the doctor. In both papers, there is a tradeoff between the quality of information and the quality of the decision rule (for a given information structure). The downside of an informed decision in Alonso et al. (2008) is a lack of coordination while in my paper it will be the neglect of costs. A major technical difference between the papers is that division managers (headquarters manager) have full (no) information in Alonso et al. (2008) while doctor and patient will both receive a noisy signal in my model. This setup seems to be closer to reality in the health sector.

From a technical point of view the paper contributes to the cheap talk literature following the seminal paper by Crawford and Sobel (1982). Their model is extended in de Barreda (2010) to a setup where the decision maker receives a noisy signal. My paper generalizes further by substituting the perfect information on the sender/expert/patient side by a noisy signal.

This paper complements existing literature on the design of health care systems. Early contributions as Arrow (1963) and Pauly (1968) already point out the moral hazard caused by health insurance: Insured patients might overconsume treatment from a social welfare perspective because they are insured. Ma and McGuire (1997) introduce the physician as an additional player and analyze contractual difficulties in the health market. In particular, health outcome and doctor’s effort are non-contractible and even the quantity of care consumed can be subject to misreporting. Ma and McGuire (1997) analyze how these contractual constraints influence optimal contracts between insurance and patient as well as between insurance and physician. My paper focuses on a different kind of constraint, i.e. a constraint in information transmission arising in the communication between doctor and patient. It will be shown that the necessity of information transmission between patient and doctor might constrain the power of the incentive scheme offered to the doctor.
Obviously related is the literature on physician compensation and managed care. In his survey, Glied (2000) mentions two problems of “supply-side cost sharing,” i.e., cost incentives for physicians: (i) underprovision of necessary services and (ii) strong incentives to avoid costly cases. In this context, my paper adds a third problem: Hampered information transmission between doctor and patient. Furthermore, my paper provides one possible explanation for the ambiguous cost effect of managed care mentioned in Glied (2000).

The medical literature contains statements like “payment arrangements could significantly undermine patients’ beliefs that their physicians are acting as their agents” (Mechanic and Schlesinger, 1996) and emphasizes that there should be no conflict of interest between patient and doctor (Emanuel and Dubler, 1995). Kao et al. (1998) find that patients trust their physician less if the physician is capitated than when he is paid on a fee for service basis. Physicians are also less satisfied with their relationships with capitated patients compared to their average patient (Kerr et al., 1997). My paper contributes by formalizing why trust, interpreted as shared objectives, is vital for the patient-physician relationship. Such a formalization is interesting for two reasons: First, it allows for both costs (less trust) and benefits (less overtreatment) of cost incentives. Second, one can obtain results concerning the optimal design of health care systems, i.e., where in the health system are aligned interests especially important and where could cost incentives improve welfare.

The next section introduces the model and is followed by a simple numerical example. This example illustrates the main points. Section 4 analyzes a general model and answers the question: When do cost incentives work? The final section concludes by discussing certain assumptions and pointing out testable predictions as well as possible applications in different areas.

2. Formal setting

Patient and doctor have a common prior $F$ over the set of all possible health states of the patient. The set of health states is denoted by $\Theta$. A health state can be interpreted either as the severity of a given disease or as a set containing different diseases. The patient receives a private signal $\sigma^p \in \Sigma^p$ about his health state. In practice this signal can be interpreted as the symptoms a patient can report to his doctor or as the intensity of his symptoms. The doctor receives also a private signal $\sigma^d \in \Sigma^d$ about the patient’s health. This signal can be interpreted as the result of the doctor’s examination, e.g., his interpretation of an X-ray photograph or listening to the patient’s heartbeat. Given the health state, there is a distribution $G(\sigma^p, \sigma^d|\theta)$ of signals which is common knowledge. Put differently, $G(\sigma^p, \sigma^d|\theta)$ gives the probabilities that a patient (doctor) receives signal $\sigma^p$ ($\sigma^d$) given a health state $\theta$. 

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The timing is the following: First, the patient’s health state is determined by nature. This health state is unknown to doctor and patient. Second, doctor and patient receive their signals \( \sigma = (\sigma^p, \sigma^d) \) which correspond to the true health state through \( G \). Third, the patient can send a message, e.g. communicating his signal, to the doctor. Fourth, the doctor determines a treatment \( \tau \) from a set of available treatments. The costs of the treatment \( c(\tau) \) are paid for by the patient’s insurance.

Utility of the patient depends only on his true health state \( \theta \in \Theta \) and the treatment \( \tau \). In particular, a patient’s well being does in the end not depend on the signals. For the doctor, I look at two scenarios: Either the doctor has “no cost incentives” which means that he makes his treatment decision to maximize the patient’s utility or he is “cost sensitive” (or “has cost incentives”) with which I mean that he maximizes social welfare. Social welfare is the patient’s utility minus costs. The perspective of the paper is therefore eventually the perspective of a (benevolent) designer of the health system, e.g. a government or an insurance plan, who has to determine which kind of incentives he gives to the doctor.

3. A simple example

This section deals with a small numerical example which illustrates that cost incentives can lead to lower welfare. Take \( \Theta = \{A, B, C\} \) and \( \Sigma^p = \Sigma^d = \{0, 1\} \). In words, there are three diseases called \( A, B \) and \( C \). One can interpret health states either as similar illnesses or as levels of severity of the same illness. Doctor and patient will each receive one of two possible signals which are denoted by 0 and 1. For example, the patient’s signal could be whether he feels “no/little pain” or “strong pain” while the doctor’s signal could be whether the patient’s heartbeat is unusual or not. The prior \( F \) is given by disease \( A \) and \( B \) occurring with probability \( 2/5 \) each and disease \( C \) with probability \( 1/5 \). The distribution \( G \) is given in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>prior</th>
<th>2/5</th>
<th>2/5</th>
<th>1/5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\sigma</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0,0)</td>
<td>4/5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0,1)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1,0)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4/5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1,1)</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interpretation is that, given health state \( A \), signal \( (\sigma^p, \sigma^d) = (0, 0) \) occurs with probability \( 4/5 \) and signal \( (\sigma^p, \sigma^d) = (1, 1) \) occurs with probability \( 1/5 \). Assume that there are three available
treatments which are denoted by $a$, $b$ and $c$. The patient’s utility and the costs of each treatment are given in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>costs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$a$</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To illustrate: A patient with disease $A$ receiving treatment $a$ has a utility of 8. Treatment $a$ costs 5. Therefore, welfare would be $8 - 5 = 3$ in this situation.

One interpretation is that “disease” $C$ is being healthy and treatment $c$ is the option “no treatment”. Treatment $b$ is a very effective but also very expensive treatment while $a$ is not so effective but substantially cheaper. A quick calculation shows that treatment $a$ is welfare maximizing where welfare is defined by patient utility minus costs. The same is true for $b$ in health state $B$ and $c$ in $C$.

3.1. No cost incentives

If the doctor has no cost incentives, the incentives of doctor and patient are aligned. The patient will therefore communicate his true signal $\sigma^p$ in equilibrium. The doctor can then base his decision on both signals and maximizes gross consumer surplus. Hence, the doctor knows the disease whenever the signals are $(0, 0)$, $(0, 1)$ or $(1, 0)$. If the signal is $(1, 1)$, the doctor assigns equal probabilities to disease $A$ and $B$. This leads to the following optimal decisions: $(0, 0) \rightarrow b$, $(0, 1) \rightarrow c$, $(1, 0) \rightarrow b$ and $(1, 1) \rightarrow b$

Expected welfare is therefore:

\[
W^{\text{nci}} = \frac{16}{50} (10 - 8) + \frac{1}{5} 10 + \frac{16}{50} (10 - 8) + \frac{4}{50} (10 - 8) + \frac{4}{50} (10 - 8) = \frac{180}{50}
\] (1)

3.2. Cost sensitive doctor

If the doctor is cost sensitive, his preferred decisions (if he knew both signals) would be: $(0, 0) \rightarrow a$, $(0, 1) \rightarrow c$, $(1, 0) \rightarrow b$ and $(1, 1) \rightarrow b$. Hence, there is a conflict between the patient and the doctor whenever the signal is $(0, 0)$: The doctor prefers treatment $a$ while the patient prefers $b$. Next, I write down the optimal decision of the doctor if he only knows his own signal $\sigma^d$. If $\sigma^d = 0$, he assigns equal

\[\text{In principle, there is also a pooling equilibrium in which the doctor takes only his own signal into account and the patient sends the same message regardless of his signal. However, this equilibrium is Pareto dominated and does not seem very realistic.}\]

\[\text{Just to illustrate: The first term is the probability of being in state } A \text{ and receiving the signal } (0, 0), \text{ i.e. } 2/5 \times 4/5, \text{ multiplied with the utility of the resulting treatment } b \text{ in state } A, \text{ i.e. } 10, \text{ minus the costs of this treatment, i.e. } 8.\]
probability to disease \(A\) and \(B\). Therefore, the optimal treatment is \(b\). If \(\sigma^d = 1\), he assigns probability 2/9 to disease \(A\), 2/9 to disease \(B\) and 5/9 to disease \(C\). It is straightforward to calculate that in this case the optimal treatment is \(c\).

In principle, there could be two kinds of equilibrium: First, a separating equilibrium in which the patient truthfully reports his signal to the doctor, i.e. the two signals are separated. Second, a pooling equilibrium in which the patient sends the same message regardless of his signal.

Suppose there is a separating equilibrium, i.e. the patient communicates his signal \(\sigma^p\) truthfully to the doctor in equilibrium. The doctor will then implement the welfare maximizing treatment knowing both signals. If \(\sigma^p = 0\), the patient expects—given his signal—to get a utility of \(u^{\text{truth}} = 8/13\times 8 + 5/13\times 10 = 114/13\).\(^7\) If however the patient lied and communicated \(\sigma^p = 1\), the doctor would implement treatment \(b\) and the patient’s expected utility would be \(u^{\text{lie}} = 8/13\times 10 + 5/13\times 9 = 125/13\). Hence, lying pays off for the agent and there cannot be a separating equilibrium.

Consequently, there is a pooling equilibrium in which the doctor uses only his own signal. Welfare is then
\[
W^c = \frac{16}{50}(10 - 8) + \frac{4}{5}10 + \frac{16}{50}(10 - 8) + \frac{4}{50}1 + \frac{4}{50}1 = \frac{172}{50}
\]

Since \(W^c < W^{nc}\), cost incentives reduce welfare in this example. Nevertheless, costs are lower if the doctor is cost sensitive since the signal \((1, 1)\) leads to the low cost treatment \(c\) while \(b\) is prescribed without cost incentives. The driving force behind this result are the conflicting objectives of patient and doctor which result in a break down of communication.

3.3. Variation I: Restricting the choice set

Interestingly, there is an easy fix in this example: Suppose, the health authority does not clear treatment \(a\). Hence, treatment \(a\) is not available. But then there is no conflict between doctor and patient as even a cost sensitive doctor will now prescribe \(b\) if the signal \((0, 0)\) occurs. Unfortunately, this means that cost incentives simply do not matter/work: Every signal leads to the same treatment with and without cost incentives. Furthermore, this trick will not always work: Amend the example above with a disease \(D\) which can be identified with certainty (so there would be a signal \((2, 2)\) which occurs if and only if the health state is \(D\)). If in this state \(D\) treatment \(a\) is by far superior to all other treatments, a health authority banning treatment \(a\) would reduce welfare.

\(^7\)Given \(\sigma^p = 0\), the patient assigns probability 8/13 to health state \(A\) with signal \(\sigma = (0, 0)\) which leads to treatment \(a\). With the counter probability 5/13, he expects state \(C\) with signal \(\sigma = (0, 1)\) and treatment \(c\).
3.4. Variation II: Increasing costs

The negative information effect of cost incentives can be so strong that costs can be higher under cost incentives. To see this, change the example above by changing the ex ante probability of disease $C$ from $1/5$ to $p^c < 1/5$ and assign the ex ante probability $(1 - p^c)/2$ to sickness $A$ and $B$. Note that this does not change decisions without cost incentives as it is always perfectly known whether one is in state $C$ or not.

If, however, $p^c$ is small enough and the doctor knows only his own signal, he will prescribe treatment $b$ instead of treatment $c$ when he receives signal $\sigma^d = 1$. This inevitably leads to higher costs than without cost incentives: Now $b$ is always prescribed while $c$ was prescribed without cost incentives for signal $\sigma = (0, 1)$. Note that a lower $p^c$ will make the incentive constraint of a separating equilibrium even tougher, i.e. reducing $p^c$ does not lead to a separating equilibrium. It turns out that in the example expected costs are higher with cost incentives if $p^c < 2/41$.

This result is slightly reminiscent of the empirical results concerning the cost effects of managed care. One feature of many managed care plans are cost incentives for doctors, e.g. capitation payment. As Glied (2000) reports in his survey, results on the cost effect of managed care are however inconclusive: Some studies report higher costs, some report lower costs or no cost difference between managed care and traditional care plans.

4. Model and results

This section uses a more general model to analyze the setting and effect described before. There are two reasons why this is desirable: First, one has to verify that the effects described above are not due to the discrete nature of the example. Second, this will allow to determine under which circumstances cost incentives are welfare maximizing and therefore have implications for the optimal design of a health care system.

The patient’s message in the example above is “cheap talk”: The message itself does not have direct payoff implications. Only the treatment decision is relevant for the patient’s utility and welfare. The canonical model for cheap talk games is Crawford and Sobel (1982). To fit the health sector, the information structure of Crawford and Sobel (1982) has to be amended as described below.

I assume that health state $\theta$ is a real number from some bounded interval and also $\sigma^p, \sigma^d$ and $\tau$ are assumed to be real numbers.\footnote{Restricting $\tau$ to some interval, e.g. $\mathbb{R}_+$ is possible as explained in footnote 13. Drawing the signals from some closed subset of $\mathbb{R}$ simplifies matters, see assumption 1.} Without loss of generality take $\Theta = [0, 1]$. Again one can interpret the
health state either as the severity of a given illness or one views $\Theta$ as a continuum of illnesses. Higher signals are assumed to imply higher expected states. To make this formal define by $H(\theta|\sigma^p, \sigma^d)$ the cumulative distribution function which gives the probability that the state is below $\theta$ given signals $\sigma^p$ and $\sigma^d$. This distribution is derived from $F(\theta)$ and $G(\sigma^p, \sigma^d|\theta)$ using Bayes’ rule. The assumption is that $H(\theta|\sigma^p, \sigma^d)$ first order stochastically dominates $H(\theta|\sigma^{p^*}, \sigma^d)$ whenever $\sigma^d \geq \sigma^{d^*}$ and $\sigma^p \geq \sigma^{p^*}$. In words, a higher signal implies that higher health states are more likely to occur.

Patient utility $u(\theta - \tau)$ is a function of “distance” between health state and treatment. It is assumed that the patient is fully insured, i.e. costs of treatment do not enter his utility function. Assume that $u(\theta - \tau)$ is two times continuously differentiable, strictly concave and attains its maximum at 0. Put differently, patient utility is maximized if $\tau = \theta$ and is lower the further away treatment $\tau$ is from this ideal treatment. It is not assumed that $u(\cdot)$ is symmetric and therefore over- and undertreatment might affect utility in different ways. The cost function $c(\tau)$ is strictly increasing and marginal costs are bounded away from 0, i.e. $c'(\tau) \geq \delta$ $\forall \tau$ for some $\delta > 0$. This last assumption implies that the patient’s utility is never aligned with the social objective or, put differently, the patient always prefers a more expensive treatment than socially optimal because he is insured. If there was no such conflict, cost incentives would simply not matter for the outcome. Consequently, introducing cost incentives could not even help to reduce costs.

I use Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium as solution concept. After observing his signal $\sigma^p$ a patient updates his beliefs about his health state $\theta$ and about the doctor’s signal. Given $\sigma^p$, a strategy for the patient is a probability distribution over $\Sigma^p$ denoted by $q(m|\sigma^p)$.$^9$ This distribution gives the probability of reporting $m \in \Sigma^p$ when the true signal is $\sigma^p$. For illustration purposes, think of a partition equilibrium in which patients with signals in, say, $[0.3, 0.4]$ are bunched, i.e. send the same message. In this case $q(m|\sigma^p)$ could be a uniform distribution over $[0.3, 0.4]$ for all $\sigma^p \in [0.3, 0.4]$. Given his signal $\sigma^d$ and the message he receives from the patient, the doctor updates his beliefs about the health state of the patient $\theta$ and chooses his preferred treatment. For simplicity, I assume that $u(\theta - \tau) - c(\tau)$ is strictly concave in $\tau$ which implies that there is a unique socially efficient treatment $\tau^w$. This assumption is, for example, satisfied if $c(\tau)$ is linear or convex. Hence, the doctor will always have a unique preferred treatment which I denote by $\tau^d(m, \sigma^d)$. The strategies $(q(m|\sigma^p), \tau^d(m, \sigma^d))$ form an equilibrium if:

1. For each $\sigma^p$, $q(m|\sigma^p)$ is a distribution, i.e. $\int_0^1 q(m|\sigma^p) dm = 1$, and if $q(m^*|\sigma^p) > 0$ then $m^* \in \arg \max_m \int_0^1 q(m|\sigma^p) \int \theta u((\theta - \tau^d(m, \sigma^d))dP(\theta, \sigma^d|\sigma^p)$ where $P(\theta, \sigma^d|\sigma^p)$ is the distribution of $(\theta, \sigma^d)$ derived from $G(\sigma^p, \sigma^d|\theta)$ and $F(\theta)$ conditional on observing $\sigma^p$ and using Bayes’ rule.$^{10}$

$^9$For notational convenience $q(m|\sigma^p)$ is a probability density function but mass points can be easily accommodated.

$^{10}$Note that the patient takes expectations not only over the health state but also over the doctor’s signal because $\sigma^d$
2. For each \( m \) and \( \sigma^d \) treatment maximizes the doctor’s objective. For the cost sensitive doctor this means that
\[
\tau^d(m, \sigma^d) \in \arg\max_{\tau} \int_0^1 [u(\theta - \tau) - c(\tau)] \, dH(\theta|m, \sigma^d)
\]
where with a slight abuse of notation \( H(\theta|m, \sigma^d) \) is the distribution of the health state conditional on observing \( \sigma^d \) and \( m \) using by Bayes’ rule (given \( G(\sigma^p, \sigma^d|\theta), F(\theta) \) and \( q(m|\sigma^p) \)). Without cost incentives \( \tau^d(m, \sigma^d) \in \arg\max_{\tau} \int_0^1 u(\theta - \tau) \, dH(\theta|m, \sigma^d) \).

In words, the first condition says that the patient reports with positive probability only signals maximizing his utility given the strategy of the doctor. The second condition establishes that the doctor uses an optimal strategy given the patient’s equilibrium behavior.

For the analysis of this model the following technical assumption proves to be useful. Note that the boundedness part is automatically satisfied if \( H_{\sigma^p} \) is continuous and the signal \( \sigma \) is drawn from a closed set, i.e. if \( \Sigma^p \) and \( \Sigma^d \) are closed intervals.

**Assumption 1.** \( H(\theta|\sigma^p, \sigma^d) \) is differentiable in \( \sigma^p \) and \( |H_{\sigma^p}(\theta|\sigma^p, \sigma^d)| \) is bounded from above by some \( M > 0 \). At all states where \( H(\theta|\sigma^p, \sigma^d) \) has a density \( h(\theta|\sigma^p, \sigma^d) \), this density is also differentiable in \( \sigma^p \) and \( h_{\sigma^p} \) is bounded.

Put differently, beliefs about the true health state do not change too sharply if the patient’s signal changes marginally. Note that slightly irregular distribution, e.g. with mass points at a “healthy state” \( \theta = 0 \), can be allowed. Assumption 1 simplifies the analysis by ensuring that the doctor’s treatment decision is differentiable in the patient’s signal.

The game is then similar to the information transmission model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) with three additional twists: First, the doctor (receiver in the language of Crawford and Sobel) receives a signal while he is completely ignorant in Crawford and Sobel (1982). Second, the patient (sender) does not know the state of the world. Instead he has a noisy signal. Third, the divergence of interests between doctor (receiver) and patient (sender) is not fixed but depends on the treatment (decision). The following proposition extends results from Crawford and Sobel (1982) to this more general setting.

**Proposition 1.** With cost incentives, there exists no separating equilibrium. There exist partitioning equilibria on the range of \( \sigma^p \). Each part of this partition has a minimum length \( \kappa \) which is bounded away from zero. If \( \Sigma^p \) is bounded, the number of parts in the partition is bounded from above.

**Proof.** see appendix

The intuition is the following: In equilibrium a patient cannot tell his true signal to the doctor. If he did, the doctor would prescribe a treatment that is “too cheap” from the patient’s point of view (as he does not care about costs). Hence, the patient would have an incentive to overstate his signal.
In practice, this would mean to claim additional symptoms or to overstate the intensity of existing symptoms. What happens in equilibrium is that the patient’s signal range is partitioned and the patient reports in which part of the partition his signal lies. The doctor does not know the precise signal of the patient but gets a rough idea which he takes into consideration when choosing the treatment. Because of the partitioning, a patient can no longer overstate his signal “a little bit”. If the patient deviated by reporting a higher part of the partition, he would get a substantially higher treatment. In equilibrium he will not deviate because he expects this treatment to be too high. In practice one could interpret this in the following two ways: First, a patient does not want to report symptoms that are too much different from the real ones as this could mislead the doctor, i.e. result in treating the wrong illness. Second, extreme overstatement of symptoms could result in too strong medication with severe side effects. Hence, the patient does not want to overstate his existing symptoms too much.

It is also clear that the partition cannot be arbitrarily fine: If the parts are too small, then over-stating one’s signal “a little bit” is again possible. This explains the minimum length statement in the proposition. The minimum part length immediately implies that the number of parts is bounded if the interval from which patient signals are drawn is bounded.

The mechanism through which cost incentives can harm welfare is the same as in the example of section 3: If the objectives of doctor and patient are different, the patient has an incentive to use his information strategically to get the more expensive treatment he wants. In equilibrium, the doctor will have less information (partitioning of signal range) compared to the situation without cost incentives. Consequently, he is more prone to make inappropriate treatment decisions. In short, there are two effects when introducing cost incentives: First, costs are taken into account which, ceteris paribus, decreases costs and increases welfare. Put differently, the doctor stops prescribing excessively expensive treatments. Second, communication and therefore the information of the doctor is worse. Hence, treatment decisions are less accurate which reduces welfare. Whether the cost or the information effect dominates is ex ante unclear. The following propositions show that in two extreme cases the cost effect dominates and therefore cost incentives lead to higher welfare than no cost incentives.

**Proposition 2.** Welfare is higher with cost incentives if the doctor’s signal is sufficiently informative. That is, given \( G(\sigma^p, \sigma^d|\theta) \), there exists an \( \varepsilon > 0 \) such that cost incentives lead to higher welfare than no cost incentives if the doctor’s signal is drawn from \( \varepsilon G(\sigma^p, \sigma^d|\theta) + (1 - \varepsilon)1_\theta \) where \( 1_\theta \) is a distribution putting all probability mass on \( \theta \). Cost incentives lead also to higher welfare if the patient’s signal is sufficiently uninformative, i.e. for \( \varepsilon > 0 \) small enough if the patient’s signal is drawn from \( \varepsilon G(\sigma^p, \sigma^d|\theta) + (1 - \varepsilon)U_\theta \) where \( U_\theta \) is the uniform distribution over \([0, 1]\).

**Proof.** see appendix
This result is intuitive: If the doctor is able to determine the patient’s health state almost on his own, i.e. without knowing the patient’s signal, then the patient’s signal is useless. Therefore, the information effect of introducing cost incentives is small while the cost effect is still there.

One interpretation of proposition 2 is that cost incentives become eventually more attractive with medical progress. This holds at least true if medical progress implies better diagnosis possibilities for doctors. Consequently, one might then expect to see more cost incentive elements in health care systems over time.

A second interpretation is that some specialists optimally should have cost incentives while others should not. A radiologist or a trauma surgeon will normally base his decisions on his own examination and less on the patient’s report. This might be less true for an internist or a general practitioner.

A related third interpretation is that an optimal health care system should incorporate selective cost incentives. More precisely, cost incentives should be applied for the treatment of diseases where the doctor’s information is relatively more important than the patient’s information.

**Proposition 3.** Cost incentives lead to higher welfare than no cost incentives if social and private objectives differ sufficiently. That is, for any given information structure and cost function \(c(\tau)\) there exists an \(\alpha > 0\) such that cost incentives lead to higher welfare than no cost incentives under the cost function \(\alpha c(\tau)\).

**Proof.** see appendix

The intuition is that the cost effect will become dominant if (marginal) costs are high enough. Consequently, the information loss due to cost incentives is negligible compared to the cost effect.

In line with previous interpretations cost incentives are especially useful for specialists dealing with high cost treatments on a regular basis. Also diseases involving high cost treatment on a regular basis are especially well suited for cost incentives.

The previous propositions illustrate when cost incentives are superior to no cost incentives. To conclude this section, I want to give an example where no cost incentives are superior to cost incentives. In fact, I can use the same example as Crawford and Sobel (1982) which is attractive for two reasons: First, it is very simple and allows therefore for an analytical solution. Second, it has been used repeatedly in the cheap talk literature and has become a benchmark example there.

**Example.** Health states are uniformly distributed on \([0, 1]\). The patient has perfect knowledge of the health state while the doctor’s signal is completely uninformative. Assume that the patient’s utility function is a quadratic loss function, i.e. \(u(\theta, \tau) = -(\theta - \tau)^2\), and that the cost function is linear in

\[\text{———}^{11}\text{Another example of this category is the veterinarian or to quote Will Rogers: “The best doctor in the world is the veterinarian. He can’t ask his patients what is the matter—he’s got to just know.”} \]
treatment, i.e. \( c(\tau) = \alpha \tau \). Given the information that \( \sigma^p \) (which is now the true health state) is in the interval \((s_1, s_2)\), the optimal treatment decision for a doctor with cost incentives is \( \tau = \frac{s_1 + s_2 - \alpha}{2} \). With \( \alpha = 1/10 \) the model is mathematically equivalent to the example in Crawford and Sobel (1982). It is shown there that the finest possible equilibrium partition is \((0, 2/15, 7/15, 1)\), i.e. a patient will report whether his signal is in \([0, 2/15)\) or in \([2/15, 7/15)\) or in \([7/15, 1]\). Utility of a patient with state \( \theta \) in \([0, 2/15)\) is given by \(-(1/60 - \theta)^2\), with \( \theta \in (2/15, 7/15) \) utility is \(-(1/4 - \theta)^2\) and with \( \theta \in (7/15, 1) \) utility is \(-(41/60 - \theta)^2\). Expected consumer utility in this partition equilibrium is therefore

\[
EU = \int_0^{2/15} - \left( \frac{1}{60} - \theta \right)^2 d\theta + \int_{2/15}^{7/15} - \left( \frac{1}{4} - \theta \right)^2 d\theta + \int_{7/15}^1 - \left( \frac{41}{60} - \theta \right)^2 d\theta \approx -0.01058
\]

while expected costs are

\[
EC = \frac{1}{10} \left( \frac{2}{15} \frac{1}{60} + \frac{5}{15} \frac{15}{60} + \frac{8}{15} \frac{41}{60} \right) = 0.045.
\]

Hence expected welfare is \(-0.01058 - 0.045 = -0.05558\). Note that this is an upper bound on welfare:

Of course, there are also equilibria with partitions consisting of only two parts or one part. It is easy to check that these equilibria result in lower welfare.

Without cost incentives the patient will truthfully reveal his signal and therefore communicate the true health state to the doctor. Consequently, \( \tau = \theta \) and consumer welfare is 0. Expected costs are \( \frac{1}{10} \times 0.5 = 0.05 \) which results in expected welfare of \(-0.05\). Therefore, no cost incentives lead to higher welfare than cost incentives.

5. Discussion and conclusion

Introducing cost incentives for doctors turns out to be a double edged sword: On the one hand, taking costs into consideration should avoid the prescription of too expensive treatments. On the other hand, misalignment of patient’s and doctor’s incentives will hamper communication between the two. The patient has an incentive to exaggerate and in equilibrium this leads to signal bunching. Consequently, the doctor has worse information and is less likely to assess the patient’s health state correctly. Knowing about the uncertainty he might even choose more expensive treatments to be on the safe side. In a numerical example, this can lead to higher costs than under no cost incentives (see section 3).

If costs are very high or if the doctor is able to assess the health state very accurately given only his signal, cost incentives are the welfare maximizing policy. This shows that an optimal health care system will use different degrees of cost incentives in different circumstances. In practice, cost incentives could differ across diseases and across specialists.

Although the model is stylized, it allows to formalize the idea that trust is important in the patient-
doctor relationship. A lack of trust reduces the quality of communication and eventually the quality of the doctor’s diagnosis. This effect could constrain contracting between insurances and doctors.

Note that some seemingly strong assumptions are actually not very restrictive: The concentration on two extreme cases where the doctor either maximizes patient utility or total welfare is obviously not realistic. The main effect, that diverging objectives lead to worse communication, however, holds true whenever the doctor cares more about costs than the patient. By the same argument, it is not restrictive to assume full indemnity insurance: The main point is that the patient does not bear the full social costs which is a feature of any form of insurance. The results do therefore not depend on a specific form of insurance. One can interpret the costs $c(\tau)$ simply as the part of treatment costs paid by the patient’s health insurance.

In some sense, the model is a best case scenario for the benevolent designer: He can freely set the doctor’s incentives without incurring any costs. In practice setting up an incentive scheme for doctors might actually be costly. Doctors might also not respond immediately because of previously formed habits. It is therefore even more remarkable that the designer might not want to give cost incentives to the doctor.

The model gives several testable predictions. Quality of diagnosis should decrease after an introduction of cost incentives for doctors. Such a quality decrease could be reflected in the data in different ways: First, therapies could be changed more often (if the doctor realizes the error at a later stage). Second, patients with a given diagnosis-treatment pair will be treated less successfully (e.g. take longer to recover) because some receive the wrong treatment due to a wrong diagnosis. These effects should be more pronounced for specialists and diseases where patient input is vital for the diagnosis. If trust reflects the willingness to communicate, one should expect patient’s trust in their doctor to be lower when their doctor has cost incentives. This last result is indeed confirmed by the health literature, see for example Kao et al. (1998).

More abstract, a welfare maximizing sponsor (say a benevolent government) might prefer a decision maker (doctor) who shares his preferences not with the sponsor but with the patient. In a broader context an agent might benefit from surrendering his interests when information provision by another party is important. This could have applications in other contexts like mediation: A mediator with decision power who shares the interests of another party might be preferable to making the decision oneself.

In general, shared objectives proof to be vital for information provision. Patient advocacy can therefore be seen as an institutional response to the importance of information provision by patients. Consequently, one might expect similar institutions to emerge whenever information provision by
affected parties is vital. In this context, the relationship between a lawyer and his client could serve as an additional example.
References


Appendix

Proof of proposition 1: The proof proceeds in a number of steps. The first three steps establish that there cannot be a separating equilibrium, i.e. there is no equilibrium in which a patient always reports his true signal. Consequently, patients with some signals are bunched together. Patients in one “bunch” (one part of a partition of the signal range) send the same report to the doctor. Steps four and five establish that each part of a partition must have minimum length, i.e. the partition cannot be arbitrarily fine.

The first step is to show that there exists a \( b > 0 \) such that \( \argmax_\tau \int_0^1 [u(\theta - \tau) - c(\tau)] dH(\theta|m, \sigma^d) + b \leq \argmax_\tau \int_0^1 u(\theta - \tau) dH(\theta|m, \sigma^d) \) for a given equilibrium strategy \( q(m|\sigma^p) \); i.e. the patient would opt for an at least \( b \) higher treatment than a cost sensitive doctor if he chose (and had the same information). This follows from the first order conditions corresponding to the two \( \argmax \) expressions

\[
\int_0^1 -u'(\theta - \tau) dH(\theta|m, \sigma^d) = \begin{cases} c'(\tau) \\ 0 \end{cases}.
\]

Since the left hand side is strictly decreasing in \( \tau \) and \( c'(\tau) \geq \delta \) the claim follows as \( u'(\cdot) \) is continuous. Therefore, the left hand side of (3) is continuous in \( \tau \) and also strictly decreasing in \( \tau \). This argument is for a given \((m, \sigma^d)\) but the infimum of all these \( b \) over \((m, \sigma^d)\) will also be strictly positive. To establish this, it is sufficient to show that the derivative of the left hand side of (3) with respect to \( \tau \) is bounded: \(^{12}\) Since \( u'(\theta - x) > 0 \) for \( x \geq 1 \) and any \( \theta \in [0,1] \), the optimal treatment is bounded from above by 1. Furthermore, the optimal treatment is bounded from below by \( \tau \) solving \( u'(-\tau) = c'(\tau) \), i.e. the optimal treatment if the doctor knew that \( \theta = 0 \). Therefore \(-1 \leq \theta - \tau \leq 1 - \tau \). By the continuity of \( u''(\cdot) \) and the compactness of \([-1, 1 - \tau]\), \( u''(\cdot) \) is bounded on this interval. Consequently, the derivative of the left hand side of (3) is a weighted (by the distribution \( H(\cdot) \)) average of a bounded function and therefore bounded. Denote by \( B > 0 \) such a bound on the derivative of the left hand side of (3). Then we can choose \( b = \delta/B \).

Second, the patient’s expected utility is under separating higher under a slightly higher decision than the cost sensitive doctor takes. From the first step and the strict concavity of \( u(\cdot) \) it follows that any treatment in \((\tau^d, \tau^d + b)\) yields a higher expected utility for the patient than \( \tau^d \).

\(^{12}\) Just to illustrate why boundedness is sufficient: Say the derivative of the left hand side of (3) is between 0 and \(-B\). Since this left hand side is differentiable, the two \( \tau \) solving (3) with the right hand side equal to zero and equal to \( c'(\tau) \) have to differ by at least \( \delta/B \).

\(^{13}\) If the treatment is restricted to be larger than, say, 0, the argument still holds true as long as \( H(0|0,0) < 1 \). A patient will then always desire a treatment that is strictly bounded away from 0. Therefore, interests of patient and doctor are not aligned even if the constraint \( \tau \geq 0 \) is binding.
Third, in a hypothetical separating equilibrium the patient attains a higher utility by misrepresenting slightly upwards as the doctor will increase his decision uniformly continuously in $\sigma^p$. The implicit function theorem gives for a hypothetical separating equilibrium

$$
\frac{d\tau^d}{d\sigma^p} = \frac{-\int_0^1 \theta \left[ -u'(\theta - \tau) \right] dH(\theta|\sigma^p,\sigma^d) }{-\int_0^1 \left[u''(\theta - \tau) - c''(\tau)\right] dH(\theta|\sigma^p,\sigma^d)}.
$$

The denominator is obviously positive as it is $(-1)$ times the second order condition of the doctor’s maximization problem. The numerator is positive as well because of stochastic dominance: As $-u'(\theta - \tau)$ is a strictly increasing function of $\theta$, we have $\int_0^1 -u'(\theta - \tau) dH_1(\theta) > \int_0^1 -u'(\theta - \tau) dH_2(\theta)$ whenever $H_1(\theta)$ first order stochastically dominates $H_2(\theta)$. Since $H(\theta|\sigma^p,\sigma^d)$ first order stochastically dominates $H(\theta|\sigma^p,\sigma^d)$ whenever $\sigma^{p'} > \sigma^p$, the numerator has to be positive. The uniform continuity follows from the boundedness of 4: The numerator is bounded by assumption 1 and the fact that $u'(\theta - \tau)$ is bounded on the relevant range. The strict concavity of the doctor’s program implies that the denominator is strictly bounded away from zero.\(^{14}\) By uniform continuity, misrepresentation can be chosen small enough to prevent an “overreaction” by the doctor.

Consequently, there cannot be a separating equilibrium. The same argument shows that also locally, i.e. on some subinterval of the patient’s signal range, there cannot be a perfect separation of types, i.e. patient signals have to be bunched in equilibrium.

Fourth, in a partition equilibrium communicating a higher partition will result in a higher treatment decision. This follows from the fact that higher signals $\sigma^p$ indicate higher health states $\theta$ and the doctor’s optimal treatment decision is increasing in $\theta$. Formally speaking, $H(\theta|(s_1, s_2),\sigma^d)$ first order stochastically dominates $H(\theta|(s_1', s_2'),\sigma^d)$ whenever $s_1' < s_2' \leq s_1 < s_2$.

Fifth, in a partition equilibrium there exists a minimum partition length $\kappa > 0$. It was shown earlier that the optimal treatment decision of a doctor is uniform continuous in $\sigma^p$ (in a hypothetical separating equilibrium). Therefore, there exists a $\kappa > 0$ such that optimal treatment decisions differ by less than $b$ for all $\sigma^p$ and $\sigma^{p'}$ with $|\sigma^p - \sigma^{p'}| < \kappa$ (in a hypothetical separating equilibrium). Now suppose by way of contradiction that there was a partition $(s_0, s_1)$ with $s_1 - s_0 < \kappa$. By the definition of $\kappa$ and $b$, a patient with signal $\sigma^p = s_0$ will (in expectation) strictly prefer the cost sensitive doctor’s separating treatment decision for type $\sigma^p = s_1$ to the separating treatment decision for type $\sigma^p = s_0$. By concavity of $u(\cdot)$, he will also prefer a cost sensitive doctor’s separating treatment decision for all types $\sigma^p \in (s_0, s_1)$ to his own. By continuity, the same holds for patients with a signal $s_0 - \varepsilon$ for some $\varepsilon > 0$ small enough. Clearly, a cost sensitive doctor receiving the message $(s_0, s_1)$ will assign a

\(^{14}\)To be precise, this follows as the treatment range is bounded by $\tau$ and 1. On this closed and bounded treatment range the maximum of the second derivative exists and constitutes the bound away from 0.
treatment between the optimal separating treatment for \( \sigma^p = s_0 \) and for \( \sigma^p = s_1 \). Therefore, a patient with signal \( s_0 - \varepsilon \) will prefer the message \( (s_0, s_1) \) to any message \( m \subset [0, s_0] \).

Step five and the boundedness of the patient’s signal range imply that the number of partitions in any partition equilibrium is bounded.

A one-partition equilibrium ("babbling equilibrium") in which all \( \sigma^p \) are pooled exists always. This proves existence of partition equilibria.

**Proof of proposition 2:** Denote the doctor’s beliefs over states \( \theta \) (derived by Bayes’ rule) given a signal drawn from \( \varepsilon G(\sigma^p, \sigma^d|\theta) + (1 - \varepsilon)1_\theta \) by \( k(\theta, \varepsilon|\sigma^d) \). Note that these beliefs are continuous in \( \varepsilon \). For \( \varepsilon = 0 \), the doctor has full information and therefore the welfare maximum is attained with cost incentives. As \( c'(\tau) > 0 \), decisions under no cost incentives differ from decisions with cost incentives. Consequently, welfare with cost incentives is strictly higher than without cost incentives if \( \varepsilon = 0 \). As beliefs (and therefore treatment decisions and welfare) are continuous in \( \varepsilon \), the first part of the proposition follows.

For the second part, note that \( H(\theta|\sigma^p, \sigma^d) \) does not depend on \( \sigma^p \) if \( \varepsilon = 0 \). Consequently, no information is lost when switching to cost incentives. Taking costs into account makes cost incentives strictly superior as \( c'(\tau) > 0 \). By continuity of \( H(\theta|\sigma^p, \sigma^d) \) in \( \varepsilon \), the same conclusion holds for \( \varepsilon > 0 \) small enough.

**Proof of proposition 3:** Since \( c'(\tau) \geq \delta > 0 \), there exists an \( \alpha \) such that

\[
-u'(1) - \alpha c'(0) \leq 0.
\]

This implies that the welfare maximizing treatment decision \( \tau \) is non-positive for any signal/message under the cost function \( \alpha c(\tau) \). Without cost incentives \( \tau \geq 0 \) and \( \tau(\sigma^p, \sigma^d) > 0 \) with strictly positive probability as

\[
\int_0^1 -u'(\theta) dH(\theta|\sigma^p, \sigma^d) > 0
\]

whenever \( H(0|\sigma^p, \sigma^d) < 1 \). Consequently, welfare is lower without cost incentives compared to the simple policy \( \tau = 0 \) (regardless of the signal) under cost function \( \alpha c(\tau) \). A cost sensitive doctor will improve on this simple policy by using the information he has, i.e. \( \sigma^d \). Consequently, cost incentives lead to higher welfare than no cost incentives under the cost function \( \alpha c(\tau) \).