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"No, we don't mix languages":
Ideological power and the chronotopic
organization of ethnolinguistic identities

by

Farzad Karimzad & Lydia Catedral[©]
(University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

karimza2@illinois.edu │ medill2@illinois.edu

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Ideological power and the chronotopic organization of ethnolinguistic identities

Farzad Karimzad & Lydia Catedral

Department of Linguistics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Abstract

We address ethnolinguistic identity using Bakhtin's (1981) notion of chronotope. Taking an ethnographic approach to linguistic data from Azerbaijani and Uzbek communities, we trace the impact of various chronotopes on our participants' acts of ethnolinguistic identification. Building on Blommaert and De Fina (2017), we illustrate how ethnolinguistic identification is an outcome of the interaction between multiple levels of large- and small-scale chronotopes. Furthermore, we argue that chronotopes differ in terms of their power, depending on the ideological force behind them. We demonstrate how power differentials between chronotopes can account for certain interactional and linguistic patterns in conversation. The power inherent in chronotopes that link nationhood with specific languages makes the notions of *discrete languages* and *static identities* 'real' for our participants. Therefore, discussions of language and identity as flexible and socially constructed, we argue, must not obscure the power of these notions in shaping the perceptions of sociolinguistic subjects.

Key words: chronotope; ethnolinguistic identity; power; Uzbek; Azeri/Azerbaijani; nationalism; language mixing; language ideology

1. INTRODUCTION

In this paper, we address ethnolinguistic identity through engagement with Bakhtin's (1981) notion of chronotopes - spatiotemporal envelopes that help participants organize and understand social and cultural information. Building on previous work that discusses the multilayered dialogic nature of chronotopes and their deployment within discourse (Bakhtin 1981; Wirtz 2016; Blommaert & De Fina 2017), we illustrate how chronotopes structure the linguistic and metapragmatic practices related to ethnic and linguistic identity. We draw from the various strands of scholarship that have employed chronotopes to discuss large-scale vs. small-scale, 'brought along' vs. 'brought about', and momentary vs. enduring aspects of social life in order to show how the interaction between multiple chronotopes leads to conflicting images of particular ethnolinguistic categories and the ways in which speakers are associated (or not) with these categories.

Focusing on in-group conversations about Azerbaijani and Uzbek identities, we trace the impact of various chronotopes in the participants' discursive acts of ethnolinguistic identification. Blommaert and De Fina (2017) claim that identities are chronotopically organized, i.e. certain acts of identification are governed by specific spatiotemporal configurations. However, their empirical data focus only on instances in which the immediate chronotopic context determines language choice. Our data, on the other hand, allow for an analysis of how the immediate chronotopic context along with interacting large- and small-scale chronotopes results in particular linguistic and metapragmatic outputs. We show how participants who draw from contrasting large-scale chronotopes construct conflicting images of ethnolingusitic identity, which elicit (dis)alignment from the other participants.

Examining the conflicting discourses between our participants over issues of ethnolinguistic identity, we also find evidence for the idea that chronotopes can differ in terms of their salience and power, and that these power differentials influence the linguistic

and metapragmatic output of the involved speakers. This means that certain chronotopes emerge as salient in response to the context of the ongoing discussion, and that these salient chronotopes differ from one another in terms of power, depending on the ideological force behind them. One consequence of a chronotope being relatively more powerful is that it is also relatively more accessible. The accessibility of these powerful chronotopes makes them more communicable (Blommaert 2015), such that they require less explanation. More powerful chronotopes may elicit unmarked alignment and be invoked with increased epistemological certainty, while relatively less powerful chronotopes may elicit less unmarked alignment, be invoked with decreased epistemological certainty, and require more extensive explanation.

The fact that some chronotopes are more powerful has implications for the perceived 'realness' of the categories of language and identity. More specifically, in part due to the sociohistorical and political circumstances experienced by the communities we study, the chronotopes related to nationhood are dominant, leading to the 'realness' of ethnonational identities. Similarly, there is a sense of 'realness' associated with the notions of *discrete languages* and the *ideal monolingual speaker*, even though most of our participants are multilingual in practice. While we agree with the existing scholarship that allows for a more complex and less essentialist view of identity, we also find that the ideological power inherent in dominant chronotopes legitimates essentialist ethnolinguistic identities as 'real' for our participants. Similarly, we understand that terms such as *languaging* (Jørgensen 2008), *translanguaging* (Li 2011), and *polylanguaging* (Jørgensen et al 2011) are meant to illustrate the fluidity of language practices. However, because chronotopes related to discrete languages are still powerful and thus make the notion of *discrete language* psychologically 'real' for many speakers, the abovementioned terms fail to capture the ideologies of the speakers we purport to study. Thus, we argue that scholarly discussions must not only make

space for an understanding of the notions of 'language' and 'identity' as socially constructed, but must also recognize the power of these terms in shaping the social lives of the subjects of sociolinguistic research.

In what follows, we give an overview of the literature on chronotopes as well as background information on issues related to ethnolinguistic identity from the two communities under study. After reviewing the methods of data collection and analysis, we first present the Uzbek data and then the Azeri data. In each of these sections, we provide information about the immediate context of our excerpts, and then illustrate chronotopic interactions, as well as the differential power between interacting chronotopes. We conclude with an overview of our contributions and the implications of our analysis for sociolinguistic approaches to identity and language more broadly.

1.1. The Chronotope and Identity

Initially used by Bakhtin (1981) to capture the fact that time and space were closely connected in literature, the chronotope has now been used across studies of social and cultural phenomena in an attempt to clarify and nuance concepts of context and interaction. Following Bakhtin, Agha (2007: 321) posited the notion of *cultural chronotope*, 'a semiotic representation of time and place peopled by certain social types', which has been taken up by scholars of discourse to shed light on issues such as migration, ideology, history and identity. For instance, Dick (2010) uses the notion of chronotope to demonstrate how the time-space-personhood combination creates a *real* and *indivisible* image of life in the United States for the residents of Uriangato, Mexico, even though they have never been to the United States. This 'modernist chronotope' captures the ways in which a space and time not connected to the immediate context is still a social reality for her participants, and she demonstrates how this reality manifests in their discourses. Another example of the utility of the chronotope as a

unit of analysis can be found in Woolard's 2013 paper, where she uses it to explain why individuals may have different stances regarding their past experience with a language and their current attitudes towards the language.

In addition to seeing the utility of the chronotope for explaining disparate ideologies and viewpoints, scholars have also noted the utility of examining the interaction between chronotopes - a move which also draws from Bakhtin's (1981) assertion of the intrinsically dialogical nature of discourse. Anderson (2011), for instance, describes how the interaction between major and minor chronotopes can explain the organization of a highly specialized counting system; while Wirtz (2016) argues that history is not a homogeneous project, but rather the consequence of dialog between differing chronotopes. Linking this dialogical nature of chronotopes to the subjective experiences of individuals, Karimzad (2016a) demonstrates how large-scale chronotopes pertaining to a successful future life in the United States inform relatively smaller chronotopes related to images of success in the U.S. and a lack of success in Iran, for Iranian educational migrants.

In this paper, we similarly aim to bring together discussions of individual subjectivity and dialog between chronotopes, in part by drawing from more recent work by Blommaert and De Fina (2017), which explicitly discusses the connection between identity and chronotopes. They argue that identities are organized chronotopically, i.e. an understanding of the indices involved in identifying speakers is dependent on particular time-space configurations. They further maintain that the full complexity of identities can only be understood through attention to the interaction between various macroscopic and microscopic chronotopes, along with other aspects of social and cultural life. They note, for instance, that the chronotope of 'student life' may be experienced differently by different students depending on the identities that these students bring along to their interpretation of student life. They also illustrate, using data from Italian dialects, the ways in which the linguistic

choices of their participants shift in response to shifts in the immediate chronotopic context, i.e. the use of Italian in speaking to the teacher, and Sicillian in the 'back regions' of the classroom. What we add to their discussion is, first of all, an analysis of data that illustrates not only the linguistic impact of the immediate chronotopic context, but also the linguistic impact of participants' engagement with chronotopes at multiple levels. Secondly, we provide empirical evidence to show how the dialog between these chronotopes impacts and constrains not only linguistic choices, but also metapragmatic comments. We explore all of these theoretical issues within the context of ethnolinguistic identity to show how different chronotopes are invoked as justifications for particular ways of identifying speakers and creating links between language and ethnicity. As such, this paper also adds to the literature on chronotopes by demonstrating that chronotopes are a useful unit of analysis in de-essentializing ethnolinguistic identity, while at the same time showing how the power of certain chronotopes can reaffirm the essentialist nature of identities related to the nation-state, ethnicity, and language in the perceptions of participants.

1.2. Uzbek Ethnolinguistic Identity

Uzbekistan is Central Asian country, which became independent from the Soviet Union in 1991. Notions of Uzbekness or Uzbek identity have shifted throughout the country's history, but have been consistently important to the political projects in the region starting from 1924 when Uzbekistan became a nation-state under the Soviet Union. The project of creating the Uzbek nation-state and corresponding ethno-national identity began as part of the larger soviet project of creating semi-autonomous nation-states each with its own titular ethnicity, all bound together by socialism (Hirsch 2005). This binding together of the nation-states through socialism linguistically manifested in the promotion of Russian as the language of interethnic communication between the various ethnicities – both within the individual

republics and across the Soviet Union as a whole (Fierman 1995; Landau & Kellner-Heinkele 2001).

After independence from the Soviet Union, there was an effort to derussify the language (Pavlenko 2008) and a more general attempt to establish an Uzbek identity distinct from soviet Uzbekness. Adams (2010) claims that post-independence Uzbekness was simultaneously a reaction to soviet legacy and a continuation of a view of Uzbek culture through a soviet lens. Ethnolinguistic identity remains complicated, however, given that Uzbekistan is a multilingual and multiethnic state with speakers of almost 130 languages living within its borders (Schlyter 2011). Additionally, notions of Uzbekness are highly localized (Finke 2014) – with different regions being populated with different ethnic groups. For instance, the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara are predominantly ethnically and linguistically Tajik cities.

In order to make sense of the data that follows, it is also crucial to understand Uzbekness in part as a spectacle style performance for others. This notion of spectacle style performance (Adams 2010) can be traced through three different scales: regional, state and global. At the regional level, Doi documents how during the early soviet period Uzbek dancers were used to represent the different regions of Uzbekistan simply by 'changing her [their] gestures and dress' (2002: 136) and that through their collective dances they became 'symbolic mediators' that in many ways constituted the nation-state. Adams argues that contemporary Uzbekistan makes use of internationally recognized Olympic style spectacles for state holidays in order to 'demonstrate their culture's universality as well as its uniqueness' (2010:89) and its projected position as 'an equal in the global community' (2010: 99). In our observations of the Uzbek community in the United States, we see these type of performances continue in holiday celebrations. One individual who is very involved in the Uzbek community noted specifically that one of the purposes of having regular 'Uzbek

picnics' is to invite non-Uzbeks who do not know about Uzbekistan to show them *kimligimizni, qanday odamlar, qanday millat* 'who we are, what kind of people, what kind of ethnicity' by *dasturxonni ko'rsatish, milliy taomlar bilan… musqialar bilan… san'atkorlar bilan* 'showing them our table spread, with our ethnic foods …with music… with artists'. Many of the Uzbeks that the second author spoke to had a great desire to represent and explain Uzbekness to her, holding a similar perspective to this individual about the importance of performing Uzbekness for others in the United States.

1.3. Azerbaijani Ethnolinguistic Identity

Iran is an ethnolinguistically diverse country, and among its different minority groups, Iranian Azerbaijanis (also referred to as Iranian Azeris or Iranian Turks) constitute the largest population. Azerbaijanis live in northwestern provinces of Iran and speak Azerbaijani or Azeri as their first language. This is a Turkic language spoken also in the Republic of Azerbaijan. There is no consensus about the number of Azerbaijanis in Iran. While this number varies between 12 to 19 million according to some sources (see Bani-Shoraka 2005; Lewis, Simons, & Fennig 2016), the number circulating in talk among Azerbaijanis, specifically promoted by nationalistic discourses, ranges between 30 to 40 million. Yet, given the large number of intermarriages and lack of accurate census data, these numbers are hard to validate.

Following the European one nation-one language ideology, Iranian language policy considers Persian (Farsi) as the unifying language of the nation (Sheyholislami 2012). It is thus the single official language of the country and is the dominant language of education, mass media, and administration. Consequently, the majority of Iranian Azerbaijanis—except for older generations -- are bilingual speakers of Azeri and Persian, where the use of Azeri, similar to other minoritized languages, is restricted to informal domains (Bani-Shoraka 2005; Karimzad 2016b). The other consequence of such a lack of status is that Iranian Azerbaijani

does not have a standard written form. In fact, given the dominance of Persian in all formal domains, it is only on social media that Azerbaijanis have the opportunity to practice their language in written form (Karimzad & Sibgatullina, forthcoming).

The hegemonic power of Persian language and speakers in Iran has had other consequences for minority groups as well. In particular, different minority groups have been looked down upon, and their accented Persian has been ridiculed by the Persian majority. Azerbaijanis have not been an exception in this regard. In fact, the typical theme of cultural productions, particularly jokes, circulating among non-Azerbaijanis has revolved around depicting Azerbaijanis as 'less intelligent' and 'foolish', making them an object of mockery (Karimzad, in press). In recent years, there have been attempts by the educated, reformist elites to change this culture of ridiculing minority groups; however, given the history of such ethnolinguistic subordination, improvements in this regard would indeed require further awareness-raising.

The sociopolitical and historical circumstances around Azerbaijanis in Iran have resulted in the emergence of diverse ideologies about Azerbaijani language and identity. The main ideologies, as Karimzad (in press) outlines, are the *'pureness', 'correctness',* and *Speak-your-own-language* ideologies. The proponents of 'pure' Azerbaijani attempt to free their language from any influence from Persian. As a result, they replace the linguistic features associated with Persian with features linked to other Turkic languages so as to differentiate themselves from *Iranianness/Persianness* and emphasize the *Turkicness* of their identity (Karimzad & Sibgatullina, forthcoming). This is a common practice among the nationalists. The 'correctness' ideology, on the other hand, is different from 'pureness' in that it does not get rid of *any* Persian influence, but instead is more concerned about using what is perceive as 'correct' Azeri. While established borrowed words are acceptable, the proponents of the correctness ideology seek to preserve their language from the changes that have been

'harming' the language both diachronically and synchronically, and also to speak as monolingually as possible (Karimzad, in press). Finally, those who favor the 'speak-your-own-language' ideology denaturalize the linguistic and metalinguistic practices that aim to police language practices and, though monolingual speech is still ideal, they opt for less monitored language use, preferring the language with which they have been socialized. Unlike the nationalist, purist ideology, the latter two ideologies would, to a great extent, agree with both the *Iranianness* and *Turkicness* of their identities (For a detailed discussion, see Karimzad, in press; and Karimzad & Sibgatullina, forthcoming).

2. METHOD

We draw from a corpus of 45 hours of recorded interviews and naturally occurring conversations among members of two diasporic communities: Iranian Azerbaijanis in the United States and Uzbeks in the United States. This data is part of two large ethnographic studies on these respective communities carried out by the authors since late 2012. We supplemented our audio recordings with ethnographic notes and observations and have transcribed our data according to conventions adapted from the CA tradition (Atkinson & Heritage 2006).

In analyzing the following linguistic data, we take an ethnographic approach to careful linguistic analysis, paying particular attention to the discursive moves through which participants align and disalign with one another. We specifically focus on language practices such as the use of pronouns and other deictics, language choice, etc., as well as metapragmatic commentary on language and identity. In discussing the chronotopes that we see at play, we draw not only from the linguistic data from our participants, but also from an understanding of the larger historical and social context in which our participants are operating.

3. DATA ANALYSIS

3.1. Uzbek Data

Excerpt 1 is taken from conversations between four women: the second author, a mother and daughter, and a mutual friend, we call Farida. Farida and the second author had been friends for a few years. Farida had originally met the mother and daughter at a Russian cultural event and had introduced them to the second author for a casual conversation that was recorded for research purposes. They met again the next day for the second author to ask the other three explicit questions about comments they had made in the previous conversation. In the initial conversation, the mother had identified Farida as Tajik given that her Russian language abilities were stronger than her Uzbek language abilities. The daughter had contradicted the mother, identifying Farida as Uzbek. These conflicting perspectives on Farida's identity prompted the second author to ask both the mother and daughter to further explain their positions.

It should be noted that both the second author and Farida were graduate students focusing on issues of identity and culture at the time of recording, so both saw the interactions as potential sources of data for their work. Similarly, the mother and daughter had been informed that the second author was doing research related to Uzbekness, and they had mentioned specifically to Farida that they wanted to represent Uzbekistan positively. However, given their previous meeting, they had developed a friendly relationship that extended beyond the researcher-participant relationship. And at the time of recording, everyone was relaxed in the home environment and spoke casually with one another, while they answered questions, ate treats and socialized.

"She speaks Russian, so she's Tajik"

In the excerpt that follows, the daughter and mother continue to debate and give justifications for whether Farida is Tajik or Uzbek. In our analysis, we highlight the levels at which chronotopes are operating in organizing their discourses. We note that the large-scale, conflicting chronotopes brought along by the mother and daughter respectively influence how they discursively identify Farida in the ongoing interaction. We will also illustrate that the mother and daughter's chronotopes are not equal in power, and how the relative power of these chronotopes shapes their discourses and influences what they take away from the conversation.

Excerpt 1:

1. **Farida:** Qiziq (.) **chto russkiy yazyk** *because you are Tajik*	1. **F:** It is interesting (.) **that Russian language** *because you are Tajik*
2. **Farida & Mother:** (hahaha)	2. **F& M:** (hahaha)
3. **Mother: Net (.) vot** man man tushuntiraman hozir	3. **M: No (.) here** I I will explain now
4. Bila↑sizmi nima	4. Do you know what↑
5. O'zbeki<u>ston</u> Tojiki<u>ston</u> **tak** Qozoq<u>ston</u> Qirg'iz<u>ston</u>=	5. Uzbeki<u>stan</u> Tajiki<u>stan</u> **hmm** Kazakh<u>stan</u> Kyrgyz<u>stan</u>=
6. =Chegara-ku↑bizar (.) chegara rayonlar-da↑(.)	6. =We're borders-EMP (.) border regions-EMP↑(.)
7. Uh **vot** qo<u>zo</u>qlar yashiydi=	7. Uh **here** Ka<u>zakh</u>s live=
8. =o'z<u>bek</u>lar Qozoqstonda yashaydi	8. =Uz<u>bek</u>s live in Kazakhstan
9. qo<u>zo</u>qlar O'zbekistonda yashiydi	9. Ka<u>zakh</u>s live in Uzbekistan
10. <u>toji</u>klar O'zbekistonda	10. <u>Taji</u>ks in Uzbekistan
11. O'zbeklar tojikistonda yashiydi	11. Uzbeks live in Tajikstan
12. **Farida:** To'g'ri. to'g'ri.	12. **F:** Right. right.
13. **Mother: Vot** mana endi maktab qanaqa ti- tur- qaysi tilda qilish kerak	13. **M: Here** now school what kind of ty- lang- which language should it use
14. **Farida:** To'g'ri.	14. **F:** Right.
15. **Mother:** O'sha paytda soyuz paytida <u>to'g'ri</u> **reshenie** bo'lgan bo'lishi mumkin=	15. **M:** In that time in the soviet time it might have been a <u>correct</u> **decision**=
16. =Chunki <u>RUS TILI</u> mana **tak vot** bitta ((inaudible)) **internatsional'ny yazyk** deb aytishadi	16. =Because <u>RUSSIAN</u> here **here is like** a ((inaudible)) **international language** they would say
17. **Lydia & Farida:** Hmm	17. **L&F:** Hmm
18. **Mother:** Lekin ((inaudible)) bir darajada rus tili millatlarni o'rtasida **takoy internatsional'ny**	18. **Mother:** But ((inaudible)) at some level Russian was **like** an **international** language
19. bizarni millatlarimizni orasida **internatsional'ny** til [bo'lgan	19. between our ethnicities it was an **international** [language
20. **Farida:** [Birlashtir-	20. **F:** [Unifie-
21. **Mother:** Birlashtiradigan til bo'lgan	21. **M:** A language that unified

22. O'shani uchun maktablarda (.) shu aniq chegaralarda yashagan anaqalar	22. For that reason in schools (.) especially in the border region there lived those who
23. Mana mana **tajichka** buni aytaylik	23. Here here let's say she (Farida) is **Tajik**
24. Tajik O'zbekda yashiydi	24. Tajik and she lives in Uzbekistan
25. **Daughter:** O'zbek-<u>ku</u>↑ o'zbek	25. **D:** She's Uzbek-<u>EMP</u>↑ Uzbek
26. **Lydia:** (hahaha)	26. **L: (**hahaha)
27. **Mother:** Yo- **o'zbechka-** (…)	27. **M:** No- (she is) **Uzbek-** (…)
28. **Farida:** U lekin rozi emaslar	28. **F:** But she (the daughter) does not agree.
29. **Mother:** U	29. **M:** She (the daughter)
30. chegarada yasha[magan	30. did not live on the [border
31. **Daughter:** [Man ko'p narsa bilan rozi emasman. (hahaha)	31. **D:** [I don't agree with a lot of things. (hahaha)
32. **Mother: Da** bu bu bunda ma:n bilama:n bu chunki keyingi avlod	32. **M: Yes** this this for her I: kno:w Because she is the next generation
33. Bizar **uje** boshqacha tarbiyalangan	33. For us we were **already** raised differently
34. **Mother:** Bizar millat sifatida basharimiz-yuzimizni yuoqotdik devo:tti↑	34. **M:** In terms of ethnicity our face – our countenance we lost it she is sa:ying↑
35. Bu qizim to'g'ri aytivotti=	35. This my daughter is saying correctly=
36. =Chunki bizar o'sha paytda mana shunaqa narsa bilan tarix bilan o'qidik=	36. =Because we read history with these things at that time
37. =O'zimiz haqiqiy tariximiz bilmadik bizar	37. We didn't know our own true history

The first large-scale chronotope we observe in the data is the *soviet chronotope*, which is brought along by the mother. The Soviet Union is both a time and a place, and as such forms a chronotopic lens through which her identification of Farida as Tajik can be understood. The mother invokes this chronotope within the discourse by reference to particular places that were a part of the Soviet Union, i.e. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan (line 5), and by referring to a particular time, *o'sha payt* 'that time', which she later clarifies to be *soyuz payti* 'soviet time' (line 15).

The bringing about of this soviet chronotope can also be observed linguistically in the following ways. First of all, the mother code-switches to Russian from Uzbek in the words *reshenie* 'decision' (line 15) and *internatsional'niy yazyk* 'international language' (line 16 and lines 18-19).[1] Additionally, the mother uses ethnonyms marked with Russian morphology to indicate femininity, such as *tajichka* 'Tajik-woman' (line 23) and *o'zbechka* 'Uzbek woman' (line 27) to refer to Farida. Russian language use is generally associated with

the Soviet Union since making Russian the language of education was a decision connected to soviet policies, and the phrase *internatsional'niy yazyk* 'international language' as applied to Russian was a part of widely propagated soviet ideologies. Therefore, these switches to Russian aid in the discursive construction of the image of the soviet time.

It is not only through the mother's discourse that this soviet chronotope is invoked in the ongoing conversation. Notably, in lines 12 and 14 Farida responds to the mother's explanations with the affirmation *to'g'ri* 'right', indicating alignment. In lines 18-19, when the mother notes that *bizarni millatlarimizni orasida internatsional'ny til bo'lgan* 'it was an international language between our ethnicities', Farida interjects with the word *birlashtir* 'to unify' (line 20) and the mother reiterates this word in her next statement *birlashtiradigan til bo'lgan* 'a language that unified' (line 21). Farida is not only aligning with, but also co-constructing this soviet chronotope in the moment of interaction and by doing so, she is approving of the relevance of this spatiotemporal configuration in the ongoing conversation.

The soviet chronotope is invoked by the mother in order to justify why she identifies Farida as Tajik. More specifically, when she states that the Russian language was a language *millatlarni o'rtasida* 'between the nationalities/ethnicities' (line 18) and that it was a language that unified (line 21), she is pointing to the fact that ethnic minorities depended on Russian to communicate during soviet times. It is within this soviet chronotope that soviet-style ethnolinguistic identification can take place, and that Farida's proficiency in Russian can be used to identify her as an ethnolinguistic minority within Uzbekistan.[2]

The daughter disagrees with the mother's identification of Farida as an ethnic minority because she brings along a *post-independence chronotope*. This post-independence chronotope, though not invoked overtly, pertains to discourses about the nature of Uzbekistan and Uzbekness after the fall of the Soviet Union. Specifically, within this chronotope,

Uzbekness is realized through location in the nation-state of Uzbekistan and linguistic proficiency in Uzbek. Since Farida meets both of these qualifications, the daughter identifies her as Uzbek. The invocation of this post-independence chronotope is also evident in the daughter's linguistic practices. Unlike the mother's use of ethnonyms marked with the Russian morphology to indicate femininity such as *tajichka* 'Tajik-woman' (line 23) and *o'zbechka* 'Uzbek woman' (line 27), the daughter marks her use of ethnonyms as Uzbek by omitting this morphology -- as is evident in her use of *o'zbek* 'Uzbek' twice in line 25. This is in line with national efforts in Uzbekistan to derussify the Uzbek language post-independence.

We have noted that the dialog between the post-soviet and post-independence chronotopes brought along by the mother and daughter influence how they characterize Uzbekness. It is important to note that these chronotopes have differential power, and the imbalance of power between these chronotopes can be observed in the mother and daughter's discourses. The soviet chronotope is salient to the ongoing conversation and in particular to the mother's perception of Farida's identity. However, it has a diminished ideological force behind it, given that the Soviet Union is no longer in power. On the other hand, the post-independent chronotope is relatively more powerful, in part because Uzbekistan is currently independent and promotes and normalizes rhetoric which legitimizes the titular ethnicity and language of the nation-state. Furthermore, the significant ideological force behind the notion of a homogeneous nation-state goes beyond the case of Uzbekistan and applies more generally to global perceptions of the relationship between governance, sovereignty, and ethnolinguistic and national identity. The power differential between these two brought along chronotopes manifests in the conversation both metapragmatically and linguistically. For instance, even though the mother identifies Farida through the lens of the soviet chronotope, we see that in summing up the conversation, she discursively moves away from the soviet

chronotope by negatively evaluating it through the lens of a post-independence chronotope. She comments *qizim to'g'ri aytivotti* 'my daughter is saying correctly' (line 35) referencing her daughter's earlier criticism of soviet times, and aligning with her negative assessment of these times. She also notes that *o'sha paytda … o'zimiz haqiqiy tariximiz bilmadik* 'in that time … we didn't know our own true history' (lines 36-37) evaluating the soviet chronotope as a time and a place in which people lost their ethnic faces and did not know their true history.

Additionally, it may be possible to read certain aspects of the mother's pronoun usage as discursive distancing from the soviet chronotope. In line 16, she notes that Russian was referred to as an international language saying *rus tili mana tak vot internatsional'ny yazy deb aytishadi* 'Russian here is like an international language they said' (line 16). Her use of the third person plural in the verb *aytishadi 'they said'* is a way of distancing herself from the soviet chronotope. Instead of using the first person plural conjugation, i.e. 'we said', she removes herself from this spatiotemporal configuration. It may be the case that she distances herself from this claim about Russian being an international language because she is aware that post-independent chronotopes are more powerful and demand adherence to a vision of Uzbekistan in which Russian is no longer required. We can interpret this discursive distancing from the soviet chronotope as indicative of the influence of post-independence rhetoric on the ongoing conversation. We can also observe the tentativeness of the mother's position in the fact that she uses the first person plural imperative to pose a hypothetical identification of Farida as Tajik in *tajichka buni aytalik* 'let's say she is Tajik' (line 23). This tentativeness is not observed in the daughter's response *o'zbek-ku o'zbek* 'she's Uzbek Uzbek' (line 25), which is emphasized through the repeated use of the word *o'zbek* and through the use of the emphatic particle *–ku*. The difference between the epistemological

certainty with which these comments are made reflect the power differential between the soviet chronotope and the post-independence chronotope.

The relatively more powerful position of certain chronotopes also makes them relatively more accessible, resulting in particular interactional patterns. In other words, the more powerful a chronotope, the more accessible it is, and the greater the accessibility, the greater its communicability (Blommaert 2015). As a result, less powerful chronotopes require more explanation, while more powerful chronotopes can be taken for granted as assumed shared knowledge among the participants. In our example, we see that the mother talks extensively about the soviet chronotope, elaborating on its characteristics and the ways in which it informs her identification of Farida as Tajik from lines 3-24. On the other hand, the daughter neither explains the post-independence chronotope, nor does she attempt to justify her identification of Farida as Uzbek. In response to her mother's long explanation of the soviet chronotope and her identification of Farida, the daughter simply responds by saying *o'zbek-ku o'zbek* 'she's Uzbek Uzbek' (line 25) without any additional explanation or justification for this claim. The fact that the post-independence chronotope is not explained, while the soviet chronotope receives a great deal of explanation, points to the fact that the post-independence chronotope, given its contemporary dominance, is relatively unmarked.

3.2. Azeri Data

The conversations in the following excerpt were recorded at a dinner party hosted by an Iranian Azerbaijani university professor in a college town in the U.S. The professor and his wife are known in this town for gathering Azerbaijanis at their place once or twice a year. Although Persian, American, and guests from other nationalities are also invited, these dinner parties are generally understood as gatherings of Azerbaijanis. This time, in addition to the host and his wife, there were four Iranian Azerbaijani male graduate students including the first author, two male visiting students from the Republic of Azerbaijan, three women, two of

whom were half Persian-half Azerbaijani, and one American woman who had come with her Iranian Azerbaijani boyfriend. Most of the guests were comfortable communicating in both Persian and Azeri, but the visiting students from the Republic of Azerbaijan did not speak Persian and the half Persian-half Azerbaijani women were much more comfortable communicating in Persian. While Persian, as the shared language amongst Iranians, is the unmarked language choice in most other gatherings, the immediate chronotopic context of this gathering required that Azeri be the dominant language of the conversation. While prior experience at these types of gatherings had helped some of the guests bring along an image of what linguistic behaviors were expected, for others, it was totally new and brought about in the very first interactions. The excerpt we focus on was part of a larger conversation that resulted from one of these initial interactions when the half Azerbaijani women, Tina and Zahra, were introduced to the men from the Republic of Azerbaijan, Alim and Rashid. When Zahra was greeting Rashid, she first greeted him in Azeri, aligning with the expected linguistic behavior, but once she found it hard to further communicate in Azeri, she switched to Persian. Given the fact that her dominant language was Persian, this would have been an acceptable switch if she was interacting with another Iranian Azerbaijani. However, since Rashid did not speak Persian, he reacted: "We do not have Persian here. We are all Turks". This led to very explicit discussions about language and identity among those present. The resulting conversations were dominated by four of the participants: the hosting professor (Behzad), one of the visiting students from the Republic of Azerbaijan (Rashid), and two of the male Iranian Azerbaijani graduate students (Farhad and Majid). As we shall see, these interactions were triggered by two conflicting chronotopes which led to different alignment and disalignment patterns. While Rashid had brought along a more nationalistic chronotope about Azerbaijani language and identity, Behzad, Farhad, and Majid's shared histories as

Iranian Azerbaijani elites led to their (re)-construction of different chronotopic images regarding the situation of Azerbaijani language and identity in Iran.

"There's no hostility between Turks and Persians"

In this data, once again multiple contrasting chronotopes are brought along and result in different positionings relative to issues of language and identity. While our Uzbek example illustrates how different chronotopes can lead to different identifications of an individual; in this example, we show how contrasting chronotopes lead to different definitions of authentic linguistic practices and ethnic identities for Azerbaijanis in Iran. In particular, we show how Rashid brings along a rather nationalistic chronotope, which leads to his negative evaluation of Azerbaijanis in Iran, who he assesses as not complying with the more rigid standards he expects for Azeri ethnolinguistic identity. On the other hand, Behzad, Majid and Farhad's shared histories as Iranian Azerbaijani elites result in the construction of relatively more flexible chronotopic images of Azeri ethnolinguistic identity, allowing them to defend the situation of Azerbaijanis in Iran as a natural and realistic consequence of different sociopolitical and historical factors. Proponents of nationalistic ideology have claimed sole authority in defining ethnolinguistic identity for Azerbaijanis in Iran (Karimzad, in press) and are further empowered by the fact that these ideologies align with the aforementioned notion of the ideal monolingual speaker in the ethnically homogeneous nation-state. As a result, the chronotope brought along by Rashid is relatively more powerful than the chronotope brought along by Behzad, Majid and Farhad, leading to differences in their discourses and interactional patterns.

Prior to Excerpt 2, Rashid was questioning why the government does not allow education *in* and *of* the Azeri language, given the large number of Turks in Iran. He specifically claimed that this number was 35 million, which, as mentioned earlier, is a

number promoted by the nationalistic discourses and is hard to validate. Taking this number at face value, Behzad and Farhad draw Rashid's attention to the various complexities of the multilingual situation in Iran in an attempt to explain why education is not offered in Azeri. Given Rashid's critical evaluation of Iranian Azerbaijanis, Behzad, Farhad and Majid try to defend themselves by explaining the history of the sociopolitical situation in which they have lived. They defend the current situation by highlighting how it has improved compared to the past. Behzad specifically presents a 'chronotopic contrast' (Agha 2007: 322) pointing to a point of time in Iran in which, given their ethnolinguistic subordination, Azerbaijanis were reluctant to identify themselves as such so as to avoid being mocked: "Previously, people would be embarrassed, Azerbaijanis would be embarrassed to even speak their language. But now, they are not only not embarrassed, but they speak (their language) more strongly".

Farhad also notices that Rashid's criticisms are based in a nationalistic chronotope, and therefore assumes that he also imagines that there is conflict between Azeris and Persians. The following excerpt begins with their statement of this assumption. Note that the common words for *Azerbaijani people* and *Azerbaijani language* in their language are *Türk* and *Türki* ('Tork' and 'Torki' in Persian) respectively. As we will illustrate in the examples, the use of these very words has resulted in the construction of certain chronotopes about their language and identity; therefore, we have kept them unchanged throughout the English translations.

Excerpt 2:

1. **Farid:** Bidana da mæsælæ mænim zehnimæ gælir. Bidæn man ehsas eliræm siz fikr elisiz Iranda chox faslarinan türklarin arasinda düshmænchılıx var. Ojür dæyir va:qeæn. Yani mæsælæn, bülüsæn næjür diyim bilæyæn, mæn shæxsæn özüm heshvax oni ehsas elæmæmishæm. Demirama:, olup ha. Iranda bir dana mütæ:ssifa:næ bir sheyki var	1. **F:** There is one issue that comes to my mind. I feel like you think there is a lot of hostility between Türks and Persians in Iran. It is not really like that. So, for example, you know, how should I tell you, I've personally never felt like that. I'm not saying it has not happened. In Iran, there is one problem unfortunately, and that is they unfortunately

mütæ:ssifa:næ chox jok diællær Tühlærin ba:ræasindæ. Amma düshmænchılıx dæyiri. Bülmüræm næjür diæm ba:

(...)

2. **Rashid:** Hæ. Næ fikirlæshisæn? Deyisæn ki bir problem görmüræm, sænja niæ yoxdi?
3. **Majid:** Axi niæ gæræh ola?
4. **Farid:** niæ gæræh ola?
5. **Rashid:** niæ yoxdu?
6. **Majid:** Axi niæ gæræh ola?
7. **Rashid:** Farsınan türkün arasında o problem yoxdu. O olsa sizja problem, onda no:lar?
8. **Majid:** Axi bilmiyæm, væxti yoxdi man diæmmaram nolar=
9. **Rashid:** onda Iran daghılar! ((inaudible)) bilæxæræ ojür saxlır ki qoy bashın [qaldırmasın da.
10. **Majid:** [bidana bishey, bishey ki vardi, dær moredi inke faslar tühlæræ jok jürliyeylær. bir mæsælæsi, eeeehhh, mænim næzærimæ buki istiyælær vaqeæn mæsxæræ eliælær, dæyir=
11. **Rashid:** =næ?
12. **Majid:** mæsælæn istiælær mæsxæræ eliælær dæyir. Türküsi næmænæ olar onun?
13. **Rashid:** Sæn türksæn da?
14. **Majid:** Türkæm, amma xob (0.3), bax birsheylær vardi, birseri sheylær *natural* di, tæbi'i ittifaq tüshür. æz jümleye o (0.1) dilin qarıshmasi obirsi dillærinæn. Bizim dilimiz qarıshıp Farsınan, Farsi qarıshıp æræbinæn, bu mænim ælimdæ dö:r, bu sænin ælindæ dæyi. Sænin dilin shayæd qarısha rusunan. Rusun bæzi kælæmælærin shayæd istifa:dæ eliæsæn.
15. **Rashid:** Yo!
16. **Majid:** olmeyipdi? sæn shanslısan. Bizim ki bujur olupdi. Dillær eliæ büleylær *mix* oleylær. Sænin ælindæ dæyi, mænim ælimdæ dæyi. Mæn ushaxlıxdan ojür boyümüshæm, væ oni orgæshmishæm, mæsælæn (.)ælan hansi kælæmæni dedim siz bülmædiz?

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tell many jokes about Türks. But it is not hostility. I don't know how to explain.

(...)

2. **R:** Yeah, what do you think? You say you see no problem, why do you think so?
3. **M:** But, why should there be?
4. **F:** why should there be?
5. **R:** Why isn't there?
6. **M:** But why should there be?
7. **R:** There is no problem between Persians and Türks. If there is (a problem), what do you think would happen?
8. **M:** I don't know but when there isn't (such a thing), I can't say what would happen.
9. **R:** In that case, Iran would collapse! ((inaudible)) So, it (the system) keeps it like this so that people [don't raise their heads (become aware)
10. **M:** [one thing, there is one thing about why Persians make jokes about Türks. One issue uh, in my opinion, is that it is not that they really want to mock (Turks).
11. **R:** What? ((can't understand the word Majid uses for 'to mock'))
12. **M:** For example, it is not that they want to mock. What is it (the word for 'to mock') in Türki?
13. **R:** You are a Türk, right?
14. **M:** I'm a Türk, but well (0.3), look, there is something, some things are *natural*, they happen naturally. For instance (0.1) the mixing of languages. Our language has been mixed with Farsi, Farsi's been mixed with Arabic. This isn't in my hands, it is not in your hands. Your language might have been mixed with Russian. You might be using some Russian words.
15. **R:** No!
16. **M:** It has not happened (to your language)? You've been lucky then. Ours has turned out to be like this. Languages can be *mixed*. It is not in your hands, it's not in my hands. I have been raised like this, and have learned it like this, for example (.) Now, what word did I use that you didn't know?

17. **Farid:** Mæsxæræ [elæmax

18. **Majid:** [mæsxæræ elæmæh. Bizæ bu farsıdan gælipdi.mæ-<u>mænim</u> günahım dæyir, mæn gæræh oni jürliæm dæyir. Onu qoy qıragha.

19. **Rashid:** Ahan.

20. **Majid:** pæs indi mænki sænnæn danısha biliyæm, hær *level*dæ, bu özi yerindæ qha:bele ehteramdi. Næ mæn sæni mæsxæræ eliræm, næ sæn mæni. Farsi da ojürdi. Ellæti odi ki indi farslar jok jürleylær mænim dalimjan, türkün diliynæn, ellæti o dæyi ki istillær vaqeæn mæsxæræ eliælær (0.1) bir ellæti oduki, ehh, *exposure* deyirix da ingilisidæ, ki *exposed* olmamıshıx bizlær iranda türklær, faslar, xa:rij æz, ælæn amrika da gör nechæ melliætdær gæleylær? indiæjan görmüsæn biri obirsinin ingilisi danıshmaghın mæsxæræ eliæ? Yox! Chün hammının læhjæsi var benoee (0.1). *Exposed* oluplar, görüplær. Ænva:e melliyætdærdæn gæliplær, türk olupdi, eeh, hær yerdæn vardi. Odi ki æslæn bæhse zæban, olara dil, bir mæsælæ dæyir ki istiyælær… Amma irankimi keshværdæ, Fars olarımısh, væ ona göræ alay læhjæ görmeyiplær. Chün millæt görmeyip, færhæng görmeyip, qæbul eliæ bilmeyipdi.

21. **Rashid:** axı türk az dæyilki, biri var desæki azdi, axı gör bu næqædædi ((inaudible))

22. **Majid:** Indi sænin müshkülün vardi öz keshværindæ alay dillærinæn?

23. **Rashid:** Nejæ?

24. **Majid:** Ö-öz kishværindæ, azærbaijanda, obirsi alay dillærinæn müshkülüz ki yoxdi sizin? Harda sæn indi o müshküli görüsæn? Biryerdæ görüpsæn o müshküli? (0.2)sænæ-sænæ o torænmiyipki alay yerdæ sænæ mæsælæn biri diæ ki læhjön var? ya alay dildæ mæsælæn=

25. **Rashid:** =Yox, bizdæ ojür mæsælæ yoxdi. (…)

26. **Farid:** Bæhse læhjæsi var ha filan, Majid düz diyir, illæti buduki Iranda chox adam var, mæsælæn sæn færzæn 50 il bunnan qabax

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17. **F:** To [mock

18. **M:** [To mock. It has come to us from Farsi. It is not <u>my</u> fault. It is not that I should fix it. Put this aside.

19. **R:** Gotcha.

20. **M:** So, now that I can speak with you, in whatever *level*, it is respectable anyway. I don't mock you, nor do you. It is the same case with Farsi. The reason is that now they make jokes about me, about the Türks' language, the reason is not that they really want to mock (0.1) one reason is that, uhh, we call it *exposure* in English, that we've not been *exposed* in Iran, the Türks, the Persians, beyond our, now in America, see how many different nationalities have come? Have you seen an instance in which someone mocks the other's English? No! Because everyone has an accent to some extent (0.1). They have been *exposed*, they have seen. They come from different nationalities, they are Türks, uhh, they are from everywhere. So, for them, language is not an issue to want to (make fun of someone). But, in a country like Iran, they have been the Persians, and because of that they have not seen other accents, and cannot accept them.

21. **R:** But, the Türks are not few, if it's said that they are few, but see how many they are ((inaudible))

22. **M:** Now, do you have a problem in your country with other languages?

23. **R:** How so?

24. **M:** In your country, in Azerbaijan, you do not have any problems with other languages, do you? Where do you see this problem? Have you seen this problem somewhere? (0.2) This has not happened to you that in a different place, for instance, someone tells you that you have an accent? Or in another language=

25. **R:** =No, there isn't such a problem among us. (…)

26. **F:** The discussion of 'he has an accent' and stuff, Majid is right, the reason is that in Iran there are many people, suppose 50 years ago

| Tehran da hammi bir læhjeynæn danıshardi, yaxji? Tühlær ævvældæ gedændæ Tehrana, choxi ka:rgæridilær, mæsælæn gedirdilær æsha: ishlær görürdülær. Hammısınında türki læhjælæri varıdi. Türki læhjæ tehrannıların zehnindæ olmushdi, bu zat, musavi ba buki sænin savadın olmiæ, xob? æsha: adam olasan. Amma bu chox dæyishilipdi, ælan sæn get Tehrana, Tehranın yarısi tühdi Tehranin, yani Tehran, Istanbuldan sora, dünyada ikiminji shæhrdi ki chox türki danıshan jæmiæti var. | in Tehran, everyone spoke with a similar accent, right? When first the Türks went to Tehran, the majority of them were workers doing low-class jobs. All of them had Türki accents. In Tehranis' minds, the Türki accent had become this, equated with (the idea) that you are illiterate, right? Being a low-class person. But this has changed a lot. Now, go to Tehran, half of Tehran's population is the Türks. So, After Istanbul, Tehran has the second largest Türki-speaking population in the world. |

In line 1, Farhad attempts to refute the idea that there is hostility between Azerbaijanis and Persians because he anticipates Rashid's potential assumption of conflict between the two groups. He brings along the elitist chronotope to highlight the fact that he has not witnessed such a thing. However, he does point to the historical subordination of the Azerbaijanis as manifest through jokes, which he differentiates from hostility: *Iranda bir dana mütæ:ssifa:næ bir sheyki var mütæ:ssifa:næ chox jok diællær Tühlærin ba:ræasindæ. Amma düshmænchılıx dæyiri. Bülmüræm næjür diæm ba:* 'In Iran, there is one problem unfortunately, and that is they unfortunately tell many jokes about Türks. But it is not hostility. I don't know how to explain'. Rashid, however, brings about a different chronotope through which he articulates the conspiracy theoretic claim that such lack of hostility is maintained by the Iranian system in order to prevent itself from collapsing as a result of interethnic conflict: *onda Iran daghılar! bilæxæræ ojür saxlır ki qoy bashın qaldırmasın da.* 'In that case, Iran would collapse! So, it (the system) keeps it like this so that people don't raise their heads (become aware)'.

In line 10, Majid attempts to provide a reason why Persians tell jokes about Azeris, asserting that the purpose of these jokes is not to mock. In doing so, he uses the verb *masxara elamax* ('to mock') which is an established Persian borrowing in Iranian Azeri that is not shared with North Azerbaijani; hence, Rashid does not understand it. This leads to a series of

interactional exchanges from lines 11 to 19, digressing from the topic of jokes and engaging in metapragmatic commentary about how languages work. In order to justify his use of a borrowed word, Majid claims that language mixing is natural: "Look, there is something, some things are *natural*, they happen naturally. For instance, the mixing of languages. Our language has been mixed with Farsi, Farsi's been mixed with Arabic. This isn't in my hands, it is not in your hands. Your language might have been mixed with Russian. You might be using some Russian words". Having explained how the contact between Azeri and Farsi or Farsi and Arabic has resulted in language mixing, Majid attempts to elicit positive alignment from Rashid towards the end of his turn, expecting that Rashid would accept that North Azerbaijani has been influenced by Russian, given its historical contact with the Russian language. However, Rashid straightforwardly disaligns with him in line 15.

Majid finally manages to return to his point about why Persians make jokes about Turks in line 20. Connecting this phenomenon to Persians' lack of 'exposure' to other accents in Iran, he illustrates that since in a country like the U.S. people are exposed more to other nationalities, Americans do not make fun of other accents. However, in Iran, "they have not seen other accents, and cannot accept them" (line 20). It is evident that in his example of the situation in the U.S., Majid is drawing on his own elitist experience of interacting mostly with his fellows in academia, and thus ignores the fact that ethnolinguistic subordination occurs in other contexts in the U.S. In order to make his point about the generality of such practices, Majid once again attempts to elicit alignment from Rashid in lines 22 and 24, assuming that such subordination also exists in the context of the Republic of Azerbaijan: "In your country, in Azerbaijan, you do not have any problems with other languages, do you? Where do you see this problem? Have you seen this problem somewhere? This has not happened to you that in a different place, for instance, someone tells you that you have an accent?". Rashid yet again refuses to align with Majid's point: "No, there isn't such a problem among us". In line

26, Farhad aligns positively with Majid's point about why Persians mock Azeri-accented Farsi. In doing so, he constructs a chronotopic image of certain Azerbaijani social types that Persians were exposed to in Tehran fifty years ago, maintaining that since the first Azerbaijani immigrants to Tehran came from working class families, they started associating the Türki accent with low class people and hence made jokes about them. Towards the end of his turn in 26, he returns to his previous point, contrasting the past situation of Turks in Iran from that of the present, emphasizing that things have gotten better.

This excerpt illustrates how Rashid, Farhad, and Majid employ contrasting chronotopes when they are positioning themselves with respect to language and identity. Rashid's refusal to acknowledge the influence of Russian on North Azerbaijani or the existence of socially dominant groups that might linguistically subordinate other groups in the Republic of Azerbaijan reveals the nationalistic chronotope he has brought along, which pertains to a unified nation in which the language has not been influenced by other languages, and it has not been used as a way of subordinating certain social groups. Also, his claim that mocking accents "is not a problem among *us*" is in line with his overarching position throughout the conversation in which he differentiates *us* from *you*, i.e. *you* have let the system manipulate *you* and the Persians mock *you,* and *you* have let *your* language be influenced, while *we* do not have these problems. On the other hand, Farhad and Majid are engaging with different chronotopes in their language-ideological orientations. While denying the existence of hostility between Persians and Azerbaijanis, they attempt to provide broader social explanations for the current situation of Azerbaijanis in Iran, motivated by the chunks of history they have brought along. The chronotopes they invoke regarding Persians come from their experiences as students attending prestigious universities both in Tehran, Iran, and in the U.S. These experiences are different from the experiences of the working class families living in Tehran to whom Farhad was referring, which is indicative of their

rather elitist perspective. In addition, what Majid discusses in terms of how languages work is in part a *re-entextualization* of his previous interactions with the first author over a period of four years, a recalibrated chronotope taken away from previous encounters and brought about in the current interaction.

Farhad and Majid attempt to present a more complex image of the situation in their metapragmatic comments compared to Rashid's rather nationalistically biased perspective. However, it is evident that their discourses are organized through the interaction of various small-scale and large-scale chronotopes, some of which are in fact shared with Rashid. As mentioned above, those chronotopes which are more powerful are also more accessible, and it is an understanding and employment of these powerful and accessible chronotopes that is shared across the three speakers. In this case, there are two powerful chronotopes at play. The first relates to the aforementioned link between ethnonational identification and the ideal monolingual speaker. Although Majid attempts to justify the naturalness of language mixing, he still defers to this more powerful chronotope in the following instances. First, when Majid realizes that Rashid did not understand the word he used for 'to mock', he asks the others to help find a better word in line 11. The way he frames his question, "what is it (the word for 'to mock') in Türki?", illustrates that Majid assumes that there should be a *Türki* word that he does not know, reinforcing the idea of the existence of a pure Turkic language. This leads to Rashid questioning his '*Türkness'* in line 13 (*Sæn türksæn da?* 'You are a Türk, right?'), again reinforcing the notion that ethnic Turks should speak pure Türki. Similarly, when Rashid claims that there is no mixing between Azeri and Russian in the Republic of Azerbaijan, Majid responds by attributing this lack of mixing to 'luck'. The invocation of luck here, positively evaluates non-mixing and further points to the power associated with the chronotope of ideal monolingual speakers.

The second powerful chronotope at play in the conversation relates to notions of a single Turkic people and Turkic language, and to the idea that Azeri is a variety of this larger Turkic language. The fact that Iranian Azerbaijanis usually refer to Turkish and North Azerbaijani languages as *Istanbuli* and *Bakı Türkusi* – the *Türki* of Istanbul and Baku -- reinforces this chronotope. We see this in our data towards the end of line 26 where in his attempt to present the improved situation of Iranian Azerbaijanis in Tehran, Farhad refers to Istanbul and Tehran as the two cities with the largest Türki-speaking population, ignoring the striking differences between the Azeri and Turkish. Previous to the excerpt above, he also attributed the improved situation of Azeri in Iran to the Turkish TV programs that had become popular among Iranian Azerbaijanis: "Of course, it is partially because of satellite TV. When there is satellite TV, we'd watch *Türki* (Turkish) programs. Kids now learn *Türki* before Farsi, because parents watch Turkish channels from morning till night, so because of that, for instance, uh, kids grow up there and you see, for example, they speak Istanbul *Türki* fluently. They learn Farsi as well. So, satellite TV somehow has a positive effect on the culture of the Iranian Turks". Although he is partially right about how this new trend has resulted in what Bani-Shoraka (2003) calls the *revitalization* of Azerbaijani language and identity, children's exposure to Turkish TV programs has alternatively been argued to be a new threat to the Azeri language. Mirvahedi (2012), in particular, regards children's tendency to watch Turkish programs and learn the Turkish language as a new challenge, making it difficult to maintain Iranian Azerbaijani. Karimzad (in press) also argues that Iranian Azerbaijanis' exposure to these satellite TV programs has resulted in *self-subordination* among some people, i.e. "the idea that the variety of Turkic language *they* are speaking is 'stronger', 'purer' and more 'authentic' than *ours*—since ours has been influenced by Persian – lead[ing] to devaluing their own language and linguistic practices and elevating the value of Turkish (or North Azerbaijani) as *the* norm".

Returning to the idea that more powerful chronotopes are more accessible and require less explanation, we see that both claims regarding pure and unmixed language and the idea of a single Türki language are relatively unmarked, unquestioned and shared across the participants. We see this, for instance, in the fact that the Iranian Azerbaijanis go to great lengths in the excerpt to explain what has caused the mixing of Azeri and Persian and the subordination of Azeri relative to Persian. In contrast, Rashid only answers "No" without explanation when asked if there is mixing between Azeri and Russian, and responds simply "No, there isn't such a problem among us" in response to the question about the subordination of certain social groups in the Republic of Azerbaijan. His relatively short answers point to the fact that monolingualism and images of a homogeneous nation (however imaginary) do not require the same explanation and justification that language mixing and social inequality between ethnic groups require. This in turn is indicative of the relative power of the chronotopes of monolingualism and the nation-state.

4. CONCLUSION

In this article, we have illustrated that acts of ethnolinguistic identification are chronotopically organized. That is, it is the dialogical nature of various (and sometimes conflicting) large-scale and small-scale chronotopes that informs participants' understandings of ethnolinguistic identity and guides their discursive processes of (de)authenticating certain identities. We have shown that the spatiotemporal configurations in which interactions take place make certain chronotopes more salient, and that these more salient chronotopes, or particular 'chunks of history' (Blommaert 2015), are invoked by participants, organizing their discourses. In the case of the Uzbek data, we see that an *explicit* knowledge of the second author's research interests and the ongoing discussion on the topic of language and ethnonational identity make the soviet and post-independence chronotopes salient to the mother and daughter respectively. With the Azerbaijanis, it was their *implicit* shared

knowledge of the fact that dinner parties at this professor's house are typically for Azerbaijani migrants to gather together that informed which chronotopes they invoked. These multiple brought along chronotopes interact with one another, some of them overlapping and others conflicting, all of which results in these chronotopes being realized, or brought about, within the interaction. For instance, the Uzbek mother's brought about justification for identifying Farida as Tajik is informed by her brought along soviet chronotope; and the daughter's brought along post-independence chronotope results in her identification of Farida as Uzbek, leading to the observed patterns of disalignment between the mother and daughter.

The chronotopes we have observed within these conversations not only differ in terms of the time and place they refer to, whether they are macroscopic or microscopic, or whether they are brought along or brought about, but they also differ in terms of their power. For instance, in the Uzbek example, we see how even though the soviet chronotope is important to the mother's justification of her identification practices, she ends the conversation by negatively evaluating this same chronotope when she views it through the lens of the more ideologically powerful post-independence chronotope. In the Azeri example, we see that Majid draws on different chronotopes than Rashid regarding language mixing and the relationship between language and ethnicity. More specifically, Majid sees language mixing as permissible, considering it a natural outcome of language contact; however, given the authority and normativity of certain ideologies related to linguistic purism and the monolingualism of the nation-state, he aligns with Rashid's negative attitude towards language mixing when he says that the Azeris in Azerbaijan are "lucky" that their language has not been mixed with Russian. As noted in the analysis above, the power differential between chronotopes results in specific linguistic patterns. Most notably, because less powerful chronotopes are less accessible, they require more explanation, but because they are less dominant, they are also articulated with less epistemological certainty.

The relatively more powerful standing of the chronotopes related to the nation-state and the 'ideal monolingual speaker' has implications for understanding and analyzing sociolinguistic subjects' relationship to language and identity. Beyond what we have shown here, we can also see the dominance of chronotopes linking the nation-state and the ideal speaker in a recent study conducted by the Pew Research Center. Surveying people across 14, mostly European, countries, their results show that language is seen as 'the cornerstone of national identity'.[3] Although these findings may not be surprising, their implications are far-reaching in terms of sociolinguistic theory. The ideological force behind these chronotopes related to language and ethnonational identity point to the perceived 'realness' of these categories for our participants, and for sociolinguistic actors more broadly. Given that it is our job to describe both sociolinguistic processes and the ideologies which inform these processes, doing away with the notions of language and identity will unnecessarily limit our vision of the sociolinguistic field and also restrict our understanding of the sociolinguistic behaviors of those we study. Therefore, while the use of terms such as *identification* (Hall 1996), *languaging* (Jørgensen 2008), *translanguaging* (Li 2011), and *polylanguaging* (Jørgensen et al 2011) may prove useful for the analyst in moving away from essentialist notions of 'language' and 'identity', they should not replace them, if we want to avoid obscuring the subjective realities experienced by the social actors we strive to understand.

Notes:

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[1] Note that while the mother did make some earlier switches to Russian, these were mostly conjunctions and interjections – unmarked switches for Uzbek-Russian bilinguals.

[2] The participants note that they consider a Tajik minority specifically because of the ways she looks and the city she comes from.

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[3] Source: http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/02/01/language-the-cornerstone-of-national-identity/ (Last accessed February 3, 2017).

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APPENDIX: Transcription conventions

<u>Underline</u>	emphatic stress
(. . .)	intervening material has been omitted
(.)	brief pause
(hahaha)	laughter
(())	transcriber comment
()	English translation within brackets is added by the author for clarification
[	speaker overlap
=	contiguous utterances
,	utterance signaling more to come
.	utterance final intonation
:	lengthening of preceding sound
CAPS	increased volume
↑	rising intonation
↓	falling intonation
italics	switch to English
bold	switch to Russian
EMP	emphatic particle (morphology)