TILEC Work In Progress: Michael Verba
The Right Sort?: How Two-Tiered Patent Systems Induce Sorting
Technological progress has been identified as the main channel for socioeconomic development (Solow, 1957; Jones, 2002). The raison d’être of intellectual property (IP) protection is the promotion of technological discovery. However, questions about the specific design of the patent system, its institutional features and procedures, are still ongoing and occupy the attention of both theorists and policy practitioners (Scotchmer, 2004; Encaoua et al., 2006). These questions are important because the chosen designs can affect the rate and direction of innovation (Eswaran & Gallini, 1996; Moser, 2005). In this paper, we inquire into the effects of one specific institutional design option for patent systems, namely, multiple tiers of intellectual property protection. Using data on patent system design in European countries, we investigate whether two-tiered patent systems induce sorting of patent applications by invention quality or applicant type.
Keywords: utility model; patent system; sorting; patent quality;
individual inventors; financial constraints
Authors: Michael Verba & Jussi Heikkilä
Time : 10:45-11:45
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