Workshop
Faultless Disagreement and Truth
Relativism

Tilburg, 24.09.2008
Synopsis

Are there topics on which people can disagree without fault? Many philosophers (e.g. Max Klbel, John MacFarlane) have recently argued that faultless disagreement is a genuine phenomenon with important consequences for the correct semantics of, say, predicates of taste: a semantic account of predicates of taste would have to a judge-parameter relative to which the sentence in which the predicate occurs is evaluated. And if you accept that there is such a thing as faultless disagreement about tastes or epistemic entitlements, you may want to defend a form of assessment-relativism about truth. Others, however, reject that genuine faultless disagreement exists. They will hold on to an objective conception of truth and explain away the illusion of faultless disagreement via other means. At this TiLPS workshop, three speakers discuss the phenomenon and offer new perspectives.

Organizers: Filip Buekens (TiLPS, University of Leuven)

Keynote Speakers

Filip Buekens (TiLPS), Richard Dietz (University of Tokyo), Sebastiano Moruzzi (University of Bologna), Crispin Wright (New York University)
Program

Wednesday 24.09

14:00 - 15:00  Richard Dietz: *Two Dogma’s About Correct Disagreement*
15:00 - 16:00  Sebastiano Moruzzi and Crispin Wright: *Trumping Assessment and the Aristotelian Future*
16:00 - 17:00  Filip Buekens: *Faultless Disagreement and Expressivism*