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Tilburg Law and Economics Center

TILEC supports and stimulates academic research on the governance of economic activity. It fosters academically path breaking and practically relevant research and aims to be a leading center worldwide.

TILEC Seminar: Riccardo Calcagno (EM Lyon Business School)

Takeover Duration and Negotiation Process
10:45-11:45, M 1003

Riccardo Calcagno is Professor of Finance at the EM Lyon Business School (Ecully, Lyon region, France), in the Department of Economics, Finance and Control, and Research Fellow at Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies at Collegio Carlo Alberto, Moncalieri (Turin), Italy.

Financial economist as training, Riccardo Calcagno has been a professor of finance at emlyon business school since 2011. He holds a PhD from the Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium).  

His research focuses on information economics and its applications to household finance and corporate finance. He has worked on various topics such as financial literacy and financial advice, mergers and acquisitions and the problems inherent to the negotiation processes behind them, the design of managerial compensation.

He previously worked at the Tilburg University and at the Free University of Amsterdam (VU).

He published articles in various academic reviews, such as the Review of Economic Studies, the Journal of Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance: An International Review and the Journal of Banking and Finance, among others.


We study the determinants of takeover duration. We focus on bidder-initiated, one-to-one negotiations. As the negotiation process goes on, both parties learn about true deal synergies. At any moment, rival bidders can show up and compete for the target, and entry of rival bidders signal a higher deal synergy. Using a discrete time finite horizon dynamic programming approach, we study the equilibrium relations between the negotiation duration, the pressure of potential competition and the learning process. We test these relations empirically, controlling for a novel measure of the intensity of potential competition calibrated on a large sample of merger negotiations with hand-collected data from SEC filings. The negotiation duration is related with the takeover premium and depends jointly on potential competition, learning process and ex-ante riskiness of the deal. These findings show the importance of assessing correctly the intensity of potential competition in order to predict the outcome of takeover processes.


When: 27 March 2019 10:45

End date: 27 March 2019 11:45