PhD Defense E. Neretina

This thesis consists of three chapters and it highlights the implications of limited competition in Financial Economics. The first chapter shows negative externalities from corporate lobbying on the market value of competitor companies that do lobby themselves. It also demonstrates that the competitors do not lobby when they lack voting power to support lawmakers in the elections, or when they fail to coordinate in trade associations. Two other chapters focus on implications of limited competition in intermediation industries. The second chapter shows that segmentation in the corporate bond market results in limited choice of underwriters to the issuers, providing underwriters with high bargaining power and oligopolistic rents. The third chapter shows that dominant plaintiff law firms that charge premium fees for their services do not improve the settlement outcomes for their clients, but merely use their ability to select large and profitable lawsuits.

Ekaterina Neretina (the USSR, 1989) received her B.Sc. in Economics from Higher School of Economics (HSE), and she received master degrees from a joint program of HSE (M.A. in Economics) and Duisenberg School of Finance (M.Sc. in Finance), all with cum laude. Before joining Tilburg University as a master- and then a PhD-student, she did a research internship at the Dutch Central Bank. At Tilburg University, her doctoral studies were financed with NWO Research Talent grant. After graduating from PhD, she will join University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business as an Assistant Professor of Finance and Business Economics.

• Location: Cobbenhagen building, Aula (access via Koopmans building)
• Supervisors: Prof. L.D.R. Renneboog, Prof. F.A. Ferrell