TiLPS

The Tilburg Center for Logic, Ethics, and Philosophy of Science studies knowledge, reasoning, and value in all their forms.

tilburg university

Research Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science

This research seminar is a forum for all members of TiLPS with research interests in epistemology or philosophy of science to present and discuss their work. Sometimes we also have a guest speaker or discuss a recently published article. Master students and Research Master students may take this research seminar for credit. Please contact Matteo Colombo for more information. Papers for discussion and some background reading will be available from this website at least one week in advance.


Upcoming seminars

Thursday, 12 October 2017, 12:45-14:00

Room: D 119

Speaker: Matteo Colombo (TiLPS)

Title and abstract: t.b.a.

Thursday, 26 Ocotober 2017, 12:45-14:00

Room: D 119

Speaker: Silvia Ivani (TiLPS)

Title and abstract: t.b.a.

Thursday, 23 November 2017, 12:45-14:00

Room: D 119

Speaker: Noah van Dongen (TiLPS)

Title and abstract: t.b.a.

Thursday, 7 December 2017, 12:45-14:00

Room: D 119

Speaker: Naftali Weinberger (TiLPS)

Title and abstract: t.b.a.


Recent seminars

Thursday, 14 September 2017, 12:45-14:00

Room: D 119

Speaker: Jan Sprenger (TiLPS)

Title: Trivalent Semantics for Indicative Conditionals: A Resurrection Attempt

The semantics of indicative conditionals are a notoriously difficult philosophical problem. Many philosophers take the view that they don't have classical truth conditions: the truth value of 'If A, then B', cannot be determined as a function of the truth values of A and B. Focus has therefore shifted to the acceptability and/or probability of indicative conditionals.

Unfortunately, this view severs the ties between the semantics and the epistemology of indicative conditionals. I propose a principled solution that goes back to De Finetti: to adopt a trivalent semantics, based on reading indicative conditionals as conditional predictions of the consequence. The advantages of this view are spelled out, and it is defended against the standard objections (e.g., invalidity of classical inference schemes).