Expertise
Macroeconomics and Inequality, Political Economy, Economic Development, Trade Theory
Key words
Publications
Principal publications- "Government Revenues and Economic Growth in Weakly Institutionalized States," Economic Journal, 120(June), 631-650.
- "Market Imperfections, Wealth Inequality, and the Distribution of Trade Gains," Journal of International Economics, 81(1), 15-25 (with Reto Foellmi).
- "Creditor Protection and the Dynamics of the Distribution in Oligarchic Societies," Journal of Economic Growth, 14(4), 313-344, 2009.
- "Why Progressive Redistribution Can Hurt the Poor," Journal of Public Economics, 92(3-4), 738-747, 2008 (with Reto Foellmi).
- "Who Gains from Non-Collusive Corruption?", Journal of Development Economics, 81(1), 95-119, 2007 (with Reto Foellmi).
Click here for the extended list of publications 
Education
2002-2006: University of Zurich
Ph.D in Economics (Dissertation: "Imperfect Credit and Barriers to Entry in Macroeconomic Models;" Committee: Josef Zweimueller, Ernst Fehr)
1997-2002: University of Zurich
Licentiate in Economics (MSc. equivalent)
1999-2000: Humboldt Universitaet zu Berlin
Visiting Student
Career
2012-now: Tilburg University, Department of Economics
Associate Professor; CentER Fellow; EBC Fellow
2010-2011: University of Bern, WTI
Assistant Professor
2008-2010: Tilburg University, Department of Economics
Assistant Professor; CentER Fellow
2007-2008: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics
Visiting Scholar
2006-2007: University of Zurich
Post-Doctoral Fellow
Download complete CV.
Webpage at IDEAS.
Publications
Principal publications- "Government Revenues and Economic Growth in Weakly Institutionalized States," Economic Journal, 120(June), 631-650.
- "Market Imperfections, Wealth Inequality, and the Distribution of Trade Gains," Journal of International Economics, 81(1), 15-25 (with Reto Foellmi).
- "Creditor Protection and the Dynamics of the Distribution in Oligarchic Societies," Journal of Economic Growth, 14(4), 313-344, 2009.
- "Why Progressive Redistribution Can Hurt the Poor," Journal of Public Economics, 92(3-4), 738-747, 2008 (with Reto Foellmi).
- "Who Gains from Non-Collusive Corruption?", Journal of Development Economics, 81(1), 95-119, 2007 (with Reto Foellmi).
Click here for the extended list of publications 
Projects
Working Papers
- Globalization and Productivity in the Developing World (2013; with Reto Foellmi).
Abstract: We explore the impact of international trade in a monopolistically competitive economy that encompasses technology choice and an endogenous distribution of mark-ups due to credit frictions. We show that in such an environment a gradual opening of trade (i) may - but not necessarily must - have a negative impact on productivity and overall output; (ii) is bound to increase the polarization of te income distribution. The reason is that the pro-competitive effects of trade reduce mark-ups and hence the borrowing capacity of less affluent entrepreneurs. As a result, smaller firms - while not driven out of the market - may be forced to switch to a less productive technology. Our framework matches several salient patterns in the recent evidence on the impact of trade in developing countries.
- Income Shocks and Social Unrest: Theory and Evidence (2013; with Christian Almer and Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti).
Abstract: Combining theoretical and empirical work, this paper explores the impact of economic shocks on the incidence of social unrest in less-advanced economies. Our theory predicts negative shocks to boost unrest since - in bad times - fighting the regime to reduce the level of resource diversion becomes cheaper. Using a new dataset on political instability in Africa, our empirical analysis confirms this prediction. Various instrumental variables estimates - which take into account the potential endogeneity of GDP changes - paint a consistent overall picture: The level of social unrest increases substantially in response to a negative economic shock.
- Targeting Autocrats: International Economic Sanctions and Regime Change (2012).
Abstract: When it comes to international economic sanctions, the most frequent goal is regime change and democratization. Yet, use and consequences of such sanctions are little understood. Past experiences suggest that they are often unsuccessful. Moreover, paradoxically, targeted regimes tend to respond by implementing policies which severely amplify the sanctions' harmful effects. This paper offers a political-economy model which provides an intuitive explanation for these observations. Autocratic regimes lower the supply of public goods to reduce private-sector productivity and hence the resources of potential challengers. As a result, sanctions-induced challenges become less likely - and the sanctions episode may end in failure.
- Inequality and Growth: The Neglected Time Dimension (2013; with Daniel Halter and Josef Zweimueller; R&R).
Abstract: Inequality affects economic performance through many mechanisms, both beneficial and harmful. Moreover, some of these mechanisms tend to set in fast while others are rather slow. The present paper (i) introduces a simple theoretical model to study how changes in inequality affect economic growth over different time horizons; (ii) empirically investigates the inequality-growth relationship, thereby relying on specifications derived from the theory. Our empirical findings are in line with the theoretical predictions: Higher inequality helps economic performance in the short term but reduces the growth rate of the GDP per capita farther in the future.
Teaching
M.C. (Manuel) Oechslin teaches the following subjects:
Teaching activities elsewhere
Guest lecturer, Ph.D. Programme in Economics and Finance, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland.
Contact detailsRoom K 423
PO Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg