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J.M. Sprenger


Universitair docent

Tilburg School of Humanities
Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS)

 

Expertise

I mainly work on the philosophy of statistical inference (philosophers say: inductive inference), containing methodological questions in statistics, the objectivity of data-based conclusions in science, and the foundations of probability.

Besides, I am busy with decision theory, social choice (judgment aggregation), social epistemology and in particular, models of consensus and disagreement.

 

Key words

Publications

Principal publications
  • Sprenger, Jan, and Heesen, Remco (2011): The Bounded Strength of Weak Expectations. Mind 120: 819--832.
  • Schupbach, Jonah, and Sprenger, Jan (2011): The Logic of Explanatory Power. Philosophy of Science 78: 105--127.
  • Sprenger, Jan (2011): Science without (Parametric) Models: The Case of Bootstrap Resampling. Synthese 180: 65--76. 2011.
  • Sprenger, Jan (2010): Probability, Rational Single-Case Decisions and the Monty Hall Problem. Synthese 174: 331--340.
  • Sprenger, Jan (2009): Evidence and Experimental Design in Sequential Trials. Philosophy of Science 76: 637--649.

Click here for the extended list of publications PDF

 

Education

Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of Bonn, 3rd of July 2008. Title: "Confirmation and Evidence", Supervisor: Prof. Andreas Bartels.

Diploma (equivalent to M.Sc.) in Mathematics, University of Bonn, 2005, with distinction.

 

Career

Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Tilburg University (since 09/2008).

Resident Fellow, Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (since 09/2008).

"Veni" Research Fellowship by NWO ("An Objective Guide to Public Policy?"), 2010--2013.

Postgraduate Reserach Fellow of the Cusanuswerk (2006-2008).

Visiting Fellow, Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (09/2007-11/2007).

Visiting Fellow, Centre for the Philosophy of Natural and Social Sciences, London School of Economics (01/2007-03/2007).

 

Publications

Principal publications
  • Sprenger, Jan, and Heesen, Remco (2011): The Bounded Strength of Weak Expectations. Mind 120: 819--832.
  • Schupbach, Jonah, and Sprenger, Jan (2011): The Logic of Explanatory Power. Philosophy of Science 78: 105--127.
  • Sprenger, Jan (2011): Science without (Parametric) Models: The Case of Bootstrap Resampling. Synthese 180: 65--76. 2011.
  • Sprenger, Jan (2010): Probability, Rational Single-Case Decisions and the Monty Hall Problem. Synthese 174: 331--340.
  • Sprenger, Jan (2009): Evidence and Experimental Design in Sequential Trials. Philosophy of Science 76: 637--649.

Click here for the extended list of publications PDF

Projects

VENI Scholarship by the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO), 2010--2013. Value: EUR 250.000.

DFG Schwerpunktprogamm "New Frameworks of Rationality": 1 postdoc position (jointly with Stephan Hartmann). Value: ca. EUR 200.000

 

Direct and indirect funding

See above for major projects and www.laeuferpaar.de/vita.html for minor projects.

Collaboration

NWO Internationalization Grant "Formal Approaches to Social Epistemology", with University of Sydney, University of Pennsylvania, UNED Madrid.

NWO Internationalization Grant "A Global Network for Modeling in the Social and Behavioral Sciences", with London School of Economics, IHPST Paris, University of Virginia, LOGOS Barcelona.

Conferences

2009

The Logic of Explanatory Power (with Jonah Schupbach). PROGIC 2009, Groningen.

Commentary on Alvin Goldman's work in Social Epistemology. 4th Cologne Summer School in Philosophy, Köln.

The Virtue of Simplicity Revisited: A Model Averaging Perspective. Modeling the World - Perspectives from Biology and Economics, TINT Conference, Helsinki.

The Virtue of Simplicity: More Complex Than Akaike's Theorem. Colloquium Talk, Australian Centre of Excellence for Risk Analysis (ACERA), Melbourne.

How Much Do Experts Count? (with Stephan Hartmann) Evidence, Science and Public Policy, 2nd Sydney-Tilburg Conference, Sydney.

The Virtue of Simplicity: More Complex Than Akaike's Theorem. Evidence, Science and Public Policy, 2nd Sydney-Tilburg Conference, Sydney.

Artefactual Probability. Philosophical Society, Australian National University, Canberra.

Commentary on Abdellaoui, Barrios and Wakker: "Reconciling introspective utility with revealed preference: Experimental arguments based on prospect theory".

Erasmus Institute in Philosophy and Economics (EIPE) Research Seminar, Rotterdam. Sources of Disagreement Among Rational Agents. 3rd VAF conference, Tilburg.

2008

Evidence and Experimental Design in Sequential Trials. Philosophy of Science Association (PSA) Biennial Meeting, Pittsburgh.

Evidence and Experimental Design in Sequential Trials. 2nd Meeting on Philosophy, Probability and Scientific Method, Valencia.

Compromise, Consensus and Judgment Aggregation. 6th conference of the International Network for Economic Methodology (INEM), Madrid.

Reliable Methods of Judgment Aggregation. Bayes Savaged in the Extreme Conference, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen.

Pragmatism in Formal Modeling: Two Case Studies. Pragmatism and Naturalism Workshop, Tilburg.

2007

Science without models: Resampling simulations in statistical inference. London-Paris-Tilburg Workshop in Philosophy of Science, Paris.

Statistics do not require frequentist justifications. First Conference of the European Association for Philosophy of Science (EPSA), Madrid.

Science without models: Resampling simulations in statistical inference. Models and Simulations 2, Tilburg University.

Statistics between inductive logic and empirical science. Third PROGIC workshop, Canterbury.

A confirmation-theoretic model of explanation. Annual meeting of the British Society for Philosophy of Science (BSPS), Bristol.

A confirmation-theoretic model of explanation. Formal Epistemology Workshop (FEW), Pittsburgh.

A confirmation-theoretic model of explanation. Annual meeting of the Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Science / Société canadienne pour l'histoire et la philosophie des sciences (CSHPS/SCHPS), Saskatoon.

Falsificationist confirmation. 35th annual meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy (SEP), Vancouver.

Surprise and evidence in statistical model checking. Foundations of the Formal Sciences VI, Amsterdam.

 

Teaching


J.M. Sprenger teaches the following subjects:

Other activities

Conference Organization:

---3rd Sydney-Tilburg Conference The Future of Philosophy of Science (14-16 April 2010) 

---2nd Sydney-Tilburg Conference Evidence, Science and Public Policy (Sydney, 26-28 March 2009)

---Graduate School The Philosophy of Psychology -- Reasons and Decision-Making (18-21 Oct 2008) 

---International Workshop Formal Modeling in Social Epistemology (9-10 Oct 2008)

Other activities:

---Member of the Editorial Board of the digest "The Reasoner" (www.thereasoner.org) 

---Member of Research Master Philosophy Exam Committee

---Membership PSA, GAP, BSPS, CSHPS/SCHPS, SEP.

---Referee for BJPS, Synthese, Erkenntnis, Philosophical Quarterly, International Studies in Philosophy of Science, Public Choice, Polish Journal of Philosophy, and several edited volumes.

 

Contact details
Room D 143
PO Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg 
Phone+31 13 466 3281
Secretary+31 13 466 2773
Email j.sprenger@tilburguniversity.edu

Personal homepage

Universitair docent
Tilburg School of Humanities
Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS)

Working days
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Last amended: 11 February 2013

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