I have a background in law and public policy but was trained as a professional economist at Boston University and the Stockhom School of Economics, where I defended my dissertation under the supervision of Jörgen Weibull.
I specialize in industrial organization, the branch of economics which studies market outcomes. I have an interest in competition policy, especially exclusionary practives associated to predatory pricing or the use of vertical restraints, quality regulation and law and economics.
Most recent publications
Optimal deterrence of illegal behavior under imperfect corporate governance (with Eric van Damme)
Abstract: We study the optimal design of liability schemes (at the corporate or individual level) when the objective is to deter socially harmful corporate behavior without discouraging productivity enhancements. We assume that firms face agency problems between shareholders and managers (moral hazard) and that unlimited sanctions on individuals are not available. We show that pure corporate liability rules can induce the first-best outcome only if firms can condition compensation on detection and the enforcement system is good enough. In other circumstances, unless individual sanctions can be very high, optimal mechanisms typically impose both corporate and individual liability.
JEL Classification: D82, K21, L49
Keywords: illegal behavior, deterrence, agency problems, moral hazard, corporate liability, corporate crime
Exclusion through speculation (with Bert Willems)
Abstract: Many commodities are traded on both a spot market and a derivative market. We show that an incumbent producer may use financial derivatives to extract rent from a potential entrant. The incumbent can indeed sell insurance to a large buyer to commit himself to compete aggressively in the spot market and drive the price down for the entrant. It can do so by selling derivatives for more than his expected production level, i.e. by taking a speculative position. This comes at the cost of inefficiently deterring entry.
JEL Classifications: K21, L12, L42
Keywords: exclusion, monopolization, contracts, financial contracts, derivatives, risk aversion, speculation
Predation under perfect information
Abstract: In an oligopoly configuration characterized by high barriers to (re-)entry, a finite horizon, perfect information about demand and costs and the presence of three identical firms, we show that two of them (the predators) can choose to charge an initial price that is so low that the third (the prey) decides to exit immediately, after which the predators can enjoy higher profits, even if they do not raise their price. Predatory prices are thus observed on the equilibrium path and the predators end up earning more than in the best Bertrand (or even, collusive) equilibrium with three firms.
JEL Classifications: D43, L13, L41
Keywords: predation, predatory pricing, collusion, dynamic game, Bertrand competition
Doctor of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, 2006.
Master of Arts, Political Economy, Boston University, 2004.
Bachelor of Law, Université de Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne), 1998.
Diploma, Sciences Po, Paris, 1997.
2007-2012 Assistant professor, Tilburg University
2012- Associate professor, Tilburg University
Most recent publications
C. (Cédric) Argenton teaches the following subjects:
- Law and Economics (CentER)(230361)More information
- Microeconomics 4 for EBE: Information Economics(30K302)More information
- Microeconomics 4 for ECO: Information Economics(30L206)More information
- Seminar Competition Policy(330080)More information
- Law and Economics(600265)More information
Director, Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)
Member, edititorial board, French quarterly Commentaire
Room K 312
PO Box 90153 5000 LE Tilburg
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Tilburg School of Economics and Management
Department of Economics