Gumperz and governmentality in the 21st century: Interaction, power and subjectivity

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Gumperz and governmentality in the 21st century: Interaction, power and subjectivity

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This paper explores what the work of John Gumperz can contribute to our understanding of power relations in the 21st century. It does so by emphasising the critical dimension of his work (Blommaert 2005; Rampton 2001), and by considering its relevance to Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’. As a concept developed in his later work, governmentality hasn’t featured very prominently in explicit appropriations of Foucault in linguistics, but it cries out for interactional sociolinguistic analysis and it has been at the centre of discussion among social theorists about changing character of contemporary power.

To pursue this agenda – consistent with the larger programme sketched by Arnaut 2012 – I shall begin with the debate about whether and how Foucault’s work continues to be relevant, focusing on governmentality in particular (Section 1). After that, I shall review the rather different ways in which US linguistic anthropology and (mainly) European critical discourse studies relate to Foucault’s later thought (Section 2), moving into a more detailed consideration of how John Gumperz’s work resembles some of the later Foucault’s, not just in its discursive constructionism but also in its attention to the ‘antagonism of strategies’ and its understated practice-focused politics (Section 3). Next, I summarise the shifts in governmentality identified by Fraser, Deleuze, Rose and others, dwelling in particular on the new forms and functions of surveillance (Section 4). In section 5, I return to Gumperz and interactional sociolinguistics, arguing that their tracking of real time attention and inferencing, their recognition of discrepant but hidden communicative preferences, and their critique of the legibility of populations, all remain highly relevant, although to cope properly with the new digital environments, challenging new types of analysis are needed. But even without these, the Gumperzian framework can make an important contribution to understanding subjective experiences of digital surveillance, and the paper concludes with a sketch of what the empirical sociolinguistic study of contemporary governmentalities might look like.

1. Repositioning Foucault?

“How does power operate after the decentering of the national frame?”, asks Nancy Fraser in a 2003 paper entitled ‘From discipline to flexibilisation? Rereading Foucault in the shadow of globalisation’ (p.170). “In fact”, she suggests, “it would be hard to formulate a better guiding question as we seek to understand new modes of governmentality in the era of neoliberal globalization.” Foucault, she argues,

“was the great theorist of the fordist mode of social regulation… Viewed through his eyes, social services became disciplinary apparatuses, humanist reforms became panoptical surveillance regimes, public health measures became deployments of biopower, and therapeutic practices became vehicles of subjection”. [Now, however,] we… see ourselves as standing on the brink of a new, postfordist epoch of globalisation… [W]hether we call it postindustrial society or neoliberal globalisation, a new regime oriented to ‘deregulation’ and ‘flexibilisation’ was about to take shape just as Foucault was conceptualising disciplinary normalisation” (p.160).

The flexibilisation displacing ‘disciplinary society’ entails “fluidity, provisionality, and a temporal horizon of ‘no long term’” (p.169), and Gilles Deleuze offers a broadly similar account:

“Foucault located the disciplinary societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; they reach their height at the outset of the twentieth. They initiate the organisation of vast spaces of enclosure. The individual never ceases passing from one closed environment to another, each having its own laws; first,

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1 This paper is very much indebted to interactions with Karel Arnaut, Jan Blommaert, Kamran Khan and Piia Varis, though the misunderstandings are very much my own.
the family; then the school (‘you are no longer in your family’); then the barracks (‘you are no longer at school’); then the factory; from time to time the hospital; possibly the prison, the preeminent instance of the enclosed environment” (1990:3; original emphases).

But now with, for example, electronic tagging as an alternative to prison, “we are in a generalised crisis in relation to all the environments of enclosure – prison, hospital, factory, school, family” (p3-4). With “ultrarapid forms of freefloating control… replac[ing] the old disciplines operating in the time frame of a closed system”, “societies of control are in the process of replacing the disciplinary societies” (p.4; original emphasis).

The title of Fraser’s paper is of course framed as a question; Deleuze only insists that “we are at the beginning of something” (p.7); the later Foucault himself considered post-disciplinary power (Lemke 2003; Caluya 2010); and Rose warns against overstatements about epochal change, proposing instead that “we should seek to identify the emergence of new control strategies and the reconfiguration of old ones” (1999:240). Nevertheless, for sociolinguists attentive to the details of everyday life, there is a compelling invitation to participate in this investigation of Foucault’s ‘governmentality’, which, within the fordist nation-state, Fraser characterises as:

“small-scale techniques of coordination [widely diffused throughout society] [which] organised relations on the ‘capillary’ level: in factories and hospitals, in prisons and schools, in state welfare agencies and private households, in the formal associations of civil society and informal daily interaction… Organising individuals, arraying bodies in space and time, coordinating their forces, transmitting power among them, this mode of governmentality ordered ground-level social relations according to expertly designed logics of control” (2003:162; Foucault 1978/2003:229-245)

This may need updating, but Foucault’s notion of ‘government’ – much more extensive than the ordinary political meaning of the term – still offers an agenda for analysis. Rose defines governmentality as

“all endeavours to shape, guide, direct the conduct of others, whether these be the crew of a ship, the members of a household, the employees of a boss, the children of a family or the inhabitants of a territory. And it also embraces the ways in which one might be urged and educated to… control one’s own instincts, to govern oneself…. Practices of government are deliberate attempts to shape conduct in certain ways in relation to certain objectives.”(1999:3-4)

With Foucauldian government in focus, says Rose, it is vital to “try to track force relations at the molecular level, as they flow through a multitude of human technologies, in all the practices, arenas and spaces where programmes for the administration of others intersect with techniques for the administration of ourselves” (ibid. p.5).

So how far have sociolinguistics picked up this invitation?

2. Foucault in studies of language in society

In sociolinguistics, there is a great deal of research that ‘tracks force relations at the molecular level’. According to Foucault 1982, “[t]o govern… is to structure the possible field of action of others” (p.221), and “a relationship of power… is a mode of action which… acts upon the actions [of others]: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or future” (p.220).² There is an obvious

² Foucault 1984b helpfully spells out the relationships between power relations, government and domination: “I am not… sure if I made myself clear, or used the right words, when I first became interested in the problem of power. Now I have a clearer sense of the problem. It seems to me that we must distinguish between power relations understood as strategic games of liberties – in which some try to control the conduct of others, who in turn try to avoid allowing their conduct to be controlled or try to control the conduct of others – and the states of domination that people ordinarily call ‘power’. And between the two, between the games of power and states of domination, you have technologies of government [aka governmentality] – understood, of course, in a very broad sense that includes not only the way institutions are governed but also the way one governs one’s wife and children. The analysis of these techniques is necessary because it is often through such techniques that states of domination are established and maintained. There are three levels to my analysis of power: strategic relations, techniques of government, and states of domination” (1984b/2003:40-41). This also entails the view that “power relations are not something that is bad in itself… The problem… is to acquire the rules of law, the management techniques, and also the morality, the ethos, the practice of the self, that will allow us to play these games of power with as little domination as possible… I see nothing wrong in the practice of a person who, knowing more than others in a specific
potential parallel here with the conversation analytic notion of the adjacency pair – two utterances in sequence produced by different people, with the first turn setting up a limited range of possible second turns (offers require acceptances or rejections, questions expect answers etc). Adjacency pairs are a fundamental unit of conversational organisation (Levinson 1983:304), and the incorporation of conversation analysis within more comprehensive programmes for the study of language in institutions and society produces a framework that is very well suited to investigation of Foucault’s capillary ‘micro-physics of power’ (Foucault 1977:29; Goodwin & Duranti 1992:30-31; Ahearn 2012:263-5).

In north American linguistic anthropology (LA), interaction structures like adjacency are routinely integrated into accounts of power, ideology and institutions, working to principles like Silverstein’s ‘total linguistic fact’ (TLF): “[t]he total linguistic fact, the datum for a science of language is irreducibly dialectic in nature. It is an unstable mutual interaction of meaningful sign forms, contextualised to situations of interested human use and mediated by the fact of cultural ideology” (1985:220). This opens out into a large literature that can be linked to the full span of Foucault’s interests, covering (a) the human sciences, (b) institutions and their ‘dividing practices’, and (c) the formation of subjectivity, with the ‘subject’ understood in two ways: as “subject to someone else by control and dependence”; and as “tied to his [or her] own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge” (Foucault 1982:208, 212; 2003:55). LA research on, for example, language ideologies pursues issues of power and domination (i) in historical critiques of models and theories in linguistic science, (ii) in institutional analyses of language policy and practice, and (iii) in the reflexive ideas and everyday enactments of language among ordinary people (see e.g. Kroskrity 2004). Elsewhere in LA, there are eloquent descriptive case-studies of what amount to power/knowledge regimes in action (e.g. Goodwin 1994; Mehan 1996), as well as substantial programmes of investigation where Foucault is a central inspiration (see Briggs on interviews (2002) and communicability (2005)). However, as the quotations from Fraser, Deleuze and Rose indicate, Foucault also invites us to combine careful empirical micro-analysis with the investigation of gradual but widespread change in western societies, and on this, US linguistic anthropology has often had less to say, no doubt due in part to anthropology’s traditional focus on countries of the global South (Collins 2003:36-7; however, see Briggs & Hallin 2007, Duranti 2003: 332-3, Heller 1999).

In critical discourse traditions outside US LA, the situation is very different (Collins 2003:37). Foucault serves as a foundational and repeated reference point for linguistic studies that foreground the large-scale historical shifts indexed by terms like ‘the new economy’, ‘marketisation’, ‘globalisation’ and ‘modernity’, and such studies see these changes instantiated in sociolinguistic processes like the conversationalisation of public discourse, the technologisation of discourse, and new accounts of the circulation of texts (e.g. Fairclough 1989; Pennycook 1994; Blommaert 2005). Text-types and genres are often viewed as Foucauldian technologies of power, positioning discourse recipients as particular types of subject, and the comparison of texts produced at different times or places serves as a way of illustrating very general social changes.

These critical traditions recognise the capacity of linguistic discourse analysis to “track force relations at the molecular level”, opening an empirical window on the agentic improvisations with which participants respond to the way they’re being positioned in discursive encounters. Agency and freedom are in fact theoretically central to Foucault’s account of power, which depends on the subordinated subject “acting or being capable of action” (1982:220), so that “[e]very power relationship implies, at least in potentia, a strategy of struggle” (1982:225). But fine-grained accounts of here-and-now practical activity do not feature in Foucault’s empirical oeuvre and he pays much more attention to control than to creativity or resistance, so that in the end, the account is ‘rather gloomy’ and ‘one-sided’, occluding forms of creativity that, in contradistinction, linguistics is actually well able to detail (Fairclough 1992:60-61; Blommaert 2005:104). This view positions critical discourse studies as a substantial interdisciplinary contribution, with an empirical reach into the micro-physics of power unmatched elsewhere in the social sciences, and in this way, this non-American work is not only more explicit than linguistic anthropology in its engagement with Foucault, but also more ambitious.3 But there is at least one respect in which US LA is generally stronger in its capacity to penetrate power relationships as strategies of struggle, and this lies in its attention to moment-to-moment, real-time processing in interactional discourse, drawing on micro-ethnography and conversation analysis. In critical discourse studies, written texts are generally much more central as objects of analysis than spoken interaction. Admittedly, the linguistic analysis of written texts itself looks very ‘micro’ when it is compared with how other social scientists work. But it is still relatively difficult to track the movement between action

3 In US LA, Briggs is the most conspicuous exception.
and response that is central to Foucault’s notion of struggle, or to bring empirical precision to his argument that these struggles are ‘immediate’:

“[i]n such struggles people criticise instances of power which are the closest to them, those which exercise their action on individuals. They do not look for the ‘chief enemy’, but for the immediate enemy. Nor do they expect to find a solution to their problem at a future date (that is, liberation, revolutions, end of class struggle)” (Foucault 1982:211-212; Rose 1999:279-80)

In contrast, US LA is often able to pinpoint in ‘nano-sociolinguistic’ detail (Parkin 2012:2) the precise point in an immediately prior turn that sparks a resistant utterance, and interactive silences, hesitations, nuances, slightings and speakings-in-disguise are staple concerns.4

LA, then, offers an especially powerful lens for analysing governmentality as an interactive process, while explicit engagement with Foucault and with questions about large-scale shifts in the West is stronger in critical discourse studies. To bring these tendencies closer together (Blommaert 2005:Chs 2 & 3), it is worth now turning to Gumperz.

3. Foucault and Gumperz

It is hard to find any reference to Foucault in Gumperz’s publications (or vice versa), and Gumperz seldom gives the centre of the stage to the ‘big D’ Discourses (Gee 1999) that feature most prominently in sociolinguistic appropriations of Foucault. But beyond my own personal alignment (e.g. Rampton 2001), there are two sets of reasons for focusing on Gumperz in an exploration of sociolinguistics and governmentality.

First, Gumperz has played a central role in the formation of contemporary linguistic anthropology from the 1970s onwards, embracing a “dynamic view of social environments where history, economic forces and interactive processes… combine to create or to eliminate social distinctions” (Gumperz 1982:29). Situated moment-to-moment interaction occupies an especially prominent place, and the methodology he developed for engaging with the ‘total linguistic fact’ – interactional sociolinguistics (IS) – involved a deep and flexible integration of ethnography, ethnomethodology, linguistics, cognitive science, discourse and conversation analysis (1982:9-37). Where Gumperz has led, others have followed.

Second, there are at least three additional areas of loose but important compatibility between Gumperz and Foucault, especially if we are “less concerned with being faithful to a source of authority than with working within a certain ethos of enquiry, with fabricating some conceptual tools that can be set to work in relation to the particular questions that trouble contemporary thought and politics” (Rose 1999:5; also Fraser 2003:161; Haggerty & Ericson 2000:608; Foucault 1974/1994).5 These cover (a) their assumptions about the social world and discourse, (b) their tactical approaches to empirical analysis, and (c) the element of low-key activism in their commitment to ‘practical systems’ as the focus of enquiry.6

4 Although they never mention him, Varenne and McDermott’s 1998 description of doing interaction analysis looks especially close to Foucault’s approach to struggles with relations of power: “[w]hen we perform practical research tasks…, apparently paradoxical things happen as we notice how actors are both continually sensitive to matter they cannot be said to have constructed, and also slightly ‘off’ the most conventional version of what they could have been expected to do… [W]hat subjects construct in the real time of their activity can never be said to be what it would be easiest to say it is. What subjects construct may never be any particular thing that any audience may label it to be. We, as analysts, must always take the position that it is something more, something other, something that cannot be named without replacing it within the very frame the act attempted to escape” (1998:177).

5 Foucault said of his books: “I would like my books to be a kind of tool-box which others can rummage through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own area… I would like the little volume that I want to write on disciplinary systems to be useful to an educator, a warden, a magistrate, a conscientious objector. I don’t write for an audience, they can use however they wish in their own area... I would like the little volume...” (1974/1994)

6 It is maybe also worth noting that in terms of substantive focus, there are overlaps in the (fordist) technologies of power that Foucault and Gumperz attend to. In Foucault’s account of the technologies of knowledge/power, two basic methodologies in the human sciences stand out (1982:213, 1978:139f). In institutional ‘dividing practices’, there is a central role for quantifying techniques concerned with the management of populations, objectifying people as measured bodies fitting into the administration of factories, schools, hospitals, barracks etc (Foucault 1977; Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982:Ch.7). Conversely, with the formation of subjectivity/subjectification, ‘confession’ and the hermeneutic interpretations of experts play a key part turning the speech of individuals into truths about them(selves) (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982:Ch.8). Turning to sociolinguistics, Gumperz’s analysis of the interview resonates with Foucault’s critique of ‘confession’. The interview is a very widespread contemporary genre which, suggests Foucault, derives from the confession and operates as a subjectifying ‘technology of the self’, feeding into dividing practices as well (Briggs 2002:913). In Gumperz’s work on ‘gatekeeping’, there is a profound challenge to the ‘truths’ – to the asymmetrical but authoritative personal and institutional judgements – that interviews produce. This is achieved, first, by foregrounding the active role
a) Foucault famously rejected the view that events and activities are determined by hidden forces or universal structures (e.g. 2003:53-54), and instead set out to discover “the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies and so on which at a given moment establish what counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary” (1980/2003:249). He also famously rejected the idea of a social world prior to discourse, holding that “practices [themselves]… systematically form the objects of which they speak”: “[d]iscourses are not about objects; they do not identify objects, they constitute them and in the practice of doing so conceal their own invention” (Foucault 1974:49). Gumperz was focused more narrowly on communication than on social reality per se, but he refused to “treat communication as merely reflecting other presumably more basic forces” (1982:40), insisted that “the relationship of… social factors to speech form is quite different from what the sociologist means by correlation among variables” (Gumperz & Hernández-Chavez 1972:98), and proposed “an important break with previous approaches to social structure and to language and society. Behavioural regularities are no longer regarded as reflections of independently measurable social norms; on the contrary, these norms are themselves seen as communicative behaviour” (Blom & Gumperz 1972:432).

b) Gumperz always treats wider discourses and ideologies as one vital dimension in the investigation of conduct, but his analyses never begin with particular theories, policies or ‘Discourses’, setting out to examine their implementation or effects. Instead, the initial stages of IS empirical research involve ethnography, looking for “insight into the local communicative ecology” (Gumperz 1999:465). But this approach itself chimes with Foucault, who advises against beginning an empirical enquiry with a particular model or theory, and instead suggests “another way to go further towards a new economy of power relations, a way which is more empirical”:

“[this] consists of taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point. To use another metaphor, it consists of using this resistance as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, find out their point of application and the methods used…. it consists of analysing power relations through the antagonism of strategies” (1982: 211)

There is a good case for saying that ‘forms of resistance’ and the ‘antagonism of strategies’ serve as both the entry point and as the central preoccupation for Gumperz’s analyses. The initial stages of fieldwork include checking out “how local actors handle the problems they encounter” (1999:465), and in his research on interviewing, it is the communicative struggle revealed in the dissonance of institutional logics and minority worker expectations that opens into a detailed theory of discursive interaction (1982). Similarly in Gumperz’s work on code-switching in the early 70s, the incongruence and conflict between local community speech and the standard language prioritised in official transactions serve as the matrix for a far-reaching description and theorisation of the social organisation of linguistic difference (Blom & Gumperz 1972; Gumperz & Hernandez-Chavez 1972; Section 4 below).

c) In a paper on the possibilities of enquiry – ‘What is Enlightenment’ (2003) – Foucault sees the “acquisition of capabilities and the struggle for freedom” as two driving aspirations. But because the

played by interviewer interpretation, a role that is generally erased in the self-understandings and institutional documents that interviews subsequently generate. Second, by showing how interpretation of the propositional messages produced in interview speech are continuously influenced in unnoticed and highly contingent ways by an incessant stream of heterogeneous semiotic signs – ‘contextualisation cues’ – that can easily lead to misunderstanding, especially when the participants inhabit different social and communicative networks (1982:Ch.6; Roberts et al 1992). The ‘truths’ from the interview, in other words, are ineradicably partial and situated.

According to Gumperz 1990, “there’s no denying that politics and economic conditions are extremely important in race relations, and that ultimately redressing the balance of discrimination is a matter of power. But communication is power. Our social position depends on our ability to communicate, we get things in life by communicating. If we want to get a flat, we need to go to the housing authorities. To get a position in employment, we have to go through job interviews. We are tested in school at every turn, at every transition, and how we do in these tests determines how we do in later life. In all these cases, communication can make the difference. We need to communicate even to keep what we have. So communication is power—that I think is the point” (1990:52 also in Harris & Rampton 2003:272). Compare Foucault 1982:213: “It is certain that the mechanisms of [discursive] subjection cannot be studied outside their relation to the mechanisms of exploitation and domination. But they do not merely constitute the ‘terminal’ of more fundamental mechanisms.”

This is apparent when he says, for example, that “our task as interactional sociolinguists in modern educational settings is to chart the process by which models of educability [- ideas about what types of children can be educated how - ] are put into daily practice and to uncover the implicit theory of learning that informs our choice of model” (1986:67-68).
development of human capabilities is technologised and regimented, the growth of capacity normally undermines freedom, forming “the paradox of the relations of capacity and power” (p.55). This raises the question: “how can the growth of capabilities be disconnected from the intensification of power relations?” (p.55; see also note 2 above). To explore the possibilities, Foucault says that diverse enquiries should focus on concrete practices, and that these should be conceptualised simultaneously as “technological type[s] of rationality and as strategic games of liberties” (p.56):

“[t]his leads to the study of what could be called ‘practical systems’. Here [the domain of reference is] not the representations that men give of themselves, nor the conditions that determine them without their knowledge, but rather what they do and the way they do it. That is, the forms of rationality that organise their ways of doing things (this might be called the technological aspect) and the freedom with which they act within these practical systems, reacting to what others do, modifying the rules of the game, up to a certain point (this might be called the strategic side of these practices)” (2003:55)

These practical systems, we could say, are Gumperz’s central concern. Fraser’s “ground-level social relations [ordered] according to expertly designed logics of control” (2003:162) form one part of the dynamic in focus, with either the interview genre or the standard language operating as governing technologies of power. But by entering these systems through the ‘antagonism of strategies’ – by also attending, in other words, to mis-communication and to the mixing and alternation of codes – Gumperz brings in the ‘strategic game of liberties’. Indeed, when these descriptive accounts are themselves turned into materials for consciousness-raising discussion with both managers and subordinates, as in the Crosstalk project (Gumperz et al 1977; Jupp et al 1982; Roberts et al 1992), Gumperz adopts a path towards low-key, partial and specific transformations similar to the one outlined by Foucault: “analyzing and reflecting on limits” in order to open “the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think”, “practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing-over”, “grasp[ing] the points where change is possible and desirable” (Foucault 2003:53-4, 1984a/2003:23; also e.g. Rose 1999:282-4; S. Ball 2013:125)

This comparison of Gumperz and Foucault started out from the widely held view that sociolinguistics can provide the Foucauldian agenda with a microscope, sharpening its empirical grasp of how “power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives” (Foucault 1980:39). But even though Foucault obviously works across a far larger canvas than Gumperz, there are several other points of quite profound connection, and these increase the relevance of interactional sociolinguistics for Foucauldian analysis, drawing the methods pioneered by Gumperz more closely into an interrogation of how governmentality might operate “on the brink of a new, post-fordist epoch of globalisation” (Foucault op cit 160; Arnaut 2012).

To take this further, we must now consider what this shift from ‘disciplinary societies’ to ‘an era of neoliberal globalisation’ might be said to entail.

4. From ‘disciplinary societies’ to ‘societies of control’

To describe the kinds of shifts at issue here, we can begin with Fraser’s discussion of how Foucault’s account of power is affected by social major changes over the last 25-30 years.

As already noted, Fraser associates the disciplinary societies described by Foucault with fordism, which, from World War I to the fall of Communism, was “an international configuration that embedded mass production and mass consumption in national frames” (2003:161-2). During this period, a distinctive set of regulatory mechanisms held sway, and

“no social arena was off-limits in the campaign to subject everything to rational control… [In the 1910s and 1920s], US reformers began to build municipal, state and federal regulatory agencies aimed at ensuring public health and safety. The same period saw the proliferation of codified bodies of rationalising social expertise: manuals of childrearing, household management…, social work…, psychotherapy…, and industrial psychology…. Later came special age-targeted control agencies (juvenile justice) and body regimes (sex manuals, nutrition programmes, and physical fitness schedules)… [During fordism,] a dense nexus of overlapping apparatuses [emerged] where institutions of social control became interconnected …. [D]isciplinary apparatuses subsisted side-by-side in the space of the national-social,
their agents cooperating and competing on a par. Their milieu was one of middle-class professionalism, in which practitioners enjoyed considerable discretion, even as their activities were highly rationalized. The result was that disciplinary powers were socially concentrated yet horizontally arrayed within a national frame… [T]his mode of social ordering worked largely through individual self-regulation,… [propounded as] a democratic alternative to hierarchy and external coercion. As Foucault emphasised, advocates of social control sought to foster self-activated subjects capable of internal self-governance. Wagening that such subjects would be more rational, cooperative, and productive than those directly subordinated to external authority, fordist reformers devised new organisational forms and management practices. In offices, factories, and social-service agencies, supervisors were urged to listen to workers and clients, solicit their input, and increase their scope of autonomous action.…The overall thrust was to “subjectify” individuals, to encourage linguistification of their internal processes as a means of holding them responsible for those processes, thereby augmenting their capacities for self-policing.” (2003:163-4)

Since 1989, however,

“[i] the ordering of social relations is undergoing a major shift in scale, equivalent to denationalisation and transnationalisation. … [N]ational ordering is not disappearing, [but] it is in the process of being decentered as its regulatory mechanisms become articulated… with those at other levels…. At the same time, [ii] regulation is also undergoing a process of desocialisation. In today’s hegemonic – neoliberal – variant of globalisation, massive, unfettered, transnational flows of capital are derailing the Keynesian project of national economic steering. The tendency is to transform the fordist welfare state into a postfordist ‘competition state’, as countries scramble to cut taxes and eliminate ‘red tape’ in hopes of keeping and attracting investment. The resulting ‘race to the bottom’ fuels myriad projects of deregulation, as well as efforts to privatize social services, whether by shifting them onto the market or by devolving them onto the family (which means, in effect, onto women). Although the extent of such projects varies from country to country, the overall effect is a global tendency to destruct the zone of ‘the (national) social’, formerly the heartland of fordist discipline. Finally, [iii] as fordist discipline wanes in the face of globalisation, its orientation to self-regulation tends to dissipate too. As more of the work of socialisation is marketised, fordism’s labour-intensive individualising focus tends to drop out. In psychotherapy, for example, the time-intensive talk-oriented approaches favoured under fordism are increasingly excluded from insurance coverage and replaced by instant-fix pharma-psychology. In addition, the enfeebled of Keynesian state steering means more unemployment and less downward redistribution, hence increased inequality and social instability. The resulting vacuum is more likely to be filled by outright repression than by efforts to promote individual autonomy. In the US, accordingly, some observers posit the transformation of the social state into a ‘prison-industrial complex’, where incarceration of male minority youth becomes the favored policy on unemployment. The prisons in question, moreover, have little in common with the humanist panopticons described by Foucault. Their management often subcontracted to for-profit corporations, they are less laboratories of self-reflection than hotbeds of racialized and sexualized violence – of rape, exploitation, corruption, untreated HIV, murderous gangs, and murderous guards. If such prisons epitomize one aspect of postfordism, it is one that no longer works through individual self-governance.”(2003:165-6. Original emphases)

With changes like these – from nationally bounded to multilayered, from socially concentrated to dispersed and marketised, from self-regulating to increasingly repressive (166) – Foucault’s portrait of the disciplinary societies looks outdated, but Fraser insists that the study of governmentality, of the rational ordering of ground-level social relations, remains a vital project. Its pursuit, she suggests, entails at least three issues.

First, the specifically transnational character of post-fordist regulation needs to be properly understood, and here she refers to a profound reorganisation of security, policing and legal functions (2003:167; also Bigo 2002, 2006) as well as to an increasing tendency to “‘govern-at-a-distance’, through flexible, fluctuating networks that transcend structured institutional sites” (p.167; also Bauman 2000:11; Bauman & Lyon 2013:13). Second, there is a need to theorise increasing reliance on dispersed and marketised modes of governmentality (p.168), in which competition is introduced to social services, clients are turned into consumers, and auditors and accountants replace service professionals as the frontline disciplinarians (p.168; Rose 1996). Third – and this opens into the processes of ‘nano-regulation’ where interactional sociolinguistics comes to the fore – there is a need to investigate “[the] objects of intervention, [the] modes of subjectification, and [the] mix of repression and regulation” that characterise post-fordist governmentality (p.167).
On this third issue, rather than being self-regulated citizens who understand “themselves to be a member of a single integrated national society” (Rose 1996:334), Fraser argues that the preferred subject participates in “(market) choice [as a] consumer of services,… obligated to enhance her quality of life through her own decisions. In this new ‘care of self’, everyone is an expert on herself, responsible for managing her own human capital to maximal effect.” (p.168; Rose 1996:343). In the production of this consumer of services, surveillance plays a crucial part, but it no longer operates as a process of disciplinary ‘soul training’, as it did in Foucault’s panopticism (Haggerty & Ericson 2000:615). Instead, it feeds profiling and establishes “new forms of (transnational) segmentation. Working largely through population profiling, [post-fordist regulation] separates and tracks individuals for the sake of efficiency and risk prevention[, s]orting the capable-and-competitive wheat from the incapable-and-noncompetitive chaff[…]. In this ‘dual society’, a hypercompetitive, fully networked zone coexists with a marginal sector of excluded low-achievers.” (Fraser 2003:169)

The importance of new forms of post-panoptic surveillance facilitated by digital technology is addressed by other authors. Haggerty & Ericson speak of a ‘surveillant assemblage’ which they describe as “a host of different phenomena and processes working together,… operat[ing] across both state and extra-state institutions,… [seeking to] introduce breaks and divisions into otherwise free-flowing phenomena” (2000:608, 610). “[C]onstructing and monitoring consumption”, this certainly plays a major role in the processes by which “the population is increasingly constituted as consumers and seduced into the market economy” (2000:615; Bauman & Lyon 2013:16,121ff; van Dijck 2013). But this isn’t a centralised Orwellian ‘Big Brother’:

“the classifications and profiles that are entered in… disparate [institutional] systems correspond with, and reinforce, differential levels of access, treatment and mobility. Hence, while poor individuals may be in regular contact with the surveillance systems associated with social assistance or criminal justice, the middle and upper classes are increasingly subject to their own forms of routine observation, documentation and analysis. The more institutions they are in contact with, the greater the level of scrutiny to which they are subjected. In the case of the powerful, this can include the regular monitoring of consumption habits, health profile occupational performance, financial transactions, communication patterns, Internet use, credit history, transportation patterns, and physical access controls… Furthermore, the monitoring of the powerful has been eased by the proliferation of relatively inexpensive video cameras. These allow for the scrutiny of the powerful by both institutions and the general population[, as when, for example.] the general public to tape instances of police brutality…. While not a complete democratic levelling of the hierarchy of surveillance, these developments cumulatively highlight a fractured rhizomatic criss-crossing of the gaze such that no major population groups stand irrefutably above or outside of the surveillant assemblage” (Haggerty & Ericson 2000:618).

In a similar vein, Rose advises against a totalising view of surveillance, and instead proposes that “it is better seen as conditional access to circuits of consumption and civility, constant scrutiny of the right of individuals to access certain kinds of flows of consumption goods: recurrent switch points to be passed in order to access the benefit of liberty” (Rose 1999:243)

In fact, there are some for whom older forms of regulation are still useful:

“As… mechanisms of regulation through desire, consumption and the market… come to extend their sway over larger and larger sectors of the population, earlier bureaucratic and governmental mechanisms of self-formation and self-regulation become less salient and can begin to be dismantled and refocused upon marginalised individuals who through ill will, incompetence or misfortune are outside these webs of ‘consuming civility’… For the majority, [the expert government of conduct] operate[s] not through social planning, paternalism and bureaucracy, but in terms of a logic of choice… [But] a minority remain outside this regime of civility. They are, no doubt, the ‘usual suspects’ – the lone parent, the delinquent juvenile, the school truant, the homeless person, the alcoholic…. The marginalised, excluded from the regime of choice, no longer embraced within a social politics of solidarity, are allocated to a range of new para-governmental agencies – charities, voluntary organisations supported by grants and foundations” (Rose 1999:87,88,89)
Indeed there are some – poorer foreigners, asylum seekers, immigrants and ethnic minorities – who become subject to what Bigo calls the ‘Banopticon’ (2002, 2006). This is a surveillant assemblage that treats these groups as potential enemies and exceptional risks, who require forms of attention which go beyond normal democratic accountabilities. It is managed by a proliferating transnational ‘archipelago’ of security experts (police, intelligence, military, immigration control, private companies, specialist lawyers and academics), ever seeking to e.g. extend the integration of police files with data from social security, taxes, insurance, credit bureaus, supermarkets etc; it turns schools, hospitals and services into security auxiliaries; and it encourages fear and unease in the general public (see also Bauman & Lyon 2013; Huysmans 2014).

These shifts in regulation are obviously complex and varied, but they are quite elegantly drawn together Deleuze’s influential suggestions that we are moving from disciplinary societies to ‘societies of control’.

“We are in a generalised crisis in relation to all the environments of enclosure – prison, hospital, school, family… [U]ltrarapid forms of free-floating control [replace] the old disciplines operating in the time frame of a closed system…. In the disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school to the barracks, from the barracks to the factory), while in societies of control one is never finished anything… The disciplinary societies have two poles: the signature that designates the individual, and the number or administrative numeration that indicates his or her position within a mass…. In the societies of control… what is important is no longer either a signature or a number, but a code: the code is a password, while on the other hand the disciplinary societies are regulated by watchwords…. The numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access to information, or reject it. We no longer find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become ‘dividuals’, and masses [have become] samples, data, markets, or ‘banks’… The disciplinary man was a discontinuous producer of energy, but the man of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network. Everywhere surfing has already replaced the old sports… Types of machine are easily matched with each type of society… [D]isciplinary societies equipped themselves with machines involving energy, with the passive danger of entropy and the active danger of sabotage; the societies of control operate with machines of a [different] type, computers, whose passive danger is jamming and whose active one is piracy and the introduction of viruses… Man is no longer enclosed, but man is in debt” (1992:4-6)

So if these are key issues that “trouble contemporary thought and politics” (Rose op cit), in what form might Gumperzian interactional sociolinguistics offer some illumination?

5. Gumperz and ‘societies of control’

Gumperz’s major work ante-dates one of the most significant ways in which linguistic anthropology is able to engage with Deleuze’s ideas about ‘undulatory’, ‘free-floating control’ – through the detailed trans-contextual analysis of how meanings and texts move through and across events over time, developed in the 1990s (Bauman & Briggs 1990; Silverstein & Urban 1996; Blommaert 2005; Briggs 2005). Nevertheless, Gumperz situated all of his work in a realisation that the boundaries between social groups are disappearing, that distinctive group norms are weakening, that “individuals are freer to alter their social personae with circumstances” (1982:26; Gumperz & Hernández-Chavez 1972:291), and in place of ‘community’, he stressed the socio-communicative significance of interpersonal networks (Blom & Gumperz 1972; Gumperz 1982), opening the door to empirical investigation of Fraser’s suggestion that networks are “emerging as important new vehicles for postfordist governmentality” (2003:169).

But to capitalise on the distinctive capacity of interactional sociolinguistics to engage with the situated ‘nano-dynamics’ of post-fordist power, the everyday use of digital technologies presents itself as a prime object of analysis. These technologies impact on the interaction order (Goffman 1981), and they play a

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9 Bauman 1987 also offers an influential metaphor to encapsulate these changes when he proposes that the state is changing from ‘gardener’ to ‘gamekeeper’. “The gardening state presumes exceptional concern with pattern, regularity and ordering, with what is growing and what should be weeded out. Legislators have been central to the gardening state, as using their reason to determine what is and what is not productive of order. The social sciences have been part of that application of reason to society through facilitating the husbanry of societal resources…[By contrast, t]he new global order involves… the gamekeeper state…. [Such a gamekeeper state [is] not bothered to give society an overall shape… The gamekeeper [is] concerned with regulating mobilities, with ensuring that there [is] sufficient stock for hunting in a particular site but not with the detailed cultivation of each animal in each particular place” (Urry 2000:188 & 189)
central role in surveillance, ‘soft’ and ‘hard’, seducing and excluding. Larsen, Urry & Kay suggest, for example, that with mobile phones,

“distinctions between presence and absence, attention and inattention… partially dissolve. Goffman argued that ‘co-presence renders persons uniquely accessible, available, and subject to one another’ (1963:22), but it seems that many young adults’ social meetings are now typified by brief moments of ‘inattention’ and ‘mobilities’, as phone calls are answered, text messages are sent, new faces arrive while others leave” (2008:650).

“The scarce resource”, says Wellman, “is attention, not information” (2001:236), and this is targeted in the ‘attention economy’, where “the interest of consumers needs to be caught as eyeballs migrate from television to tablet to mobile phone to laptop” (van Dijck 2013:122). In the words of a manual on How to Build Habit-forming Products,

“[h]abit-forming technology is already here, and it is being used to mold our lives. The fact that we have greater access to the web through our various connected devices – smartphones and tablets, televisions, game consoles, and wearable technology – gives companies far greater ability to affect our behaviour. As companies combine their increased connectivity to consumers, with the ability to collect, mine, and process customer data at faster speeds, we are faced with a future where everything becomes potentially more habit-forming… [This book] Hooked seeks to unleash the tremendous new powers innovators and entrepreneurs have to influence the everyday lives of billions of people” (Eyal 2014:8,9)

This is governmentality – “the deliberate attempt… to shape conduct in certain ways in relation to certain objectives” (Rose 1999:4) – in post-fordist form, and there are at least three elements in Gumperz’s analytic agenda that help us orient to this, though adaptations are necessary with each one. These interests are (i) the dynamics of real-time attention and inferencing, initially developed in Gumperz’s work on codeswitching; (ii) the role played by unrecognised communicative preferences, originally articulated in his studies of cross-cultural interaction; and (iii) the mistaken faith that institutional assessments place in the stable transparency of lexico-grammatical meaning, an issue in both the codeswitching and the cross-cultural work.

a) In code-switching, people switch between different languages or registers in the course of their talk, and in the account that Gumperz developed in the 1970s and early 80s, when actors notice elements from a different code entering the stream of speech they’re listening to, their sense-making engages more or less simultaneously with two levels of meaning: the more general cultural connotations of the registers brought into juxtaposition (e.g. their indexical associations with home, work or recreation, or with particular social groups) and the rhetorical and interactional implications of the code-switch for what’s going on right now (‘does it add or substract from the authority or authenticity of what’s being said?’; ‘is it humorous, serious or accidental?’; ‘is it addressed to a different participant’ etc etc) (Rampton 2009:151-3,173n.4). As well as showing that code-switches “can act as powerful instruments of persuasion in everyday communicative situations” (Gumperz & Cook-Gumperz 1982:6), this account puts real-time attentional tracking, cognitive inferencing and shifts of cultural positioning together in a single analysis, and as such, it provided a vivid point of entry into the subtle reconfiguring of social relations continuously unfolding in interaction, a point picked up by Goffman (1981:126-7). In fact the integration of these elements also looks promising as a way of engaging with the commercial App designer’s efforts to catch and hold our attention in new habits of consumption, although to take this further, Gumperz’s framework would need to expand beyond just registers and languages to different media. But this isn’t conceptually difficult. Elaborating both Goffman and interactional sociolinguistics, Scollon 1998 offers tools for analysing multi-tasking, where “keep[ing] open several competing sites of [media] engagement” simultaneously is “the normal attention pattern” (1998:256), and Schegloff 2002, for example, provides a glimpse of the complex social calculations that go into the decision about whether or not to pick up a phone call (“Is this important enough to warrant a switch of attention? Will the interruption be justified? How much time will it take? Is this the right moment?”).

So Gumperz’s work on code-switching initially established that attention, inferencing and social positioning can be studied together as a dynamic interactional process, and in fact in any empirical

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10 I am indebted to Alex Nunes for this reference.
investigation of ideas about fluctuating control vs disciplined enclosure, some version of this is going to be important.

b) In his work on intercultural miscommunication during the 1980s, Gumperz developed another concept that can be extended and applied to the analysis of digital governmentality. Although there are always contingencies in play, Gumperz argued that there are patterned tendencies in how different groups produce and construe semiotic signs and their indexical connotations, even when they are using the same language, and he called these ‘communicative styles’. These are expressive and interpretive dispositions that are “learned in the course of previous interactive experience, [that] form part of our habitual and instinctive linguistic knowledge” (1982:162), and that encompass many different kinds of linguistic and discursive preference, ranging from ways of using particular intonation contours to expectations about the organisation of genres. But these preferences often go unrecognised, and this can generate “special problems… in a modern society where people have widely varying communicative and cultural backgrounds” (1982:167): when there is communicative friction, this is often misattributed to ability or attitude rather than to differences in style. This diagnosis has major investigative implications: although analysis of real-time processing in the here-and-now is vital, it is never sufficient. Beyond the understandings articulated by co-present individuals, there are historically-shaped and potentially discrepant communicative sensibilities operating unnoticed in the background, and to grasp their influence on what unfolds in any given interaction, researchers need know about communicative practice in different participants’ social networks beyond the event itself (Prevignano & di Luzio 2002:10,11,23).

Gumperz’s own analyses tended to focus on the unrecognised influence of non-dominant communicative styles and to describe, for example, the ways in which British-born gatekeepers failed to apprehend the distinctive discursive expectations shaping the spoken English of Indian immigrants with Hindi-speaking backgrounds. But on-line Web 2.0 environments introduce an additional set of influential but often unrecognised ‘communicative styles’, and rather disadvantaging their carriers, these are “expertly designed logics of control” (Fraser 2003:162), often seeking commercial profit. According to van Dijck,

“[s]ociality is not simply ‘rendered technological’ by moving to an online space; rather, coded structures are profoundly altering the nature of our connections, creations and interactions… Algorithms, protocols, and defaults profoundly shape the cultural experience of people active on social media platforms… Online sociality has increasingly become a coproduction of humans and machines…. [A] platform [like Facebook, YouTube or Wikipedia] … shapes the performance of social acts instead of merely facilitating them. Technologically speaking, platforms are the providers of software, (sometimes) hardware, and services that help code social activities into a computational architecture; they process (meta)data through algorithms and formatted protocols before presenting their interpreted logic in the form of user-friendly interfaces with default settings that reflect the platform owner’s strategic choices… The challenge is to make the hidden layer visible…”
(2013:20,32,33,29)

Users don’t necessarily accept the patterning of online social behaviour inscribed in these designs and algorithms, and van Dijck sets out to chart the “ongoing clash between user tactics and platform strategies”, invoking de Certeau’s account of how people negotiate the practices arranged for them by institution (2013:20, 6). But, she says, the “information apparatus that has come to produce everyday life” is “powerful, oblique and only partially visible”, a “technological unconscious” (2013:32). Of course all communication is shaped in normally unremarked ways by the linguistic and discursive resources that it draws on, but rather than simply being a stock of sedimented preferences tacitly activated in the here-and-now, as in Gumperz’s account, these techno-cultural ‘communicative styles’ are themselves interactive and fast-moving, continuously updating, customising, filtering in response to the users’ online conduct, operating, one might say, more as busy PAs 24/7 than sets of (slowly updated) reference resources.

In sum: Gumperz’s notion of communicative style emphasised hidden discrepancies in the pre-structuring of here-and-now communication, insisting on the potentially destabilising influence of the particular histories that different participants bring to an encounter, introducing unconscious partiality and bias. This challenge to ideas about consensual interactional organisation carries over into studies of digital communication, as does the need to go beyond the encounter in order to better understand it. But with the interactivity of the Web, it may be more apt to speak of ‘implicit participants’ (van Dijck
2013:33) than ‘hidden discrepancies’, and as a driving consideration, commercial success is usually more prominent than (fordist) equality of opportunity.

c) If Gumperz’s ‘communicative style’ points to how discrepant communicative hinterlands can pre-structure the social dynamics of real-time attention and inferencing in asymmetrical face-to-face encounters (his central object of analysis), the outcomes of such encounters are at stake in his efforts to unseat lexico-grammar as a central point of reference in educational and workplace assessments. Gumperz distinguishes between two broad sources of meaning: (i) the propositional meaning formulated with syntax, lexis and semantics, codified in linguistics, preserved in writing, and taught and assessed at school, and (ii) the huge and diffuse constellation of less regimented features that he calls ‘contextualisation cues’, “by which speakers signal and listeners interpret what the activity is, how semantic content is to be understood and how each sentence relates to what precedes or follows” (1982:131). Gumperz dwells on intonation as one of the most important of these less codified features, but “a contextualisation cue is any feature of linguistic [or indeed semiotic] form that contributes to signalling contextual presuppositions”, and these depend both on the situated contingencies of the moment and on “the historically given repertoire of the participants” (ibid; cf ‘communicative style’ above). With this broad distinction in place, Gumperz criticises institutions operating in ethnically diverse environments for relying too heavily on the aspects of meaning that seem to be stabilised in lexico-grammar, for overlooking the crucial contribution of less standardised contextualisation cues, and for giving poor ratings to minority speakers as a result, not because institutional representatives are prejudiced but because their comprehension is flawed, whether this is focused on code-switching at school or cross-cultural English in job interviews.

James Scott’s 1998 Seeing Like a State helps us to situate this social problem within fordist modernity. In terms that resonate with Foucault, Scott focuses on

“a state’s attempt to make society legible, to arrange the population in ways that simplified the classic state functions of taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion... The pre-modern state was, in many crucial respects, partially blind; it knew precious little about its subjects, their wealth, their landholdings and yields, their location, their very identity… As a result, its interventions were often crude and self-defeating. ....How did the state gradually get a handle on its subjects and their environment? [...P]rocesses as disparate as the creation of permanent last names, the standardization of weights and measures, the establishment of cadastral surveys and population registers, the invention of freehold tenure, the standardization of language and legal discourse, the design of cities, and the organization of transportation [can be seen] as attempts at legibility and simplification. In each case, officials took exceptionally complex, illegible, and local social practices, such as land tenure customs or naming customs, and created a standard grid whereby it could be centrally recorded and monitored....” (1998:2; emphases added)

Gumperz’s work can be read as critique of institutional ideas about the linguistic legibility of populations, as a reassertion of the importance of the “complex, illegible and local”, and as the development of an analytic apparatus for understanding this. But with the emergence of postfordism, how far is this still relevant?

Within the surveillant assemblage described by Haggerty and Ericson 2000, the legibility of populations is less dependent on language, standard or otherwise:

“[a] great deal of surveillance is directed toward the human body [...]and breaks the body] down into a series of discrete signifying flows...” “For example, drug testing striates flows of chemicals, photography captures flows of reflected lightwaves, and lie detectors align and compare assorted flows of respiration, pulse and electricity. The body is itself, then, an assemblage comprised of myriad component parts and processes which are broken-down for purposes of observation...” “It is then reassembled in different settings through a series of data flows. The result is a decorporealised body, a ‘data double’ of pure virtuality. The monitored body is increasingly a cyborg: a flesh-technology-information amalgam... These hybrids can involve something as direct as tagging the human body so that its movements through space can be recorded, to the more refined reconstruction of a person’s habits, preferences, and lifestyle from the trails of information which have become the detritus of contemporary life. The surveillant assemblage is a visualizing device that brings into the visual register a host of heretofore opaque flows of auditory, scent, chemical, visual, ultraviolet and
informational stimuli. Much of the visualization pertains to the human body, and exists beyond our normal range of perception.” (2000:611,612)

Indeed, within the kinds of site that Gumperz analysed,

“[c]urrent organisational surveillance practices feature the collection of information from the body and provide detailed data about individuals, their habits and lifestyles that they might not ordinarily reveal in face-to-face interactions such as the recruitment interview” (K. Ball 2005:90,91)

There is still a great deal of substance in Gumperz’s critique of the superficiality with which individuals are construed and assessed:

“[r]ather than being accurate or inaccurate portrayals of real individuals, ['data doubles’] are a form of pragmatics: differentiated according to how useful they are in allowing institutions to make discriminations among populations… [S]urveillance is often a mile wide but only an inch deep…. These new forms of reputation lack… deep subjective nuances… Instead, knowledge of the population is now manifest in discrete bits of information which break the individual down into flows for purposes of management, profit and entertainment” (Haggerty & Ericson 2000:614, 618, 619)

But compared within the interviewing manager or classroom teacher targeted in Gumperz’s interventions, the judges here are now much more remote, ‘governing-at-a-distance’, while deconstruction of the authority of the semiotic codes on which institutional assessments are based now needs to focus on much more than relatively standard lexicogrammars.

So in proposing that Gumperz’s framework holds relevance to new forms of governmentality in ‘societies of control’, I have suggested that the account of codeswitching needs to be extended beyond languages to different media, that analysis of the hidden influence of discrepant communicative styles should engage with the codes inscribed in Web 2.0 platforms, and that critiques of the semiotic basis of institutional assessment should now extend to the “flows of auditory, scent, chemical, visual, ultraviolet and informational stimuli” that inform the surveillant assemblage. But is this ridiculously over-ambitious? There can be no doubting the obstacles: both the technical challenge of finding and understanding the codes, algorithms and protocols – “embedded, hidden, off-shored and merely forgotten about” (van Dijck 2013:29) – that shape on-line sociality and translate bodies into digital information, and the practical problems of identifying and gaining access to the “scattered centres of calculation”, the “forensic laboratories, statistical institutions, police stations, financial institutions, and corporate and military headquarters” where “the information derived from flows of the surveillant assemblage are reassembled and scrutinized in the hope of developing strategies of governance, commerce and control” (Haggerty & Ericson 2000:613). But there is still, it seems, at least one gap in the study of postfordist governmentality where Gumperzian interactional sociolinguistics can help start to make some inroads.

Writing from a base in business organisation studies, Kirstie Ball argues that “the experience of surveillance has not yet been addressed in any detail… The fact that individuals sometimes appear to do little to counter surveillance does not mean that surveillance means nothing to them” (2009:640; emphasis added). She locates this experience in “[t]he moments between the surveillance system’s hailing of the subject, and the subject’s response” (ibid p. 645), and elsewhere, she addresses “resistance strategies… breaking or disrupting [the relations] between watch and watched” (2005:93), proposing that arguments about “resistance… challenge the totalising impulse of surveillance practice [and] are welcome in the face of government and private sector rhetoric about its desirability” (2005:89). The moment between interpellation and response is of course a space where interactional sociolinguistics offers an especially sensitive lens. And regardless of whether or not they are (macro-)politically valuable, “forms of resistance” and the “antagonism of strategies” are, as we have seen in 2b, a productive Foucauldian starting point for the study of power relations, potentially leading from there into analysis of “the system of differentiations”, the “forms of institutionalisation”, the “degrees of rationalisation” (Foucault 1982:223) where closer engagement with the software shaping the user interface in digital technologies may or may not become more important as the analysis proceeds.

So in concluding, it is worth looking at the shape that (neo-)Gumperzian investigation of 21st century governmentality might take.
6. Empirical projects

To be consistent with the discussion in this paper, interactional sociolinguistic research on 21st century governmentality should

i) situate itself in issues that “trouble contemporary thought and politics” (Rose 1999:5; Gumperz 1982:29, 2002:9);

ii) attend to the micro-dynamics of interaction in which new technologies play some part, looking ethnographically for moments of friction;

iii) watch out for “the emergence of new control strategies and the reconfiguration of old ones” (Rose 1999:240; K. Ball 2005:99-100);

iv) try to involve comparison across time, juxtaposing datasets both before and after the ascendance of mobile digital technologies, to help to avoid overstating and overestimating about epochal change; and

v) develop collaborative interventions that build on Foucault’s low-key but practice-focused commitment to helping us “to step back from [a] way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and to question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals, … reflect[ing] on it as a problem” (1984a/2003:23), recognising that this kind of critical “[t]hought is not, cannot be, an external evaluation” (Rabinow & Rose 2003:xix; 2c above).

Studies of this kind could be conducted in a range of institutions, but guided by the background of my own work, I will briefly make the case for schools as a good site.

To begin with, schools are places where the traditional discipline intersects with marketised consumption, and it is very widely claimed, for example, that digital technologies have transformed learning in ways that are really difficult for schools to cope with, an issue with which research has yet to come to grips 11 (Sefton-Green & Erstad 2013:88; Rampton & Harris 2010:254-7). Power relations at school can also be productively probed with micro-analysis. In data from the mid 1990s, I was able to show, for example, that the disciplinary regimes of standard language pedagogy failed to generate the ‘linguistic insecurity’ predicted by sociolinguists who overlook interaction (Rampton 2006:271-7,319-20). Rather than producing “discipline, obedience, order-following routine, uniformity and a reduction of options”, a number of pupils responded to the standard language curriculum with “initiative, adventurousness, experimentation, self-assertion, emotionality, pleasure and entertainment seeking” (Bauman & Lyon 2013:57-58; Rampton 2006:Ch.8) – a heteroglossic mix which partly attests to the influence of consumer subjectivities but could also be read as Foucauldian ‘games of liberty’ (Rampton 2006:120-3). Updating to 2005-6 when mobile digital devices had become quite common, Georgakopoulou has examined the ways in which the subjectivity of teenage girls is affected by their everyday interactional involvement with techno-popular media, concluding that these media engagements “serve as major structuring forces in peer-group interactions, shaping the individuals’ distinct sense of self…, their sense of heterosociability, their ethical scenarios about how to display oneself, and their social relations inside and outside school” (2014:241). Practical negotiations of the relationship between media culture and formal education are obviously complex and very varied, and there is a great deal of scope for close comparative analysis of, for example, the experience of different forms of surveillance (the teacher’s gaze, CCTV in the corridor, playground gossip, smartphone snapshots), or the here-and-now constraints and affordances of different platforms and technologies (MSN, WhatsApp, pens and paper)(Varis ftc). Two datasets like these, pre- and post-dating the spread of mobile technologies, provide a potentially workable base for historical comparison, a task we started with a broad quantitative survey of pupils’ practical engagements with techno-popular culture (Rampton, Harris, Georgakopoulou, Leung, Small & Dover 2008:7-9; Rampton & Harris 2010:256-7, 261n.15), and following in the tradition of Crosstalk (2c above), recordings and transcripts of interaction in familiar settings can also feed into awareness raising discussion material for teachers, as in Harris & Lefstein 2011 (viz. pp 46-64 on new media in class).

At the point where it becomes necessary to investigate directly the hidden codes that shape on-line conduct and the non-linguistic semiotics that make populations legible in digital surveillance (4b and 4c), interactional sociolinguists needs to collaborate with computer science, but Gumperzian methodology can still make a useful and distinctive contribution to the discussion of issues like privacy or ‘algorithmic regulation’ 12 even in its current form. People may be shocked when, for example, they are shown what really happens to

11 The editor of the journal Learning Media and Technology recently complained that “educational technology and media research focu[s] firmly on the state-of-the-art rather than the state-of-the-actual”, and called instead for “in-depth, forensic accounts of … the ordinary rather than extra-ordinary aspects of how digital media and technology are being used (and not being used)” (Selwyn 2011:211-2)

12 This is Morozov’s term and it refers to the way in which certain parts of the political process can now be automated due to the advent of Big Data, enabled by the proliferation of cheap sensors and data-storing devices.
their personal details (Mulgan 2014:18), but the formulation of workable strategies has to engage with the ways in which people actually experience – use, enjoy and depend on – digital technologies in their everyday practice. In their Crossstalk programme, Gumperz, Jupp and Roberts sought to facilitate rethinking that engaged fully with the complex lived relationship between situated actions and their longer term influences and effects, focusing in their case on institutional encounters and race discrimination. But this kind of awareness-raising could also address Ball’s ‘experience of surveillance’, fully mindful that “[t]he notion of resistance, at least as it has conventionally functioned with the analyses of self-proclaimed radicals, is too simple and flattening… [Instead,] one […] should examine the [much smaller] ways in which creativity arises out of the situation of human beings engaged in particular relations of force and meaning, and what is made out of the possibilities of that location” (Rose 1999:279).

Drawing on historical analyses, Foucault saw everyday practices as being central to relations of power, and Gumperz pioneered empirical tools and procedures for understanding these practices in the ethnographically situated here-and-now of their enactment, motivated by a similar commitment to the possibility of their operating differently. Fraser argues that although Foucault predates the 21st century, rereading and reworking what he wrote will help us better understand the modes of regulation now emerging. The same applies to Gumperz.

References


